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We study the role of the so-called ’shadow banking’ sector in innovating
aggregate money supply and providing safe assets to meet demand from as-
setholders with a need for low-risk, high-liquidity monetary services. We
consider the measurement and literature around shadow banking to date,
econometrics of modelling money demand, and latent factor approaches. In
doing so we contribute to a literature around shadow banking founded on
the papers of Pozsar, Adrian, Shin, Gorton, Metrick, and their various co-
authors. We set the shadow banking sector within the financial frictions
paradigm espoused by Bernanke and co-authors, and our empirical approach
builds on the work of Johansen & Juselius (1990), as extended by Stock &
Watson (2002). The focus on demand for money in the UK follows the
work of Drake & Chrystal (1994). The quarterly-frequency dataset collected
follows the work of Errico et al (2014), and covers 38 variables from Q1
1984 to Q2 2016 (130 quarters). The empirical methodology extends the
Factor-Augmented VECM approach of Banerjee & Marcellino (2009), and
introduces a novel technique of time-cluster analysis in Principal Component
space. A novel identification strategy is also applied, extending the work of
Johansen & Juselius (1990). Assessing hypotheses due to Pozsar (2013)
and to Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), we find evidence that
shadow-bank-created ’money’ is treated as a safe-asset substitute both for
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“Money markets are frequently a backwater, except when they are not, in
which case they are cascading rapids. . . [in August 2008] global money mar-
kets became not just cascading rapids, but roaring waterfalls. The financial
world will never be the same after the US Treasury and Federal Reserve’s
fateful decision on the weekend of September 13-14 to stand aside, as Lehman
Brothers plummeted to death on the rocks below”
Paul McCulley, 2009
1.1 Outline of Thesis
National economies have endured financial crises before. The South Sea
Bubble of 1720 prompted the Bank of England to become one of the world’s
first Central Banks. The free banking era in the United States (1837-1862)
led to the failure of around 50% of the state-chartered banks active during
this period, and engendered the creation of the Federal Reserve System –
arguably the most prominent Central Bank in the world today. However,
the ‘Great Recession’ of 2008, preceded (and perhaps in no small part caused
by) a bank lending pullback known at the time as the ‘Credit Crunch’, was
notable for its global reach and profound and long-lasting consequences in
the form of low growth, wage stagnation, historically low interest rates and
damaging fiscal austerity in the United Kingdom.
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The credit crunch was in turn preceded and likely precipitated by a valu-
ation crisis in the US ‘subprime’ mortgage market – high-risk, high-yielding
loans to low-income borrowers with poor credit ratings. These loans were
frequently ‘securitized’ – the firm advancing the money to the ultimate bor-
rower was in turn advanced that money by a firm with cash on hand that
could not or would not merely be left in a conventional bank deposit account.
In exchange, the finance firm in contact with the client sold the right to the
borrower’s stream of repayments to the upstream firm, appropriately dis-
counted and promising an interest rate indicative of the risk associated with
the transaction – yet often, for reasons that will be explored in due course,
with a rating-agency assessment that the product was far less risky than
its ultimate borrower’s credit characteristics might suggest. This essential
process was iterated into the many acronyms familiar to a news-watcher of
September 2008 – CDOs, CMOs, CDOs-squared, Synthetic CMOs. These
financial securities, and many others, along with the chains of financial mar-
ket participants that they connect, constitute what Paul McCulley termed
the ‘Shadow Banking System’(SBS) – a capital-markets based analogue of
the deposit-taking and loan-making activity of the traditional bank as pop-
ularly envisaged.
10 years have passed since the subprime crisis, and the shadow banking
system is an active area of economic research – though substantial research
questions of interest exist, particularly with respect to the shadow bank-
ing system outside the US. There remain differing estimates of the scale of
shadow banking activity – including anywhere from 50% to 150% the size
of the regulated banking sector [Pozsar et al., 2010]. The simple question
of economic good or bad remains to be further studied. Does the shadow
banking system extend credit to those ‘underbanked’ whom the regulated
sector is unwilling or unable to serve? [Purnanandam, 2010]. Access to
credit is generally held to be conducive to economic growth. Does the SBS
compete with the TBS (Traditional Banking Sector) in loan markets, aid-
ing credit price discovery and market efficiency? On the other side of the
balance sheet, does the shadow banking sector have a beneficial role in pro-
ducing safe assets to meet otherwise unmet demand? What is the role of
the SBS in responding to central bank monetary policy? What is its role in
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money creation- should its deposits be considered money or near-money, or
are they better modelled as equity-like liabilities? The latter suggests a role
for an analysis of the SBS in assessing the narrow-banking proposals of, for
example, [Cochrane, 2014] and the ‘Chicago Plan Revisited’ of [Beneš and
Kumhof, 2012] - all-equity funded lending having some similarities with the
process of securitisation. Does the mark-to-market nature of credit extended
by the SBS help investors accurately gauge credit risk, or does the securi-
tisation process obscure information to broaden the extension of credit by
mitigating information asymmetries that could lead to market failure [Dang
et al., 2017] - and is to do so welfare optimal?
Various authors have considered shadow banking from the perspective
of safe asset demand or as a response to financial frictions. Pozsar and
co-authors have produced a series of highly detailed descriptive papers con-
cerning the ‘plumbing’ of the US shadow bankings system [Pozsar et al.,
2010, Pozsar, 2013, Pozsar, 2014]. Gorton & Metrick concern themselves
with the functioning of repo markets in meeting demand for safe assets
[Gorton and Metrick, 2009, Gorton et al., 2012, Gorton and Metrick, 2012].
Krisnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen offer a quantitative approach to assess-
ing the substitutability between government debt and other safe financial
assets for both the US [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012] and
European case [Krishnamurthy et al., 2017]. Duca [Duca et al., 2014] con-
siders drivers of activity in US shadow banking more broadly. However, no
author of which we are aware has advanced the study of UK shadow bank-
ing beyond attempting to decribe and measure - the present study seeks to
assess the UK shadow banking sector in the context of the well-established
economic literature on money demand.
This literature divides demand for money into transactional, speculative,
and precautionary motives [Fisher, 1911, Keynes, 1930, Hicks, 1989]. Each
of these motives may be hypothesised as having a different demand func-
tion, and a different relationship with the opportunity cost of holding money.
Shadow-bank-issued safe assets are best considered as meeting (changes in)
the speculative demand for money - Keynes’s liquidity preference, though
the work of Gorton et al [Gorton et al., 2012] in highlighting the consis-
tency of the safe-asset share in the US economy suggests an important role
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for the transactional and precautionary motives also. The broader litera-
ture on money demand typically concerns demand for real money balances,
and emphasises the speculative motive which relates demand for real money
balances to their opportunity cost - that is the interest rate available by
exchanging that money for other financial assets. The precautionary and
transactional motives may be hypothesised as being less price-elastic in na-
ture, and so it is the speculative (i.e. the risk-vs-reward) motive which is
being studied when relating demand for money to non-money interest rates
available. Sriram however [Sriram, 1999] notes that the different theories
giving rise to demand for money nevertheless have variables in common,
and as such a consensus in the literature is that empirical work on money
demand is not atheoretic, but is rather motivated by a blend of theories. Var-
ious authors including Drake & Chrystal, Hendry & Ericsson, and Nielsen
[Drake and Chrystal, 1994, Hendry and Ericsson, 1991, Nielsen et al., 2004]
have considered the case of money demand in the United Kingdom – but to
the best of our knowledge, none have set the shadow banking sector within
this framework.
This study proposes to define and describe the shadow banking sector
within the UK, and set the sector’s activity in the context of speculative
demand for real money balances. To do so, a large dataset was constructed
from time-series financial and real-economy variables as reported by the
Bank of England, the Office for National Statistics, and the International
Monetary Fund. The dataset comprises (up to) 898 variables at the Monthly
or Quarterly frequency, back as far as 1969:Q1 in some cases, though this
is not typical. The dataset has a great many missing observations, but is
acceptably dense after 1987:Q1. In aggregate, we have access to 59,299 quar-
terly variable:timeperiod datapoint pairs, and 95,131 monthly datapoints.
The research questions of interest are:
• What is the extent of shadow banking sector activity in the UK?
• Does shadow banking sector activity in the UK play a role in the
provision of safe monetary assets?
• Are these pseudo-monetary assets treated as a substitute for govern-
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ment debt or deposits in regulated banks?
These are developed into specific hypotheses in chapter 3. To address
these broad questions, we subsequently follow the work of Errico et al [Errico
et al., 2014], who map and assess the extent of shadow banking activity in
the US using the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds dataset to reconstruct
the balance sheets of financial sector participants from central government
to households – we attempt to approximate their analysis using UK data
from the ONS United Kingdom Economic Accounts aggregate balance sheet
dataset, also in chapter 3. Thereafter, we retrieve time-series of the rele-
vant variables from this analysis, and combine them with other financial
sector and real-economy variables. Following the work of Stock & Wat-
son [Stock and Watson, 1999, Stock and Watson, 2002, Stock and Wat-
son, 2005], Jurado et al [Jurado et al., 2015] and Bernanke et al [Bernanke
et al., 2005] concerning Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressions (FAVAR)
and the dimensionality-reduction strategy Principal Components Analysis
(PCA), we seek to aggregate the various and disparate measures of (and
proxies for) shadow banking activity into a single synthetic time-series vari-
able incorporating as much information as can feasibly be extracted from
the dataset. Combining this synthetic variable with other time-series from
the large dataset, we construct a suite of vector error-correction models to
assess the extent to which shadow banking activity affects, and is affected
by, macroeconomic conditions in the United Kingdom.
Though we find some support for our hypotheses and some functional
forms with desirable econometric properties, the evidence is far from con-
clusive. We extend the study further into exploratory factor space, and in-
troduce a time-clustering approach to analyzing time-varying relationships
– which is believed to be novel in this field.
Addressing these questions is as vital as ever, though now in 2019 the
scarcity of government-guaranteed paper that prompted initial innovation
in composition of the money supply has reversed. With government debt
plentiful but yields close to or below 0% across much of Europe and the de-
veloped world, central banks stand as the major buyers of sovereign paper,
while private-sector money managers ‘reach for yield’ and corporate cash
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pools build up (and continue to demand safety) as firms hold back from
investing in risky products despite abundant cheap capital. An understand-
ing of how this demand for safety interacts with policy interest rates and
the conduct of monetary policy will be vital for central bankers seeking to
fight the next downturn with limited room for cutting rates before having
to have recourse to extraordinary policy. Our work suggests that it is very
likely that private-sector demand for above-all safe warehousing for capital
is highly inelastic, and even extraordinary monetary policy has little ability
to ‘force’ investors to take risk and stimulate the real economy. Explicit
nominal GDP targeting and extraordinary fiscal policy such as ‘helicopter
drops’ of money directly to consumers have been suggested as initiatives to
counteract what is once more being called ‘secular stagnation’ [Summers,
2014]. If we indeed now inhabit a world where non-risk-taking capital can-
not earn a positive nominal return, distinguishing demand for safety from
demand for yield will be vital in assessing potential for future economic
growth.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the key
theoretical literature in financial economics and economics of banking, Chap-
ter 2 assesses the state of shadow banking sector research. Chapter 3 draws
on the preceding chapters to develop hypotheses for statistical study, and
describes the Errico et al [Errico et al., 2014] balance sheet analytical proce-
dure, introducing our results from applying this process to UK data. Chap-
ter 4 replicates some established functional forms from the money demand
literature, and applies these to single-variable measures of shadow banking
activity. Chapter 5 introduces and enacts the method of principal compo-
nents for latent factor analysis, and continues this work into exploratory
factor and time-clustering approaches. Finally, Chapter 6 reflects on the
research outcomes, limitations, and avenues for future work.
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1.2 Perspectives on Money and Banking
1.2.1 Money
Economics in the popular imagination is the study of money, and in that
same psyche banks are inseparable from the money they notionally house. A
slightly more sophisticated view is memorably outlined by James Stewart’s
George Bailey in Frank Capra’s 1946 film It’s a Wonderful Life;
“You’re thinking of this place all wrong, as if I had the money back in
a safe – the money’s not here, your money’s in Joe’s house, right next to
yours! And in the Kennedy house, and Mrs Macklin’s house and a hundred
others.”
Though a passable description of financial intermediation, this explana-
tion too is incomplete, not least in so far as Bailey Brothers’ Building and
Loan was a Regulation Q thrift, a mutually-held financial intermediary (FI)
much closer to the shadow banking entities that are the subject of this work
than to a high-street commercial bank. Banks provide credit, and in doing
so create money (McLeay et al, 2014) – bank deposits represent the great
majority of money in a modern economy, 97% of broad money in circulation
as of November 2013. In so doing they both provide credit to positive-net-
present-value projects that may not otherwise have taken place, and supply
a product – bank deposits – that meets a demand. For much of the 20th
Century however, conventional theoretical microeconomics abstracted away
from the counting of coins and current account balances, focusing instead on
the allocation of real resources in the form of numeraire generic consumption
goods. That is not to say that money is entirely absent from a mainstream
economic view of the world – merely that the role of money is as a facili-
tator of exchange and of quantifying resource wealth, leading ultimately to
the same allocation as would have obtained with some other entity fulfilling
these roles.
Jevons [Jevons, 1885] highlighted these two functions of money – a
7
medium of exchange and a unit of account – in addition to two others,
holding also that money functions as a standard of value, and as a store of
value. The role of money as a standard of value is similar to its function as
a measure, though relies more on universal acceptability for the settlement
of debts. Indeed, no 19th Century economist long discusses money before
mentioning debt, though standard practice at the time was to cast money
not as a means of settling debts, but as a means of enabling transactions
otherwise thought to have relied upon barter. In this paradigm money is
seen as a means to avoid the need for a ‘double coincidence of wants’ – the
happenstance that, having some surplus with which to barter, an economic
agent encounters a trading partner who has what she needs and needs what
she has. The notion of money as a successor to a barter economy occurs in
introductory textbooks such as Sloman & Wride [Sloman and Wride, 2009],
and has a precedent stretching to the foundational text of the field of polit-
ical economy, Smith’s On the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
[Smith, 1776].
However, Graeber [Graeber, 2012] notes that these are pure thought ex-
periments, and very seldom is any evidence for a barter period preceding a
monetary economy present in the historical, anthropological or archaeolog-
ical record. Rather, barter is most readily documented between economic
actors used to transacting with money but for some reason deprived of it
– perhaps during a financial crisis, or in the canonical example, the use of
cigarettes as currency in prisons or PoW camps. In this latter example it
will be readily seen that it is the fulfilment of the four functions of money
that adds value, rather than any characteristic of money itself- the functions
then precede the entity, and there is no reason why all four needs must be
met by a single entity. In fact the differing functions imply differing ideal
characteristics of the entities that perform those functions – a store of value
or medium of exchange might be light, portable and non-perishable, easy
to store and retrieve, while a unit of account need have no physical form
at all. Indeed in our modern economy bank deposits function as a store of
value and as a medium of exchange, employ the pound sterling or the dollar
as a unit of account, but take on physical form only when exchanged for
banknotes or coins.
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Prior to the establishment of banks or even the development of precious
metal specie, Graeber [Graeber, 2012] argues that it was credit and debt -
not barter - that gave rise to the need for the four functions of money to
be met. A sufficiently small community might solve the double coincidence
of wants problem by allowing the two transfers that constitute a barter
exchange to take place at different times – creating an IOU stored in a kind
of communal memory. Smith saw in human nature “a certain propensity
. . . to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” [Smith, 1776] but
even more fundamental might be the human affinity for reciprocity [Bendor,
1987] – to do for one another favours, and keep a mental ledger of favours
owing and owed. From this attribute, as societies grew larger and more
complex, arose the need to record these arrangements in a consistent unit
of account, with an agreed standard of value, to be settled in an acceptable
medium of exchange [Graeber, 2012], and thus the need for money.
Throughout history money has variously been created by private enter-
prises and by state governments, often based on precious metals. Since the
dissolution in 1971 of the Bretton Woods system, state-created fiat money
has been considered typical in developed economies. States require taxes
to be settled in their fiat currency, ensuring its use as a unit of account
and widespread acceptability as a medium of exchange. Further, fiat cur-
rency states are not constrained by a fixed supply of precious metal in the
amount of currency they can issue – freeing central banks to target other
economic outcomes of importance, such as price level control. In practice,
such economies rarely wish or attempt to control the quantity of money sup-
plied, preferring to adjust the price of money in the form of interest rates.
State money constitutes an asset of the holders without necessarily being a
liability of the state – though one might think of the asset side of the state’s
balance sheet as being future tax revenues, or just a kind of national net
wealth.
The question of whether such money constitutes net wealth or is offset
by future tax liabilities begins with Ricardo [Ricardo, 1820] and depends on
model assumptions about wealth transfer between generations [Weil, 1991]
as well as the specific tax structures in question. In the recent paradigms
of Modern Monetary Theory and Post-Keynesianism, as well as the work
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of Keynes himself, government spending is the prior act – the state spends
money into existence. In doing so, the government issues debt, which in
Ricardian equivalence implies a future tax to repay – even if such tax is in-
definitely far in the future – and the corresponding need for economic actors
to save in order to pay this tax prevents any aggregate demand impact.
In Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), the state is not constrained by the
need to fund borrowing with future tax revenues – the central bank stands
ready as a willing purchaser of government debt and can create reserves to do
so. MMT focuses upon central bank reserves as the ultimate form of money,
and reserve control as the key aspect of central banking – in this paradigm
it would be undesirable for government to be debt-free, as government debt
issuance allows injection of reserves into the commercial banking system
[Caverzasi and Godin, 2014].
In the shadow banking system government bonds in fact perform many
of the functions of base money for nonbank financial intermediaries who can-
not access central bank reserves directly – they constitute a store of value
and a medium of exchange in sale-and-repurchase (repo) secured lending
transactions. The reuse by rehypothecation of the fixed quantity of govern-
ment debt allows the shadow banking system to meet some of the demand
for safe assets in the economy [Gorton and Metrick, 2012, Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012].
1.2.2 How banks create money
McLeay, Radia and Thomas [McLeay et al., 2014] artfully set out the mone-
tary role of commercial banks in the first publicly available Bank of England
research paper embraces the view that commercial banks create money when
they lend – and so depart from the view that commercial bank lending is
constrained by a central bank reserves multiplier. While a level of reserves
was legally required in the UK before 1981 and was voluntarily set until
2009 – and remains a requirement in the US – this constraint does not bind,
provided central bank reserves are readily available to commercial banks
demanding them. The constraint on bank lending is rather profitability of
lending projects, and so commercial banks may be expected to lend without
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limit to borrowers for whom the expected rate of return is believed to jus-
tify the risk. In making a decision to lend, the commercial bank unilaterally
expands its balance sheet, matching its new loan asset with a correspond-
ing deposit liability in the borrower’s account with the bank – a deposit
which of course is expected to be withdrawn or otherwise spent, deposited
in the bank of the seller of whatever is purchased with the loan, and settled
between the commercial banks by transfer of central bank reserves.
Correspondingly, commercial bank created money is destroyed when
loans are repaid, and the whole process is conditional on easy access to func-
tionally unlimited central bank reserves by the commercial banks – clearly
this violates the Modern Monetary Theory predicate that reserve control
determines the money supply. Instead the central bank seeks to influence
commercial bank lending decisions by setting the interest rate price of re-
serves – for a given universe of investable projects, the lower the interest
rate the larger the number of these projects have a positive expected rate
of return and so will be approved for loans, expanding the money supply.
1.2.3 Microeconomics of banking
Banks however are not mere benevolent providers of the transaction medium.
As with any profit-maximising firm in the economy, they produce products
that are demanded, and consumers pay for those products. One of these is
access to credit itself, and it is in this form that a financial sector enters the
otherwise money-free general equilibrium paradigm of microeconomics at-
tributed to Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie [Arrow and Debreu, 1954, McKen-
zie, 1959]. Specifically, access to credit allows agents to smooth consumption
– to have a time path of consumption that is not constrained by a potentially
uncertain time path of income. Given the risk aversion implied by prefer-
ence convexity / diminishing marginal utility, the typical economic agent
has that expected utility of a given wealth outcome is higher than utility
of the same wealth in expectation but over disparate outcomes: access to
financial contracts can help risk-averse consumers smooth consumption by
forgoing consumption in good states (by saving or buying insurance con-
tracts) in exchange for a guaranteed minimum level of consumption in bad
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Figure 1.1: Money creation by the aggreate banking sector making addi-
tional loans
[McLeay et al., 2014]. The following notes provide further explanation and definition of
the various terms used in this figure:
1. Balance sheets are highly stylised for ease of exposition: the quantities of each type of money shown do not
correspond to the quantities actually held on each sectors balance sheet.
2. Central bank balance sheet only shows base money liabilities and the corresponding assets. In practice the
central bank holds other non-money liabilities. Its non-monetary assets are mostly made up of government debt.
Although that government debt is actually held by Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility, so does not appear
directly on the balance sheet.
3. Commercial banks’ balance sheets only show money assets and liabilities before any loans are made.
4. Consumers represent the private sector of households and companies. Balance sheet only shows broad money
assets and corresponding liabilities – real assets such as the house being transacted are not shown. Consumers’
non-money liabilities include existing secured & unsecured loans.
12
Figure 1.2: The Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie economy with redundant financial
intermediaries
[Freixas and Rochet, 2008]
states.
In Arrow-Debreu however there is no requirement that financial interme-
diation be enacted by banks specifically- the following demonstration (figure
1.2) of this finding is reproduced from Freixas & Rochet’s canonical 1997
treatise on the microeconomics of Financial Intermediaries (FIs) [Freixas
and Rochet, 2008]:
We explain the model in more detail in order to motivate the financial
frictions paradigm upon which much of the theoretical literature concerning
shadow banking is based. As will be seen, absent such frictions not only is
there no theoretical need for a shadow banking sector, there is little justifi-
cation for the existence of any financial intermediary – including regulated
banks. As figure 1.2 indicates, that this is a 3-sector, 2-period (t = 1, 2)
model which omits the government and public sector for simplicity. The
households (denoted subscript h) are endowed with 1 unit of the numeraire
good, some to be consumed at t = 1, some to be invested by the firms
(denoted subscript f ) at t = 1 to produce consumption at t = 2. The rest
of the model is presented in terms of a representative consumer, firm, and
bank (subscript b), with holdings of investment, bonds, loans, deposits and
savings denoted I, B, L, D and S respectively- thus for example Bh de-
notes the bonds held by households. Numerical subscripts denote time in
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the 2-period framework, thus for example (C1, C2) represents the division
of consumption by households between period 1 and period 2.
The consumer
The consumer selects consumption profile (C1, C2) and the allocation of
savings S between bank deposits Dh and bonds Bh to maximise her utility
function given her budget constraints:
maxu(C1, C2) (1.1)
C1 +Dh +Bh = ω1 (1.2)
pC1 = Πf +Πb + (1 + r)Bh + (1 + rD)Dh (1.3)
where ω1 represents initial endowment, p denotes the price of C2 (second-
period consumption), Πf and Πr are profits of the firm and bank respec-
tively, and r and rD denote the interest rate paid on bonds and bank deposits
respectively. It will be noticed that in this model, bonds and bank deposits
are perfect substitutes for the consumer, and so an interior solution will be
found iff r = rD.
The firm
The firm faces similar tradeoffs to the consumer, and seeks to maximise
profit choosing an investment level I, and the funding mix between banks
and capital markets given that the firm has no initial endowment:
maxΠf (1.4)
Πf = pf(I)− (1 + r)Bf − (1 + rL)Lf (1.5)
I = Bf + Lf (1.6)
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where f denotes the production function of the firm, and rL the interest
rate paid by the firm on its bank loans. Lf represents the aggregate quantity
of loans extended to firms, and Bf the quantity of bond borrowing, and so
equation 1.6 shows that the firm can only produce to the extent that it can
borrow to invest, and sells its goods to the consumer at the price of second-
period consumption p. Once more a corner solution will be adopted with
either bank loans or capital market funding preferred unless r = rL.
The bank
The final step then is to complete the model with the bank’s loan supply
and deposit demand, chosen to maximise profit:
maxΠb (1.7)
Πb = rLLb − rBb − rDDb (1.8)
Lb = Db +Bb (1.9)
That is to say that the bank’s profit Πb is its revenue from loans rLLb
less interest paid out on bond borrowing (rBb) and interest paid on deposits
(rDDb). The bank can only extend an aggregate volume of loans Lb to the
extent that it can fund that credit with either deposits (Db) or by borrowing









Bh = Bf +Bb
(Capital market)
and that each agent behaves optimally, i.e. solving 1.1-1.9 above. Based
on the firm and household demand schedules above, we obtain that in equi-
librium, r = rD = rL, banks make zero profit from 1.8 above, and firms and
households are indifferent between bank instruments and capital markets
securities for borrowing or saving respectively.
1.2.4 Extending the model
Freixas and Rochet extend this model to the case of uncertainty, obtaining
that with perfect access to complete financial markets, and based on the
no-arbitrage assumption, there will exist a complete continuum of state-
dependent Arrow securities, each of which pays 1 numeraire in state s(s ∈ Ω)
and zero otherwise, with corresponding prices ps, and where Ω represents
the set of all future states. Suppose a bank issues a security j characterised
by the array xjs(s ∈ Ω) of its payoffs in all future states s. That is to say
that x has j rows, one for each security, and s columns, one for each possible
future state, and the typical element is the payoff of j in state x. For Arrow
securities, paying 1 in state s and 0 otherwise, this will be an identity matrix.







which is to say that the price of j is its expected value. Given j may be
interpreted as a deposit with the bank or a loan to the bank, it is apparent
that banks will still make zero profit, and so the general equilibrium model
with complete markets is ill-equipped for the theoretical study of financial
intermediaries.
The Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie paradigm is however based on strident as-
sumptions, various relaxations of which can grant theoretical foundation for
a financial sector. These assumptions include complete markets, perfect
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competition, zero transaction costs and preference convexity. The post-
1970s emergence of the asymmetric information paradigm, wherein different
actors possess differing information about economic variables will attempt to
use this for their own profit, is highlighted by Freixas & Rochet [Freixas and
Rochet, 2008] as critical to the theoretical study of financial intermediation.
Borrowing from the field of industrial organisation, they note that in the
presence of transaction costs or other ‘frictions’ in the transmission technol-
ogy, intermediaries who buy from producers and sell to consumers can exist
profitably. Freixas and Rochet here define a financial intermediary as “an
economic agent who specialises in the buying and selling (at the same time)
financial claims” [Freixas and Rochet, 2008], while elsewhere they define a
bank as “an institution whose current operations consist in granting loans
and receiving deposits from the public” [Freixas and Rochet, 2008]. They
proceed to offer two main justifications for the existence of FIs conditional
on the relaxation of the ‘complete markets’ assumption of Arrow-Debreu-
McKenzie: first, that financial markets are not in practice complete; and
second, that banks offer diversified services to their customers, visible only
in the form of financial transactions. These relaxations yield a variety of
models, and their respective extensions. Such frictions are of interest to us
as they allow for the existence of a financial intermediation sector, and dif-
ferences in these frictions between regulated and shadow banking may have
a role in influencing the scale of shadow banking activity.
1.2.5 Incomplete information
Freixas and Rochet [Freixas and Rochet, 2008], theorised that information
asymmetries may be introduced in advance of the lending decision (yielding
adverse selection type problems), contemporaneously (involving problems
of moral hazard), or in determining payoffs (costly state verification). Inas-
much as these information asymmetries lead to financial frictions such as
monitoring costs, state-verification costs, or risk indivisibilities, and pro-
vided those transaction costs are not proportional to transaction size, in-
vestors will obtain economies of scale by organising into coalitions to share
these costs, or to spread risk more optimally. Bryant [Bryant, 1980] presents
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a model in which financial intermediaries (FIs) arise as an optimal response
to an exogenously-given liquidity shock of unknown size; consumers discover
in the second of three periods whether they will have to consume ‘early’ or
‘late’ and are unable to insure against this risk in advance even in the pres-
ence of financial markets, as no single agent can observe the total state of
the economy.
Traded securities are not contingent on the incidence of these shocks,
but only on the endogenous price of the bonds, which in turn depends on
the return to investing in the first period. Thus, too many agents still prefer
to invest and suboptimal allocations are reached when some are forced to
liquidate early, returning less than the initial investment. Formation by
consumers of a financial intermediary can attain the optimal allocation by
offering deposit contracts that provide, in exchange for a deposit of one
numeraire in the first period, a withdrawal of optimal consumption level in
either the second or third period when they discover their own type, and
the FI can meet its obligations by storing assets in equal proportion to the
early withdrawers and investing the rest (though no individual knows her
type ex ante, the distribution of early and late types in the population is
common knowledge) [Bryant, 1980].
However a Bryant-style FI cannot coexist with an asset market, and the
bank’s ability to fulfil its contracts depends on no late type idiosyncratically
withdrawing early- which there is no unilateral incentive to do, absent an
asset market. If however a late consumer does not trust the bank, does not
trust her fellow consumers or does not believe that they trust the bank, the
situation can degenerate quickly into the equilibrium bank run of Diamond
and Dybvig [Diamond and Dybvig, 1983]. In this widely-studied model, the
optimal FI contract promises early withdrawers a larger payoff than they
would receive in the free market equilibrium, prompting concerns from late
types (who nevertheless receive a larger allocation by leaving their deposit
with the bank, yielding a Nash equilibrium with no runs provided all late
types believe that all other late types will do likewise). If however they
believe that other late types will withdraw early, types being unobservable,
they will have an incentive to do likewise. This decision can be predicated
only on observing the line at the bank in the early withdrawal period, which
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in turn faces a sequential service constraint, so cannot selectively suspend
convertibility of deposits. Sources of mistrust may be given exogenously, as
in the ‘sunspot’ bank runs of Anderlini [Anderlini, 1989], or based on certain
agents receiving a signal about the likelihood of a bank run, after Postlewaite
and Vives [Postlewaite and Vives, 1987]. Further, in a repeated interaction
setting, agents may have an incentive to withdraw early if superior returns
are available elsewhere, as in the continuous-time generalisation of Diamond-
Dybvig offered by von Thadden [von Thadden, 1998]. Jacklin, writing in
Prescott and Wallace [Prescott and Wallace, 1987] critiques the Diamond-
Dybvig model on the basis that households with direct access to the market
would prefer to meet short-term liquidity shocks by trading their contingent
claims with patient types, making both better off, and rendering the bank
redundant once more - and the defence of Wallace [Wallace, 1988] rests on
imperfect access to incomplete financial markets.
As is becoming clear, FIs that arise in response to frictions in finan-
cial markets do not typically result in complete markets, but may intro-
duce frictions of their own. Acharya and Naqvi [Acharya and Naqvi, 2012],
contributing to the burgeoning post-crisis literature on the role of banks in
destabilising (rather than optimising) the financial system, show how agency
problems in FIs can induce mispricing of risk. In an expanded variant of the
now-familiar Bryant-Diamond-Dybvig model, it is shown that in conditions
of macroeconomic uncertainty, consumers may prefer to reduce their infor-
mational disadvantage by storing assets in the form of bank deposits- the
abundant liquidity with which the bank is thereby afforded leads to relax-
ation of lending standards, “fuelling credit booms and asset price bubbles
and sowing seeds of the next crisis” [Acharya and Naqvi, 2012]. The model is
further enriched by giving agents of the bank itself perverse incentive struc-
tures - when they are compensated based on loan origination, but protected
from downside risk unless bank liquidity minima are breached, they have an
incentive to overextend credit, particularly when a flight-to-quality induced
by poor macroeconomic conditions grants the banks surplus liquidity and
appears to make breach of reserve covenants less likely. This is exactly the
moral hazard problem.
The adverse selection information-asymmetry problem introduced above
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as a motive for the formation of FIs may also not be completely solved by
their introduction- Broecker [Broecker, 1990] finds that FIs competing in a
Bertrand-competitive setting will always attempt to undercut one another
to improve the credit quality of their own clientele at the expense of others
- with the aggregate outcome that too much credit is extended to unworthy
firms. In this model a firm will accept the lowest interest rate immediately,
so the only consumers who appear at successive banks are those who have
been rejected from the first bank, assuming banks are visited in order of
increasing interest rate. Banks lack the ability to price-discriminate, and in-
terest rates are common knowledge. Thus the probability of a bank choosing
to remain inactive is increasing in the number of banks in the economy. It
should be noted however that Broecker assumes an imperfect bank credit-
worthiness test, rather than the fixed cost for perfect information formula-
tion that can be mitigated by coordination. Bertrand competition allows a
firm to supply whatever quantity of a good- in this case, credit- it desires at
a particular price, while Bertrand-Edgeworth competition introduces a sup-
ply constraint. An analogue for this condition in FIs may be conceptualised
as a minimum capital requirement, and indeed Thakor [Thakor, 1996] shows
that in equilibrium, “credit-risk-based capital requirements increase credit
rationing and lower aggregate lending”. In the Thakor model, banks share
costs for both pre-loan screening and post-loan monitoring, and an increase
in exogenously-given capital requirements (eg by a government or regulatory
body) increases the probability that any given agent will be denied credit
by the entire banking system, with those banks facing the highest cost of
capital responding most vigorously. Kisin and Manela [Kisin and Manela,
2016] offer empirical support for this proposition, finding that banks would
prefer to offer guarantees to Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) con-
duits which receive a more favourable capital requirement treatment- they
ascertain that a ten percentage point increase in capital requirements would
cost banks on average $143 million each, and cause lending interest rates to
increase by 3 basis points, and volumes to decrease by 1.5 percent.
Just as not all potential loan customers of a theoretical bank are hon-
est about the profitability of their projects, neither are all depositors wise,
alert and efficiency-maximising investors. The status of bank deposits in the
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modern economy as a form of money requires the bank to provide something
more than the investment yield that depositors might seek from a mutual
fund or bond investment – secrecy. In the model of Dang, Gorton, Holm-
strom and Ordonez [Dang et al., 2017] the very efficiency with which banks
produce information on their borrowers imperils the use of their deposits
as money. The ideal money-substitute bank deposit would have a stable,
predictable value and any information that might cause this value to fluctu-
ate would optimally be suppressed – depositors care more about minimising
the volatility in the value of their money, than reassuring themselves of the
solidity of the bank assets backing it. The Dang et al [Dang et al., 2017]
world allows for banks to exist alongside a capital market, and postulates
an equilibrium whereby banks invest in assets that are low-risk or for which
information discovery is either prohibitively difficult, or unnecessary. Other
projects will attract capital market funding. Notably, Dang et al [Dang
et al., 2017] suggest that debt is an optimal asset for backing money-like
liabilities, as its face value is constant – unlike traded instruments such as
equity, whose price reveals information.
1.2.6 Macroeconomics of banking
The Thakor [Thakor, 1996] model also notes that the response of the banking
system to public sector monetary policy depends on the effect of monetary
policy on the term structure of interest rates, introducing a further motive
for a good theoretical understanding of the functioning of financial inter-
mediaries - the role of the financial sector in the macroeconomy, and in the
transmission of government economic policy. The first-recognised channel,
the so-called ‘traditional’ interest rate channel, is the key channel in the
operation of the Keynesian IS-LM model. Subsequent authors have added
other asset price channels [Modigliani and Miller, 1958], lending channels
[Bernanke and Gertler, 1995], and risk-taking channels [Rajan, 2006, Borio
and Zhu, 2012]. We will now proceed to examine each of these channels in
a little more detail – the discussion which follows is in the spirit of Mishkin
[Mishkin, 1996].
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The traditional interest rate channels
The traditional Keynesian IS-LM model is widely taught on undergradu-
ate macroeconomics courses, and operates as follows. An expansion in the
money supply lowers the price of money in the form of real interest rates.
This lowered cost of capital causes a rise in investment spending by firms
and households, leading to an increase in aggregate demand and output
[Mishkin, 1996]. Because of the role of real, rather than nominal, interest
rates, this is a monetary-veil channel. Furthermore, the decision-makers are
real-economy firms and households, and the role of the financial sector is
limited. Mishkin however adds that due to the operation of this channel on
real interest rates, monetary policy can still be effective with nominal policy
rates at a zero lower bound – provided the money supply can be expanded
enough to bring down real interest rates. In this sense, the model provides
an intellectual basis for quantitative easing. Bernanke & Gertler [Bernanke
and Gertler, 1995] however find limited empirical evidence for the opera-
tion of this channel in the data – what Bernanke & Gertler refer to as ‘the
neoclassical cost-of-capital’ variable does not appear to be a predominating
factor in corporate or household investment decisions at the margin. Taylor
[Taylor, 1995] however, writing in the same edition of the same journal as
Bernanke & Gertler, argues for substantial empirical effects of interest rates
upon consumer spending, and thus for the importance of the interest-rate
channel in transmitting monetary policy.
Asset price channels
As the interest rate channel is believed to operate upon the real economy
only to the extent that the cost of capital affects firm and household in-
vestment decisions, it may be thought of as affecting only the fixed-income
asset class – bonds. However the prices of other assets, and their attendant
wealth effects, may also be believed to influence consumption. Notable in
this category are exchange rates and corporate equity [Mishkin, 1996]. An
expansion of the money supply or cut in policy interest rates make deposits
in domestic currency less appealing relative to foreign currency – this deval-
uation of the domestic currency reduces the price of domestic goods relative
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to foreign goods, increasing net exports (either by a fall in gross imports or
an increase in gross exports, or both). Taylor [Taylor, 1993] argues for the
importance of this channel.
Two subchannels comprise the equity price channel in Mishkin [Mishkin,
1996] – Tobin’s q [Tobin, 1969] and the wealth effects of Modigliani [Modigliani,
1971]. Tobin’s q is defined as the market value of a firm divided by the re-
placement cost of capital. When this q is high, firms can issue equity that
is high in value relative to the plant and equipment thus funded. The sig-
nificance of this channel then rests in how monetary policy might affect the
valuation of corporate equity, and therefore q. A monetarist story according
to Mishkin [Mishkin, 1996] holds that expansionary monetary policy leaves
equity buyers with too high a portfolio ‘weight’ towards money, more than
is desired for speculative and other motives – they may rebalance away from
money by buying equities, increasing equity prices and therefore q. An al-
ternative, Keynesian theory in Mishkin [Mishkin, 1996] is that expansionary
monetary policy makes equities more attractive relative to bonds, leading to
a similar portfolio rebalancing effect. It will be seen that both these effects
operate upon portfolio allocation decisions, respectively of potential borrow-
ers and of buyers of financial instruments. Such portfolio-rebalancing effects
will be encountered later, once more from the point of view of borrower firms,
and also from that of financial intermediaries.
Modigliani’s [Modigliani, 1971] wealth effects have much in common with
the Keynesian case outlined above, but without the link through Tobin’s q
to aggregate output. Given some holdings of equities, when equities increase
in value holders see an increase in their wealth, and may decide to consume
some of it depending upon their marginal propensity to consume. Equity
as used here can be broadly defined [Mishkin, 1996] – housing and land
wealth may be included, and as a major component of the wealth of most
households, changes in the valuation of this wealth can be consequential
for aggregate demand. Such valuation shufts may be linked to monetary
policy through the effect of monetary policy upon real interest rates, and
thus dividend-discount valuation models of the Gordon type [Gordon and
Gordon, 1997].
It should be noted that none of the channels above are entirely mutually
23
exclusive – operating side-by-side, they may lead to accelerator or multiplier
effects. A particular case of accelerator effect was outlined by Bernanke &
Gertler [Bernanke and Gertler, 1995] , and we discuss that and the broader
class of credit channels hereafter.
Credit channels
The credit channels outlined in the literature following Bernanke & Gertler
[Bernanke and Gertler, 1995] emphasise the real-economy effects of the fi-
nancial frictions arising from theoretical models outlined above. They may
be subdivided into the bank lending channel and the balance sheet channels.
The bank lending channel is premised upon the notions that banks have
an advantage in situations of informational asymmetry in credit markets
[Fama, 1985] , and that different types and sizes of firms have differing
levels of reliance on bank funding [Kashyap et al., 1992]. Provided that (for
some borrowers at least) bank loans are not perfectly substitutable with
capital market borrowing, expansionary monetary policy will increase the
loan supply to borrowers with no alternative, expanding output. Clearly this
channel could be sterilized by more closely-substitutable funding sources for
such firms, or in a world where the availability of reserves is not the binding
constraint on bank lending to profitable projects. Mishkin [Mishkin, 1996]
notes that the bank lending channel may be becoming less relevant given
post-1980s regulatory shifts relaxing the reserve constraint, and broadening
diversity of funding sources. Jiménez et al, [Jiménez et al., 2014] assembling
a large dataset of twenty-three million bank loans, find that lower overnight
interest rates do indeed induce banks to lend more and with lighter covenants
to riskier firms. They further document a symmetry between smaller firms
reliant on bank borrowing, and more thinly-capitalised banks reliant on
commercial lending.
The balance sheet channel also depends upon informational asymmetries
in the market for credit. In this case the uncertainty surrounds the quality
of assets on the borrower firms’ balance sheets, which can be pledged as
collateral against bank or capital markets borrowing. The presence of such
uncertainty may lead banks to lend at above-optimal interest rates or below-
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optimal volumes, respectively overpricing or constraining credit, and in any
case lowering investment spending and output – this is the external finance
premium [Mishkin, 1996]. Monetary policy through this channel then oper-
ates via its effect on either the size or the uncertainty surrounding the size
of firms’ balance sheets. As seen above, expansionary monetary policy may
increase the valuation of firms’ equity – expanding their balance sheet and
easing collateral concerns. Expansionary monetary policy can also soothe
lenders’ concerns by bolstering cashflow, improving debt interest coverage
ratios [Bernanke and Gertler, 1995]. A third balance-sheet channel sug-
gested by Mishkin [Mishkin, 1996] concerns the effect of monetary policy on
the general price level. As debt has a fixed nominal face value, a general
increase in price level should increase the nominal value of a firm’s assets,
while the nominal value of debt remains constant. Thus the ratio of debt
liabilities to the firm’s total assets falls, strengthening the balance sheet and
making the firm more creditworthy.
Gertler & Kiyotaki [Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010] and Gertler & Karadi
[Gertler and Karadi, 2011] consider the balance sheet channel as it ap-
plies to banks themselves, noting that an inability to attract funding lia-
bilities (either in retail deposit or interbank markets) may drive a spread
between deposit and loan interest rates or constrain the volume of loans
extended, communicating a financial-sector shock to the real economy. De
Groot [De Groot, 2014] studies financial sector balance sheets in a Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework, finding that banks delever-
age when monetary policy shocks are prevelant – a reverse-multiplier to real
economic activity, and another case of the financial accelerator of Bernanke
& Gilchrist [Bernanke and Gertler, 1995]. In general, the financial accelera-
tor offers a mechanism by which endogenous shocks in credit markets may
propagate to the real economy and their effect size be enhanced by leverage,
whether by impact on borrower or lender firms’ balance sheets.
The balance sheets discussed above are those of firms, but each has
a household analogue. Like small firms, households most probably cannot
access capital markets funding, and depend upon banks to smooth consump-
tion or for investment in e.g. housing assets. The cashflow and nominal-
rigidity-of-debt channels also operate for households [Mishkin, 1996]. Rel-
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ative yields available on different financial assets may also affect household
portfolio allocation decisions as seen in the money-balances approach above,
and we turn now to examine the general class of these portfolio-choice chan-
nels – the risk-taking channels of monetary policy.
Risk-taking channels
Borio & Zhu [Borio and Zhu, 2012] apply the practical techniques used
in investment management to the monetary transmission mechanism. The
importance of interest rates and yields in portfolio allocation decisions by
asset managers, and the dependence of these upon monetary policy, gives
monetary policy a central role in influencing allocation decisions – with real-
economy consequences. Borio & Zhu highlight three ways in which monetary
policy can affect risk appetite and therefore allocation decisons; valuations,
hurdle rates, and central bank communication [Borio and Zhu, 2012].
The valuation channel is instinctively close to the balance sheet and
wealth effects outlined above. Lower interest rates boost the valuations of
cashflow-generating assets, as well as freeing up cashflow if debt interest
rates are floating. This effect also occurs on the balance sheets of financial
firms themselves – as interest rates fall, equity prices rise, volatility falls and
position-size and risk constraints on a trading desk ease, allowing for larger
bets to be placed. ‘Mechanical’ models of mathematical risk can hardwire
this effect [Borio and Zhu, 2012] , and Gambacorta [Gambacorta, 2009] finds
empirical evidence for its existence and significance, documenting that an
extended period of low interes rates is associated with an increase in risk
taking by banks (as measured by realised bank default frequency).
The second effect depends upon ‘sticky’ target returns or ‘hurdle rates’
– as interest rates fall, target rates of return may be maintained at higher
levels due to contractual investment mandates, long-term investors such
as pension funds, or just speed-of-adjustment to a new risk regime. Ini-
tially, falling interest rates make these sticky targets easier to hit, increasing
risk tolerance – however in a prolonged low-interest-environment, as assets
reprice these targets become harder to hit, and hurdle rates may be lowered
or, if not, investment managers may be incentivised to take on more risk to
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meet targets. This is the “search for yield” of Rajan [Rajan, 2006] and of
Gambacorta [Gambacorta, 2009].
The third set of effects outlined by Borio & Zhu [Borio and Zhu, 2012]
concerns the central bank directly. By committing ahead-of-time to par-
ticular targets – or in a more extreme case, to support certain markets –
the central bank can compress risk premia, attracting investment to (and
increasing prices in) that market. Borio & Zhu refer to this as the ‘insurance
effect’, market participants referred to the ‘Greenspan Put’ in the 1990s, and
in any case this is in effect moral hazard willingly entered-into by the central
bank, assuming part of the risk distribution from market participants with-
out explicitly charging for it. Such free risk warehousing naturally affects
the approach of investors to pricing the risk remnant.
Bianchi [Bianchi, 2014] assesses the risk-taking channels in a DSGE
framework. Three operational channels are highlighted: lowering the nom-
inal interest rate reduces the real rate due to nominal rigidities (as in the
traditional interest rate channels discussed above); lowering the real interest
rate increases the present value of cash flows from bank-held assets, allowing
for greater borrowing against them (as in the balance sheet channels above);
and knowledge on the part of market participants regarding the propensity
of the central bank to cut rates in cases of future financial distress encourages
greater risk taking in the present (as with the willing-moral-hazard discussed
immediately above). The risk-taking channels may thus be considered the
most general channels by which monetary policy operates through the fi-
nancial sector.
Chapter 2 will revisit these channels as they apply to shadow banking
specifically, but having discussed supply & demand for loans, we return to
the other side of the financial intermediary’s balance sheet, and a consider-
ation of demand for money.
1.2.7 Empirical studies of money demand
Relocated from Chapter 2
The review by [Sriram, 1999] of landmark findings in the demand for
money literature highlights three of the functions of money in the economy
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previously mentioned – as a means of exchange, as a store of value, and
as a unit of account- and adds a fourth, as a source of deferred payment.
Demand for money may therefore be conceived as demand for one or more
of the services money provides. The traditional value theoretical approach
due to Hicks [Hicks, 1989] casts money as simply another asset to be chosen
at optimal level from amongst a range of assets with differing yields and
associated risks, subject to a wealth constraint- in marked contrast to prior
and contemporaneous work focusing on money as simply a transactional
medium to be held in proportion to the desire to make transactions, such
as that of Fisher [Fisher, 1911]. Demand for transactional money was also
emphasised by Keynes in establishing the key hypothetical negative rela-
tionship between demand for money balances and interest rates – interest
rates represent the opportunity cost of holding (non-interest-bearing) money
balances, and the money demand function is thus negative in (non-money)
interest rates [Sriram, 1999].
Keynes further recognised that demand for money stems from precau-
tionary and speculative, as well as transactional motives. Whilst demand
for transactional money in the Keynesian conception is a relatively constant
proportion of wealth, the demand for money for speculative reasons – the
liquidity preference – emphasises the store-of-value function of money. It
is this function that relates speculative demand for money to the interest
rate, now considered as the alternative yield available by investing in bonds-
resulting once more in a negative relationship with respect to prevailing in-
terest rates, but also a relationship with anticipated future interest rates,
the source of the Keynesian ‘liquidity trap’. When the interest rate is very
low, it is expected to rise in the future and money is thus preferred now, to
be exchanged for bonds when yields rise and bond prices fall. Keynes’ work
was extended by Baumol [Baumol, 1952] and by Tobin [Tobin, 1956] in an
inventory-theoretic approach to demand for transactional money, whereby
money is held as an alternative to almost-as-liquid but higher-yielding fi-
nancial alternatives because the transaction costs of switching justify main-
taining money inventory. The store-of-value motive was extended by Tobin
[Tobin, 1958] who recognised that money may be preferred as an asset due
to the higher certainty of its lower yield – if risk and reward are conceptu-
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alised naively as moving in lockstep (perfectly positively correlated) then all
assets should have the same expected value, and only preference for risk can
discriminate between them.
It is this preference for safety that will later be hypothesised as driving
demand for shadow-bank money-like assets when supply of government or
other safe assets is otherwise constrained. Such constraints may result from
government debt issuance policy not taking the role of sovereign paper as a
safe asset and as high-quality collateral sufficiently into account – potentially
leading to suboptimal levels of government debt ‘supply’ at times of financial
distress, as perhaps has been the case with the recent austerity policy in the
UK. While arguably wrong and inadvisedly procyclical even from a real-
economy point-of-view – the government abdicating its role as demander-of-
last-resort – it may also emerge that a reduction in government debt issuance
at a time of flight-to-safety necessitates an expansion of the shadow banking
sector at a time when prudential policy would be seeking a reduction in
shadow banking activity. It seems highly likely that reduction in government
borrowing, and therefore safe-asset issuance, during the pre-GFC years led
to an expansion of the shadow banking sector – we will attempt to show
that the sector arose in part to meet an unmet demand for safe assets.
The supply of safe assets may also be constrained, from the point of
view of safe-asset buyers, by regulatory requirements such as deposit in-
surance upper limits. Pozsar [Pozsar, 2013] and co-authors [Pozsar et al.,
2010] attribute a key quantum of demand for safe asset to corporate ‘cash
pools’. Managers of these cash pools, held to meet the transactional as
well as speculative demands for money, prefer to avoid large, concentrated,
unsecured exposures to specific banks – even if those deposits are insured
[Pozsar, 2013]. Pozsar [Pozsar, 2013] views the next-best safe asset as short-
term government bills but documents that the supply of these is insufficient
to meet demand, measured as size of cash pools on US corporate balance
sheets. In the presence of unment demand and willingness to pay for safety
in the form of accepting lower yields, it is hypothesised that a key role of
the shadow banking sector is to meet this demand. Before turning to a
more detailed examination of the shadow banking system, we look now to
antecedent empirical studies in the area of money demand.
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A broad, deep and well-established literature in econometrics is con-
cerned with estimating the form and parameters of the money demand
function. Sriram [Sriram, 1999] notes that the different theories of demand
for money nevertheless imply a relationship between observed quantity of
money supplied and a set of observable variables linked to the real economy
– including a scale variable such as GDP growth, and an opportunity cost
of holding money such as the interest rate on alternative assets. Thus, all
empirical studies of money demand may be conceptualised as assessing the
blended demand for money, or the total demand for money arising from
all motives – though different authors may emphasise different theories, and
the different motives may be relevant in assessing short-term dynamics. The
empirical study of money demand has also advanced the entire field of econo-
metrics – indeed, perhaps two of the most important and influential papers
in the field of analysing cointegrated time series – Engle & Granger’s Co-
Integration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing
[Engle and Granger, 1987] and Johansen & Juselius’s Maximum Likelihood
Estimation and Inference on Cointegration with Applications to the Demand
for Money [Johansen and Juselius, 1990] – both concern themselves with es-
timating money demand to demonstrate their novel methodologies. Sriram
[Sriram, 1999], in a comprehensive review of the money-demand literature,
motivates his study by noting that demand for money and the behaviour
of monetary aggregates play an important role in guiding monetary pol-
icy actions – still perhaps true, albeit de-emphasised since most developed
economies began to abandon monetary aggregates as a specific policy tar-
get in the late 1980s, the UK abandoning monetary aggregates in 1986 and
switching to explicit inflation targeting in 1992. Nevertheless, monetary ag-
gregates have remained a focus of study – and are now perhaps freer of the
Lucas critique that policy targets make poor structural variables.
Systems of equations, estimated in vectorised forms, have characterised
studies of money demand since their rise to prominence in the 1980s – often
being demonstrated for the first time on models of money demand. Such
formalisations allow endogeneity to be modelled rather than having to be
controlled out. The vector error correction model, wherein a system of
nonstationary variables share one or more stationary linear combinations, is
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commonly applied to the problem of estimating money demand and is easily
extended to more complex, nonlinear, threshold, or parameter-switching
functional forms.
Notwithstanding the econometric complexity that may be brought to
bear on the problem, the essence of most money demand models is simple.
Though empirical work may be motivated by any or all of the different theo-
ries of money demand, and studies may variously emphasise or de-emphasise
demand for money resulting from transactional, speculative, precautionary
or utility motives, as mentioned by Sriram [Sriram, 1999] they typically share
a framework that connects the quantity of money demanded to a measure
or measures of activity in the real economy, and to the opportunity cost
of holding that money. Price homogeneity was established and empirically
supported early on in the literature [Johansen and Juselius, 1990], and as
such subsequent authors have typically modelled demand for real, rather
than nominal money balances. Real GDP is often chosen as the measure of
real economy activity, and the measures of activity and real money balances
typically enter models in logarithms [Sriram, 1999]. The opportunity cost of
holding money must be considered with respect both to that money’s own
rate of return and to rates of return available on competing assets, either
domestically or abroad for the case of an open economy. These rates of re-
turn, being in percentage form, may enter models in logarithms or in levels.
The parameters of a log-log model then estimate the elasticity of money
demand with respect to the explanatory variable directly, while log-linear
parameters may be interpreted as a semi-elasticity. Given the interest of
the present study in establishing the elasticity of demand for shadow-bank
money with respect to alternatives, logarithmic forms will typically be used.
Sriram’s [Sriram, 1999] meta-analysis shows that a value of around 1 is
typical for the coefficient of real money balances to real income – that is
to say that demand for money grows 1:1 with real economic activity. How-
ever, studies report coefficients of below and above 1, and studies including
multiple monetary aggregates typically find different scaling parameters for
narrower or broader definitions of money – though the directionality is am-
biguous. McNown & Wallace [McNown and Wallace, 1992], assessing the US
case, find that the scale elasticity is higher (1.13) for broader (M2) money
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and lower (0.99) for narrower (M1) money, while Drake & Chrystal [Drake
and Chrystal, 1994], considering corporate sectoral demand for money find
the opposite – that the elasticity is highest for Divisia M1 at 3.3, and lowest
for Divisia M3 at 2.6 [Sriram, 1999]. All authors in the Sriram metastudy
find the expected positive semi-elasticity to money’s own rate of return, al-
beit with magnitudes varying from +0.5 to +18.1 within a single study –
Adam’s [Adam, 1992] work on money demand in Kenya. Typical orders of
magnitude are around +2.0 to +6.0. Most authors also document a negative
semi-elasticity to alternative interest rates, depicting the expected opportu-
nity cost phenomenon –indicative semi-elasticities here vary from -0.008 to
-10.1 depending upon the alternative investment return offered.
Turning to the case of antecedent studies concerned with the United
Kingdom, Drake & Chrystal [Drake and Chrystal, 1994] examine specifi-
cally corporate demand, and measure money using the Divisia aggregates.
Reasoning that corporates and households have different motives to demand
money, they consider money an input into the utility function of industrial
and commercial companies, and estimate an elasticity to real GDP of +3.2
for Divisia M1 if inflation is not included in the long-run cointegrating vec-
tor, and +3.3 if it is. For Divisia M2, inflation is included and the elasticity
of M2 demand to real GDP is +3.4. Drake & Chrystal select a rate they
term the benchmark rate of interest as an opportunity cost, finding a long-
run cointegrating semi-elasticity of -0.9 for the M2 equation, while including
opportunity cost in a calculated variable in the M1 equations, yielding esti-
mates of -4.8 and -4.3 respectively with or without including inflation.
Ericsson, Hendry & Prestwich [Ericsson et al., 1998] update the model of
Hendry & Ericsson [Hendry and Ericsson, 1991] but continue to impose unit
elasticity of money demand with respect to real GDP, basing a substantive
part of their analysis on that assumption. Assessing demand for ‘broad
money’ defined as a splice of M2, M3 and M4 at various points in time, they
find the expected negative coefficient with respect to opportunity costs: -6.7
in this study, the 1991 study having estimated the semi-elasticity at -7.0.
Nielsen [Nielsen, 2007] considers a long time series beginning in 1873,
and derives a long-run elasticity to real income of 0.77 for the same spliced
measure of broad money employed in Ericsson et al [Ericsson et al., 1998]
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– though the coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from 1 given the
standard error of 0.145. Nielsen also reports an interest rate semi-elasticity
of -7.7, highly comparable in magnitude with the findings of Ericsson et al.
Jawadi and Sousa [Jawadi and Sousa, 2013] consider the UK alongside
the US and the Eurozone, and employ a quantile regression approach to
capture nonlinearities – they report coefficients ranging from +1.76 to +2.04
to real GDP. Jawadi & Sousa employ M4 as their measure of money for the
UK, and in common with Nielsen [Nielsen, 2007], they include inflation as a
regressor despite measuring the monetary aggregate, and GDP, in real terms.
This approach seeks to capture inflation as a separate opportunity cost to
holding money, which is fixed in nominal value, as distinct from the increase
in nominal value required to meet the transactional or utility motive in an
inflationary environment. Were monetary aggregates expressed in nominal
terms the expected sign to inflation might reasonably be expected to be
positive, but in real terms inflation is another opportunity cost to holding
money balances and should enter with negative sign – though in the work of
both Nielsen [Nielsen, 2007] and Jawadi & Sousa [Jawadi and Sousa, 2013]
it is more typically insignificant in long-run equilibria.
Other authors have included real effective exchange rates [Arize and
Shwiff, 1993], alternative interest rates [Baba et al., 1992], measures of term
and risk premia [Arize, 1994], and other explanatory variables in their func-
tional forms – though to the best of our knowledge, no author has estimated
a money demand function for shadow banking sector money using data from
the United Kingdom, or estimated the relationship between shadow banking
money and traditional monetary aggregates, as the present work proposes
to do.
1.2.8 Money supply
In equating changes in observed quantities of monetary aggregates with
changes in demand for money as all empirical studies outlined above do,
the question of the role of money supply must be dealt with. Some of
the above studies precede [Engle and Granger, 1987] , or incorporate data
which precedes [Nielsen et al., 2004, Nielsen, 2007] , the recent consensus
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for central banks to target a policy interest rate rather than a monetary
aggregate. In such studies it suffices to assume that the nominal supply of
money is fixed – perfectly inelastic at the central bank’s chosen quantity. It
therefore follows that fluctuations in this total are due to changes in demand
for money – though it should be noted that supply changes in response to
the central bank’s perception of demand for money, and the assumption that
this assessment is always and everywhere correct is a strong one.
Since the 1990s, central banks have more often targeted a policy rate,
normally along with a commitment to supply as many bank reserves as
are demanded at that interest rate. Though in this paradigm the supply
of central-bank-created money could be seen as being perfectly elastic at a
given price – the policy rate – in practice the implications are the same.
Fluctuations in the quantity of monetary aggregates observed result from
changes in demand by holders of money, not idiosyncratic shifts in supply.
In examining the role of the shadow banking sector in supplying safe-
asset substitutes for money, we will follow Pozsar [Pozsar, 2013] and view
the supply of alternative, non-shadow-bank-produced safe assets as inelastic,
and so attribute fluctuations in quantity of observed shadow banking sector
liabilities to changes in demand for those claims.
1.2.9 Chapter conclusion
This chapter has briefly reviewed the history and nature of money, estab-
lished the existence of financial intermediation as a response to imperfections
in credit markets, surveyed the channels by which monetary policy impacts
the real economy, and summarised the empirical literature concerning money
demand, as well as highlighting common assumptions in the literature re-
garding money supply. It will be seen that understanding the functioning
of credit markets is important for monetary policymakers and consequential
for the real economy, and we turn now to more closely examine the nature




2.1 Introduction to Shadow Banking
The term ‘shadow banking’ is acknowledged to have been coined as recently
as 2007, by bond fund PIMCO’s Chief Economist Paul McCulley [McCulley,
2007]. McCulley characterises the system, not unjustifiably, as an “alphabet
soup of levered-up non-bank investment conduits, vehicles, and structures”,
and expresses concern about runs in the system, restricted access to liq-
uidity, and the dependence of institutions within the system on implicit or
explicit credit guarantees from parent institutions, often regulated banks.
(For exposition: it is commonplace amongst practitioners in this field, and
to an extent among academics studying it, to use the financial derivative
market terminology ‘put’ for a credit guarantee provided by a linked or sep-
arate institution. In options trading, a put conveys the right but not the
obligation to sell an underlying asset for a prearranged ‘strike’ price, and as
applied to liabilities of the SBS, may be understood to mean the expectation
that the guaranteeing institution will intervene to maintain a prearranged
value of the security in question or its issuer- an example would be a credit
line offered by a regulated bank to its own off-balance-sheet Special Purpose
Vehicle, of which more below).
This chapter will survey the shadow banking system, incorporating mo-
tives for the existence of shadow banks, estimates of the scale of shadow
banking activity globally, the structure and function of the financial instru-
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ments used by the shadow banking system, and a review of the empirical
literature.
2.1.1 Form & function
The function of shadow banks, as the name implies, is similar to that of reg-
ular banks – they conduct credit transformation, liquidity transformation,
and maturity transformation, albeit often by different means to regulated
banks. Credit transformation involves the enhancement of debt quality of
existing loans by application of a strict priority of claims – thus, senior
tranches (layers) of risky debt are safer than a part share of the whole pool
of loans, as some loans at least are always expected to perform, and the se-
nior tranches have first claim to any revenue resulting from servicing those
loans [Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016]. Credit can be enhanced to the point that
senior tranches are acceptable even to risk-averse investors such as pension
funds. Banks perform this role with deposit contracts, and by staking their
own balance sheet as collateral and relying on public trust in their reputa-
tion, whereas shadow banks often use securitisation – pooling and slicing of
loans- to make priority of claims explicit. As we have already seen, confu-
sion around priority of claims can lead to bank runs, as in [Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983]. It might seem then that shadow banks can use securitisation
methods to clarify priority of claims, but as will be seen, confusion over the
true allocation of risk may not be eliminated.
Maturity transformation in the shadow banking context is the use of
short-term liabilities to fund long-term assets. Entities are rewarded for
assuming maturity risk by the positive slope of the yield curve- long term
loans pay a higher interest rate throughout the life of the loan, allowing the
capture of a spread highlighted by the colloquial ‘3-6-3 rule’ of traditional
retail banking – borrow at 3%, lend at 6%, be on the golf course by 3pm.
Shadow bank access to securitisation techniques allows for maturity trans-
formation in either direction by credit intermediaries, and may lead to a
more optimal pattern of maturity risk sharing, while a regular bank must
assume the whole maturity risk of a loan it chooses not to securitise, sell or
otherwise fund.
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Liquidity transformation refers to the use of liquid liabilities to fund
illiquid assets, and is one of the frictions FIs can solve in the microeconomic
models discussed above- a surprise need for liquidity by consumers, who
otherwise would not invest in value-adding projects [Adrian and Ashcraft,
2016]. Regulated banks are able to access government backstops to allow
liquidity risk to remain on balance sheet, whereas shadow banks rely on
their ability to roll their liabilities to fund their illiquid assets, for example
in the repo markets [Acharya et al., 2011]. Entities are often rewarded for
assuming liquidity risk by a liquidity premium in the interest rates paid,
and though liquidity transformation and maturity transformation often go
hand-in-hand, they are distinct services- a 30-year government bond, for
example, has long maturity but is likely to be easier to sell and thus more
liquid than a short-dated over-the-counter derivative referencing a specific
named entity.
Shadow banks are thus able to perform the traditional banking roles
with the potential to achieve a superior and more easily calculable allocation
of risk through securitisation techniques- indeed much activity denoted as
shadow banking is in fact performed by regulated banks when such precision
is needed. Regular banks have advantages stemming from their government
backstops- enabling them to plausibly guarantee riskier propositions- their
large balance sheets, and their ability to share information and cross-sell
between business lines.
Shadow banking however is not universally, or even typically, seen as
benign. Portes [Portes, 2018] highlights the interconnectedness of shadow
banks with the regulated banking system with potential for contagion, and
many authors [Adrian and Shin, 2009a, Pozsar, 2014, Plantin, 2014, Huang,
2018] focus on the role of the sector in precipitating the recent Global Fi-
nancial Crisis. As will be seen, significant gaps remain in our understanding
of the scale of the shadow banking system (particularly outside the US), as
well as the economic behaviour of the sector. Addressing these gaps is of
importance for prudent financial policymakers in addition to being conse-
quential for the real economy through the influence of shadow banking on
the transmission channels of monetary policy.
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2.1.2 Motives for Shadow Banking
Adrian and Ashcraft [Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016] offer the following three
reasons why the shadow banking sector exists:
1. Innovation in the composition of aggregate money supply: Gorton
and Metrick [Gorton et al., 2010] view the development of shadow
credit intermediation as “financial innovation in the composition of
aggregate money supply” [Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016]. The fractional
reserve banking system, as depicted in the paradigm of Bryant [Bryant,
1980] above, does not maintain sufficient currency to make good all
depositors’ claim should they all be redeemed at once, and so bank
deposits function as a money in their own right, limiting the need
for specie. Initially backed only by general (typically illiquid) assets
of the bank, these monies were subsequently guaranteed in the US
financial infrastructure by the clearinghouses and later by the Federal
Reserve System to ensure they traded at par with physical currency.
Bank runs result when the convertibility of bank deposits into currency
is uncertain. Deposit insurance can help to prevent bank runs by
effectively stopping the run before it starts, often without the insurance
ever needing to pay out. Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs)
arose as a response to the limits on interest paid on checking accounts
as well as account balance limits to this deposit insurance, typically
investing in overnight repos collateralised by US Treasuries [Adrian
and Ashcraft, 2016]. Recent work by Serletis & Xu [Serletis and Xu,
2019] is premised on the role of the shadow banking sector in providing
banking services – taking deposits and making loans.
2. Capital, tax and accounting arbitrage: The access enjoyed by large
banks to official liquidity support and guarantees poses a moral haz-
ard problem. A promise of government bailout will engender exces-
sive risk taking unless accompanied by minimum capital and liquidity
standards – suggesting that the guarantees are mispriced, as equilib-
rium capital ratios would be below the regulated level. By moving
capital-burden-attracting items off balance sheet without any real risk
transfer, regulated banks can capture the full value of this positive
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externality, and the shadow banking sector provides the mechanism to
accomplish this [Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016]. Recent work by Adrian
& Jones [Adrian and Jones, 2018] also cites mispriced sponsor back-
stops, in addition to regulatory arbitrage, as a key motive for shadow
banking activity.
3. Agency problems in financial markets: Ashcraft and Schuerman [Ashcraft
et al., 2008] identify seven key frictions in securitised loan markets:
between mortgagor and originator, originator and arranger, arranger
and third-parties (warehousers, asset manager, credit ratings agen-
cies), servicer and mortgagor, servicer and third-parties, asset man-
ager and investor, and investor and credit ratings agencies. Of these,
the first two concern predatory borrowing or lending, the third con-
cerns adverse selection, the fourth and fifth concern moral hazard, the
sixth is a principal-agent problem and the seventh concerns model er-
ror. These seven frictions broadly correspond to Pozsar et al ’s seven
stages of shadow credit intermediation as will be seen below [Adrian
and Ashcraft, 2016].
2.1.3 Categories of Credit Enhancement
The seminal reference in offering a taxonomy of shadow banking entities and
their function is Pozsar et al [Pozsar et al., 2010]. Pozsar and co-authors
define financial intermediaries based on the nature and extent of their access
to credit backstops (synonymous with guarantees/puts as defined above),
their role in the securitisation chain, and their relation to regulated FIs and
to the government.
• Direct Official: balance sheet items that enjoy direct official enhance-
ment are typically liabilities of regulated banks. This is the highest
form of credit enhancement, but these instruments do not form part
of the shadow banking sector.
• Direct Implicit: the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) in the
US, including for example Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, benefit from
“an implicit credit put to the taxpayer”. The US government is the
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ultimate guarantor of the mortgages guaranteed by the GSEs, and
most authors do not consider these entities part of the shadow banking
system – though some, such as Pozsar et al [Pozsar et al., 2010] , do.
• Indirect Official: Off-balance-sheet liabilities of regulated banks are
deemed to enjoy this form of enhancement, as the regulated bank
has access to public sector support to make good on its obligations,
including any credit lines or guarantees extended to associated off-
balance-sheet entities, though these entities are not directly insured
by the government. It is this part of the shadow banking sector that
is frequently seen as arising from regulatory arbitrage.
• Indirect Implicit: includes bank-affiliated hedge funds and Money-
Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs) operated by regulated institutions.
These vehicles benefit from association with regulated banks but “may
not benefit from such enhancement ex post”. Such confusion about
true risk allocation may only be revealed during times of financial
market turmoil [Gennaioli et al., 2013].
• Unenhanced: Institutions in this category are not generally believed
to benefit from any enhancement over and above their own creditwor-
thiness.
2.1.4 The Seven Steps of Shadow Credit Intermediation
Source: [Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016, Pozsar et al., 2010]
• Loan Origination: performed by finance companies who issue Com-
mercial Paper (CP) or Medium Term Notes (MTNs).
• Loan Warehousing: conducted by single- or multi-seller ABCP con-
duits.
• Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) Structuring: Broker-dealers’ ABS desks
syndicate and pool ABCP into tranched ABS.
• ABS Warehousing: ABS tranches are held on trading books, financed
by Repo or Total Return Swaps (TRS).
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• CDO Structuring: Broker-dealers may structure ABS into Collater-
alised Debt Obligations (CDOs) with agency-issued credit ratings,
making them acceptable to e.g. pension funds, mutual funds.
• ABS Intermediation: Limited-Purpose Finance Companies (LPFCs),
Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs),
Securities Arbitrage Conduits, Credit Hedge Funds and other bank
and non-bank affiliated entities fund ABS asset purchases with cash
via repo, MTNs, bonds, equity or capital notes.
• Funding: All of the above steps are funded by wholesale funding
market providers such as MMMFs, Enhanced Cash Funds, securi-
ties lenders and direct money market investors including corporate
treasuries, fixed-income mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance
companies.
2.1.5 The Four Shadow Banking Subcategories
Source: [Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016, Pozsar et al., 2010]
• The Government-Sponsored Shadow Banking Subsector: analogous
to the classification of institutions enjoying direct but implicit credit
enhancement above, the government sponsored SBS subsector is the
securitisation chain whereby conforming mortgages are subsidised by
the US Government through the GSEs.
• The Internal Shadow Banking Subsector: composed of the off-balance-
sheet activities of regulated banks, the internal shadow banking sub-
sector thus enjoys indirect but official credit enhancement.
• The External Shadow Banking Subsector: though independent of regu-
lated banks and thus devoid of official credit enhancement, institutions
of the external SBS are often affiliated with large non-bank financial or
non-financial firms regulated in their own right, such as mutual funds,
insurance companies, standalone broker-dealers, and the car finance
subsidiaries of automobile manufacturers.
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• The Independent Shadow Banking Subsector: whereas institutions of
the external shadow banking subsector do not typically have shadow
banking as their main activity, the independent shadow banking sub-
sector comprises standalone MMMFs, standalone SIVs, and private
label mortgage security structurers. Its credit would be characterised
as unenhanced.
We summarize the four shadow banking sector subcategories and asso-
ciate each with a motive and with a level of credit enhancement in Table 2.1.
Reasons for existence are difficult to elucidate and frequently overlap, but
this framework serves to guide our subsequent investigation into the data.
In assessing the role of the shadow banking sector in producing money-like
claims which may substitute for bank or government safe assets, our focus
will be predominantly on the external and independent subsectors, with
which we associate the motive of innovating in aggregate money supply. To
the extent that financial aggregate data do not differentiate between ‘in-
ternal’ (bank-sponsored) and external money market mutual funds, there
may be some overlap with the internal shadow banking subsector in our
subsequent empirical work.
2.2 Developments in the shadow banking litera-
ture
The academic study of shadow banking began in earnest after the Global
Financial Crisis of 2008 – though some authors have argued that the pre-
central-bank era of Bagehot, when capital market financing was predom-
inant, has much in common with the recent practice of shadow banking
[Mehrling et al., 2013] . The early papers of Adrian & Shin [Adrian and Shin,
2009a, Adrian and Shin, 2009b] predominantly concern themselves with reg-
ulatory and policy issues, while the work of Pozsar and co-authors [Pozsar
et al., 2010, Pozsar, 2013, Mehrling et al., 2013, Pozsar, 2014] has focused
upon defining and giving a taxonomy of shadow banking system entities.
Gorton & Metrick [Gorton and Metrick, 2009, Gorton et al., 2010, Gorton
and Metrick, 2012] have written extensively about safe assets and in par-
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Table 2.1: The four shadow banking sector subcategories




































ticular the repo markets at the heart of the shadow banking system. The
literature as it stands is somewhat US-centric – early efforts focused on es-
tablishing the need for better regulatory and policy-making datasets to be
collected [Pozsar, 2014] , with the result that the Financial Stability Board
began to publish an annual Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report in
2011 [Board, 2012] . More recent work has begun to consider the shadow
banking system as an economic entity, assessing activity through theoreti-
cal [Gennaioli et al., 2013] , computable general-equilibrium [Verona et al.,
2013, Nelson et al., 2015] or data-driven empirical [Duca et al., 2014, Serletis
and Xu, 2019] approaches. Outside of the US, most authors have sought to
start by estimating the magnitude of shadow banking activity in the ge-
ographic area of interest – we now turn to review these studies in more
detail.
2.3 Sizing the shadow banking sector
The competing definitions and varying affiliations, regulatory regimes and
jurisdictions of the institutions involved in shadow banking activity render
a centralised database of shadow banking activity a virtual impossibility.
Attempts have been made recently to estimate the size of the shadow bank-
ing sector under various definitions and employing diverse methods, and a
selection are detailed below.
2.3.1 The U.S.A.
The comprehensive Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (FFoF) data in the US
allow most attempts to size the American SBS to proceed in a conventional,
balance sheet accounting manner. Thus [Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016] esti-
mate the sector to have issued 28% of the aggregate money supply in 2011,
having peaked at 45% in the early 2000s. They further estimate shadow
institutions to own 31% of total financial sector liabilities and 55% of to-
tal credit transformation in 2011, from respective peaks of 36% and 60%
in 2007/2008 [Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016]. [Pozsar et al., 2010] offer dol-
lar amounts of liabilities, and estimate the sector at $15tn in 2011:Q3, a
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Figure 2.1: U.S. Shadow Bank and Traditional Bank liabilities
[Pozsar et al., 2010]
decline from a 2007:Q2 peak of $22tn, and consistently larger than the regu-
lated banking sector, which peaks within the time series at $14tn in 2011:Q3
(Figure 2.1). The most recent Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report
[Board, 2018] gives the scale of ‘narrow measure’ shadow banking as $51.6
trillion in 2017, of which 29% in the US and 4% ( $2tn) in the UK. The FSB’s
narrow measure includes those entities judged by the FSB as presenting a run
risk due to involvment in maturity transformation, credit transformation,
liquidity transformation or leverage. The measure excludes entities consoli-
dated into a banking group and thus enjoying implicit credit enhancement
in addition to being subject to regulation by transitivity. As such the FSB
narrow measure excludes many securitisation vehicles. As the present work
is concerned with the UK, we do not reproduce other estimates of the size
of the US shadow banking sector in extenso here, but the interested reader
is referred to Adrian & Ashcraft [Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016].
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2.3.2 The Euro area
ECB data being somewhat less centralised than the Fed Flow of Funds, esti-
mates of the size of the European shadow banking sector are somewhat more
sensitive to classification of items and institutions, and these “do not always
have enough granularity to identify different kinds of financial intermedia-
tion and risk exposures” [Bakk-Simon et al., 2011]. The quarterly Euro Area
Accounts (EAA) divide institutions into monetary financial institutions, in-
surance corporations and pension funds, and the residual category ‘other
financial intermediaries’. While this OFI category includes many institu-
tions typically conceived as being part of the SBS, it also includes regulated
investment funds- who are engaged in shadow banking but not uniquely-
and excludes MMMFs, which appear under MFIs. Insurance companies
and pension funds may also fund the SBS through repo transactions but it
is not their principal line of business. Relatively recently, the Euro area has
added monetary statistics covering positions and flows between the MFI and
OFI sectors, and balance sheets aggregates for institutions involved in secu-
ritisation. Bakk-Simon et al [Bakk-Simon et al., 2011] estimate the assets of
the TBS as MFI minus MMMFs, and the SBS as OFIs plus MMMFs, but
minus mutual fund shares issued by funds other than MMMFs, and return
a value of EUR 10.8tn by assets for the European SBS in 2011:Q2 against
EUR 28tn for the TBS. Figure 2.2 gives a time series, and Table 2.2 breaks
out some components of the SBS share.
Arquie & Artus [Arquié and Artus, 2012] also employ ECB data and note
that financial lending corporations, (step 1 of the shadow credit intermedia-
tion procedure outlined above), are also absent from the OFI classification-
so any estimates yielded must necessarily undersize the sector. Defined on
credit extended, they report the euro area SBS as EUR 6tn, approximately
20% of the total euro area credit extension of EUR 29.7tn in 2012:Q2. They
further report $2.3tn in outstanding securitisation, dollar valued for compa-
rability, as of 2012. By a total asset measure that differs from Bakk-Simon
et al [Bakk-Simon et al., 2011], inasmuch as it includes securitisation but
not ICPFs, they give a figure of EUR 9.8tn as a potential size of euro area
SBS balance sheets in 2012:Q2; or 23% of total financial institution assets.
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Figure 2.2: Euro Area SBS and TBS by assets, time series
[Bakk-Simon et al., 2011]
2.3.3 The U.K.
Tyson & Shabani [Tyson and Shabani, 2013] seem to adopt a particularly
broad definition of the SBS, including hedge funds and private equity in
addition to the normal McCullean ‘alphabet soup’ of securitising entities.
They do not provide an estimate of the size of the sector in the UK by
conventional means, but rather reason that all SBS entities to a greater or
lesser extent interact with the market through regulated investment banks-
from SPVs created as off-balance-sheet asset pools for the banks themselves,
to hedge funds who utilise the banks’ brokerage services and private equity
firms who rely on investment bank leverage to complete corporate buyouts.
Reasoning that the ratios of compensation to revenue and of revenue to
assets are both reasonably stable over space and time, Tyson and Shabani
[Tyson and Shabani, 2013] proceed to estimate from publicly disclosed earn-
ings and compensation statement the extent of off-balance-sheet revenues,
and therefore assets. Applying the global ratios of 40.8% compensation:
revenue and 3.7% revenue: assets for a stable long-term ratio of 2:5:135
compensation: revenue: assets, they derive £109bn estimated asset flow per
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Banks 25.6 54.0 28.0 51.5
Other intermediaries 8.5 17.9 10.8 19.9
of which Money market funds (MMFs) 1.2 2.5 1.1 2.0
of which Financial vehicle corporations - - 2.2 4.1
of which Other misc. intermediaries 7.3 15.4 7.6 13.9
Eurosystem 1.6 3.5 3.1 5.8
Investment funds other than MMFs 5.5 11.6 5.6 10.3
of which Hedge funds - - 0.1 0.2
Insurance corporations and pension funds 6.1 13.0 6.8 12.6
TOTAL ASSETS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 47.3 100.0 54.4 100.0
Memo: Repo market outstanding value (lending and borrowing) in the EU 6.8 6.1
annum, and a £546bn asset stock based upon an assumed 5 year average
asset maturity. The assumption that these imputed ratios are stable over
time is a weakness of the method, as is the arbitrary assumption of 5 year
average maturity, but the result that off-balance-sheet assets are equivalent
in size to 26% of on balance sheet assets corresponds sufficiently closely with
the Eurozone estimates to appear plausible. The most recent FSB Global
Shadow Banking Monitoring Report [Board, 2018] gives the ‘narrow mea-
sure’ of shadow banking for the UK as $1.9tn for 2017 – with the broader
measure of assets held by nonbank financial corporates standing at $31.7tn
for 2017.
2.3.4 Alternative estimation methods
Fiaschi et al [Fiaschi et al., 2014] advance a further assumption-based esti-
mate of the size of SBS globally. Firm sizes across countries and over time
have been observed to obey a Paretian probability density function of the
form:
Pr{X ≥ x} ≃ cx−γ (2.1)
which is to say that the probability of observing a firm of size X larger
than x is appoximately equal to x multiplied by a constant c, raised to the
power of a scaling parameter −γ – in other words, the probability of such
an observation declines in constant proportion. The Paretian distribution
is locally self-similar under appropriate scaling parameters, and gives rise
to the ‘Pareto principle’, commonly known as the 80-20 rule- whereby 20%
of some population control 80% of the distributed factor, often income or
wealth. Such allocations can be characterised by a Pareto distribution for
some γ (in the 80-20 case, γ = log(5)log(4)). This constant-proportion property
gives rise to a linear log-log plot, and Fiaschi et al note that the distribution
of firm sizes obeys an appropriately-specified Pareto distribution for mod-
erate values, and deviates at higher values, almost all of which represent
financial firms (Figure 2.3). The implication is that these financial firms
have unobserved assets whose inclusion would restore the observed distri-
bution to the expected, and that these assets exist off-balance-sheet in the
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative Distribution for of financial and all firms by assets
[Fiaschi et al., 2014] Cumulative distribution Pr(S ≥ x) for asset sizes S for financial
(left panek) and all (right panel) firms in 2004, 2007, and 2012. The straight line is a
linear fit in an intermediate range of logPr(S ≥ x) vs logx.
SBS.
Deriving an expected Pareto exponent of 0.905 for all firms in 2013 and
0.648 for financial firms only in 2013, Fiaschi et al [Fiaschi et al., 2014] obtain
an estimate of over $100tn for the size of SBS globally in 2012, compared
to Financial Stability Board (FSB) estimates of $65 - $70tn (Figure 2.4).
As common as such firm size distributions have been observed to be, there
is of course no deterministic reason why financial firm sizes would obey
this distribution, and examples of unexpectedly inconstant second or higher
derivatives abound in financial economics (for example the ’volatility smile’
of option theory).
2.4 Shadow banking in practice
Having considered broad metrics of shadow banking activity, this section
will consider in more detail the specific financial instruments used by the
shadow banking sector. From this consideration we will justify the selection
of variables measuring shadow banking activity, to be used in the empirical
work in Chapters 4 & 5.
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of the Fiaschi et al Shadow Banking Index with
FSB estimates
[Fiaschi et al., 2014] Confidence bands ±2 standard errors in Pareto exponent estimates.
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2.4.1 Sale and repurchase orders
A sale and repurchase order, or repo, is a transaction involving the exchange
of cash for collateral in the form of securities, with a promise to reverse the
sale at the maturity date – frequently the following day. The amount paid in
cash and the amount returned differ by the repo rate – a form of interest rate;
and frequently less cash is provided than the market value of the securities
pledged – this is known as the collateral haircut. For example if £80 cash
is exchanged for £100 worth of securities and the securities are returned at
maturity for £88, the repo rate is 10% 88−8080 and the haircut is 20%
100−80
100 .
Repo transactions can be bilateral, transacted directly between the cash
provider and the collateral provider; or may involve a central clearing coun-
terparty, known as the tri-party repo market. Repo transactions can thus
arise both from a need for cash, mimicking a short-term secured loan, or
from a need for securities e.g. for short-selling.
Adrian et al [Adrian et al., 2013] find that the tri-party repo market is
mostly driven by the cash side, particularly as the cash provider does not
have to process the securities collateral in its own back office – meaning a
more diverse range of counterparties and wider use of non-specific General
Collateral. At the centre of the tri-party repo market in the US are the
clearing banks, JP Morgan and Bank of New York Mellon. The tri-party
market is a key source of funding for securities dealers, and cash is provided
by a wide array of firms with MMMFs accounting for 25-30% [Adrian et al.,
2013].
The bilateral market exists to serve parties who wish to transact specif-
ically with one another or in a specific security, and so is better config-
ured for collateral lending rather than cash lending transactions [Adrian
et al., 2013]. Collateral pledged in repo transactions can be rehypothecated-
used as collateral in a further lending transaction- meaning that the haircut
mathematically functions as a limit on leverage; for some constant haircut
θ, leverage by rehypothecation is limited to 1θ [Copeland et al., 2014]. An
increase in haircuts- meaning the same collateral can secure less cash- re-
sults in a funding shortfall that can prompt fire sales of the assets, pushing
down collateral prices, increasing haircuts and exacerbating the situation, as
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Figure 2.5: The Haircut Index of Gorton & Metrick
[Gorton and Metrick, 2009] Formatting per original.
depicted in Figure 2.5 (drawn from Gorton & Metrick [Gorton and Metrick,
2009]).
The size of the repo market in the US is typically estimated at around
$3tn, of which $2tn is in the tri-party repo market and the balance in bilat-
eral repo [Martin et al., 2014, Adrian et al., 2013]. The role of repo in the
shadow banking sector is as the deposit analogue; repo offers a repository for
corporate, insurance and mutual fund cash piles that is secured rather than
insured, and offers some yield. Thus demand for repos arises for two distinct
reasons; firstly a search for a money-like instrument for value storage and to
meet liquidity needs, and secondly a search for low-risk yield. The former is
characteristic of corporates and insurers with cash balances larger than the
deposit insurance limit, while the latter is more typical of mutual funds and
hedge funds (HFs) [Pozsar, 2014].
Repo may be viewed then as part of the growing debate on private vs
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public money creation, the Bank of England having recently officially ac-
knowledged the view commonly held for some time, that the majority of
money creation is enacted privately in the form of bank deposits and com-
parable liabilities [McLeay et al., 2014]. Empowered to create money as
they see fit, commercial banks will nevertheless only do so when profitable
lending opportunities exist, raising the possibility that when cash seeking
deposit contracts outstrips the availability of profitable lending opportuni-
ties, repo may constitute an additional source of private money to meet this
demand [Pozsar, 2014]. Sunderam [Sunderam, 2014] advances a theoretical
model of the SBS as meeting demand for private money-like assets which
also offers empirical support for the proposition.
The value of money, privately or publicly created, always and everywhere
relies on confidence that it will be accepted and trade at or near par- for
sovereign currency-issuing entities, this amounts to a promise to control
inflation. For banks and shadow banks, this value promise rests on the pool
of assets backing the money liability – and if banks lend to all profitable
lending opportunities and back their deposit liabilities with this mixture of
whole loans, then we may conclude that one of the functions of the SBS
is to make unprofitable lending opportunities profitable, at least for some
participants in the capital structure. This attempt to guarantee the value of
privately-issued money drives the requirement for MMMFs, the depository
institutions of the SBS, to maintain the Net Asset Value of each of their
$1-face-value shares above $0.995- failure to do so is known as ‘breaking the
buck’, and, as with uncertainty around the ability of banks to make good
their deposit contracts, can lead to a run on the system.
Martin, Skeie and von Thadden [Martin et al., 2014] derive a Diamond-
Dybvig style model in which repo runs results from liquidity shocks as per
[Diamond and Dybvig, 1983], but also from collateral shocks. Copeland et
al [Copeland et al., 2014] complement this theoretical work with an empiri-
cal piece which also serves to highlight the differences between the bilateral
and tri-party repo markets during the financial crisis- the bilateral markets
suffered haircut spirals, whilst haircuts in the tri-party markets remained
largely stable but volumes dropped precipitously in a number of cases. The
tri-party response thus resembles a ‘classic’ bank run, while the bilateral
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response displays an attempt to adjust prices rather than quantities- albeit
in an extreme sense- rendering the transactions more security-like and less
money-like. Acharya, Gale & Yorulmazer [Acharya and Naqvi, 2012] ad-
vance a collateral-constraint based model, and show that in the presence of
rehypothecation and buyers who also need to finance their portfolio, small
doubts about the value of the collateralising security (corresponding to small
changes in the Markov chain state transition probabilities) can lead to large
drops in the debt burden that security can sustain.
2.4.2 Asset-backed commercial paper
Asset-backed Commercial Paper forms the intermediate security of SBS in-
termediation chains. Short-term commercial paper backed by a specific pool
of cash flow-generating assets, ABCP is typically issued by a special-purpose
vehicle established by, but independent of, the originator of loans. The origi-
nator transfers ownership of the assets into the SPV, meaning they and their
cash flows are isolated from the originator in case of the originator’s failure.
ABCP claims can therefore maintain their value as long as their specific as-
sets continue to perform, whereas the failure of a bank’s general asset pool
can impair all of its retail deposits. ABCP also plays a role in maturity trans-
formation, as its reference assets are typically ABS of 3 to 5 years’ maturity
while the tenor of the ABCP itself can be anything from one to 180 days,
but typically around 30 days [Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016, Acharya et al.,
2013]. Designed as a mechanism for more accurate and controllable alloca-
tion of cash flows and associated risks, ABCP is considered by Acharya et al
[Acharya et al., 2013] to exist almost solely for regulatory arbitrage – credit
guarantees provided by regulated banks to ABCP conduits require much less
capital to be held against them, enhancing banks’ return on equity. Acharya
et al [Acharya et al., 2013] show that more capital-constrained banks were
more likely to establish conduits; and in the event that these conduits were
strained, it is shown that losses accrued substantially to the banks guaran-
teeing them rather than the investors purchasing the ABCP issued. This
is consistent with little or no economic risk transfer taking place [Acharya
et al., 2013]. Kashyap et al [Kashyap et al., 1992] show that borrower firms
55
also treat commercial paper as an imperfect substitute for bank loans, issu-
ing more when monetary conditions are tight, suggesting that a reduction in
bank loan extension is not the result of falling demand from borrower firms,
but lower willingness to extend credit on the part of banks. The regulatory
arbitrage associated with ABCP conduits may therefore allow for extension
of credit that would not otherwise have take place – though as this may
take place at a time of tight monetary policy, for the benefit of a firm of
questionable creditworthiness and by a bank of questionable strength, it is
doubtful how welfare-enhancing such credit provision is.
2.4.3 Asset-backed securities
Asset-backed securities are a general class of bond-like entities representing
claims on pools of loans, mortgages or receivables [Adrian and Ashcraft,
2016]. Whereas the pool of whole loans will have varying interest rates and
payment times, pooling and tranching can impose regularity on these cash
flows to produce a collateralized bond with regular fixed coupon payments,
collateralised by the underlying. The process of packaging loans into ABS is
known as securitisation, and results in tradeable, and therefore more liquid,
claims- potentially improving risk allocation. ABS issuance is however prin-
cipally a process of credit enhancement by diversification- using historical or
projected default rates, the ABS can be issued in slices known as tranches,
with ordinal seniority of claim and eligible for credit rating by ratings agen-
cies such as Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s. The first defaults are absorbed
by the equity tranche typically retained by the issuer, the mezzanine tranche
may attract a junk-bond level rating and its high coupon attracts hedge
funds, while the super-senior tranche has first claim on any cash flows and
can therefore often attract an investment grade rating- rendering it eligible
for purchase by pension funds etc. ABS’s credit enhancement facility being
based substantially on diversification, default probabilities are highly sensi-
tive to model risk in general and the correlation parameter in particular- the
chance that a loan will default given that other, similar loans are default-
ing. This correlation results from similar loan notional values with similar
interest rates likely being issued to borrowers with similar characteristics.
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David X., Li’s canonical copula formulation [Li, 2000] generalises the stan-
dard, discrete definition of correlation of two random variables to continuous
distributions common to actuarial science- the survival function, its comple-
ment the failure time function, and the instantaneous failure rate as time
tends to zero, known as the hazard rate function. Nevertheless this 2000
publication surveys properties of copula functions in general, with a few
specific examples, and notes that the selection of copula function depends
on assumptions about the marginal distributions of the underlying variables-
it seems a little harsh therefore to brand the Gaussian copula function ‘the
formula that killed Wall Street’ [Salmon, 2012] when the inadequacies of
the bell curve for accurately representing payoffs of financial assets are well
documented [Hudson and Mandelbrot, 2008].
It will be seen then that each financial entity in the SBS specialises to an
extent in one of the driving motives for SBS, and one for FI in general- repo
markets thus exist to serve a need for money and liquidity transformation,
ABCP offers regulatory arbitrage but also aids maturity transformation,
while ABS’s role in credit transformation also helps address information
problems in financial markets. Perversely, one of the ways it does this is
not through transparency, making the value of investment projects easier
to ascertain, but rather making this process harder in the quest for what
Dang et al [Dang et al., 2017] refer to as ‘optimal opacity’. Their Diamond-
Dybvig style model shows that banks can improve allocative efficiency by
obscuring information about the quality of their assets, so that the bank
money issued with these assets as backing does not fluctuate in value, adding
friction to trade. They show that under their conditions, banks will invest
in information-insensitive assets to reduce the incentive to produce private
information about the projects that could prove damaging to the value of the
bank’s money, while capital markets will directly finance projects that are
sufficiently risky or where the cost of producing information is sufficiently
low.
A wide literature concerns the decision facing firms to seek bank finance
as opposed to capital markets finance. Fama [Fama, 1985] famously asked
‘What’s Different About Banks?’, referring to their need to finance inter-
est forgone on capital held in reserve by increasing interest rates on loans,
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creating a paradox whereby loan clients should optimally select alternative
providers to receive financing at lower rates. Bolton & Freixas [Bolton et al.,
2012] show that under specified conditions a banking sector and capital mar-
kets can coexist, with bank loans preferred by risky borrowers and lower-risk
clients preferring capital markets- further implying lower interest rates in the
open market. Biswas & Koufopoulos [Biswas and Koufopoulos, 2014] show
that banks can offer underwriting services to capital markets issuers, backed
by reserves to reassure borrowers that their guarantees are trustworthy and
helping positive NPV projects to attract funding. Of the empiricists, Duca’s
vector error-correction model shows that activity in the shadow banking
sector is strongly driven by constraints on the TBS- reserve requirements,
deposit interest rate ceilings, prop trading restrictions and others cause the
financial system to seek alternatives outside the government-guaranteed sec-
tor [Duca et al., 2014].
2.5 The demand side
Most national statistical authorities publish multiple monetary aggregates
with different financial instruments included or excluded. In the UK these
are the narrow money measure M0, composed of notes & coins as well as
central bank reserves, and the broad money measure M4 including M0 in
addition to sterling bank deposits, certificates of deposit, commercial paper,
bonds, floating-rate notes, repo claims on UK regulated banks, sterling bank
bills, and other instruments of up to 5 years’ maturity issued by UK banks.
The consumer demand theory approach identified with the Chicago school
[Sriram, 1999] recognises that different elements of monetary aggregates
are not, in practice, treated as perfect substitutes- and that these elements
may be weighted by applying a factor wi ∈ {0, 1} known as the element’s
‘moneyness’ for all i = (1, 2, . . . , N) elements of those monetary aggregates.
Moneyness, as a proportion relative to cash=1, measures the extent to which
the asset performs the function of money- formally, they are entered “as in-
puts into the production function of money services” [Sriram, 1999]. This
measure therefore defines the extent to which assets are used, in practice,
as money substitutes though not perhaps the extent to which they resemble
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money in the abstract. One could imagine a moneyness measure defined over
the characteristics of money as a store of value- liquidity, safety in the form
of a realising full nominal value almost surely, ubiquity, acceptability etc. It
is this moneyness-as-value-store measure that non-specie money-like claims
of the TBS and SBS seek to maximise. Insured bank deposits attain a high
moneyness ‘score’ under both definitions, with bank account balances fre-
quently (in fact in overwhelming majority) transferred to settle transactions
in lieu of currency. SBS money-like claims, whilst infrequently used trans-
actionally, nevertheless attain a high theoretical-moneyness measure- repo
transactions, for example, are settled daily offering high liquidity, and are
overcollateralised (to the extent of the haircut) by mutually acceptable se-
curities that possess an automatic ‘stay’ in case of counterparty bankruptcy,
allowing the cash lender to retain the collateral in the event that the cash
balance is unable to be repaid with interest [Gorton et al., 2012]. Money-
market mutual fund shares are constrained to be redeemable at par at all
times, and investors must be informed if the net asset value of the fund
falls below $0.995 per $1 invested. Money-market deposit accounts, though
operated by the TBS, are active in repo and securitisation markets and can
be used identically to bank deposit or checking accounts.
It is these characteristics of SBS claims that the demand-side literature
highlights – liquidity, safety, and only secondarily enhanced yield. Gorton
et al [Gorton et al., 2012] document that the proportion of all US finan-
cial assets considered ‘safe’ has remained relatively constant at around 33%
since 1952, whilst the ratio of total assets to GDP has increased by a fac-
tor of 2.5- implying a role for safe assets in the production of total assets,
or a technology that allows only this proportion of total assets to be, or
be made, safe at any one time. Furthermore, the composition of this safe
asset share has changed over time, with government liabilities and tradi-
tional insured bank deposits falling in proportion relative to SBS claims and
investment-grade corporate bonds. Along with increasing GDP the result
is a substantial increase in notional value of financial assets outstanding,
a consistent proportion of which are nevertheless considered likely to be
redeemable at nominal par value.
Pozsar [Pozsar et al., 2010] attributes some of this demand to US cor-
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porate treasuries, pools of cash held for liquidity management reasons and
invested in a range of safe assets including bank deposits, government debt
and repo & securitised instruments. Being above the insurable margin with
an average cash pool magnitude in this paper of $15bn, corporates derive
risk limitation benefits from diversifying across financial firms and asset
types, limiting their exposure should a single counterparty fail to redeem its
liabilities. Corporates will also utilise derivative trades to manage specific
business risks, and likely maintain cash or liquid positions to meet fluctua-
tions in the margin accounts such derivative trades require. Pozsar [Pozsar
et al., 2010] assigns to these corporate cash pools $2.2tn of safe asset demand
at their 2007 peak, falling to $1.9tn by Q4 2010, of which $1.5tn was met by
the SBS with the balance in TBS accounts and government bond portfolios.
Sunderam [Sunderam, 2014], considering the safe asset demand attributable
to households and individual savers, notes that ABCP issuance outstanding
grew by 70% between 2004 and 2007, peaking at a notional outstanding value
of almost $1.2tn in 2007. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012], assessing the demand for Treasuries
(US government bonds) and the effect on yields of other financial assets,
show that Treasury yields were depressed on average by 72 basis points
(0.72%) over the period 1926-2008 by this demand. They further show that
supply of Treasuries negatively affects both the supply of bank-issued money,
and the yield spread between bank money and less ‘moneylike’ safe assets-
the fall of this spread suggests constrained Treasury supply induces lower
yields on these assets, allowing them to become more moneylike [Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012]. Finally, Bernanke et al [Bernanke
et al., 2011] document total issuance of safe assets of the order $4.5tn in
the period 2003-2007, of which 55% was sold to foreign investors including
European banks and governments, Asian corporates, ‘Global Savings Glut’
countries where households tend to be net savers rather than borrowers (esp.
China), and oil-rich Middle Eastern sovereigns. Supposing that the remain-
ing 45% was sold uniquely to US corporates rather than households, this
approximates the $2.2tn cited by Pozsar [Pozsar et al., 2010] to within an
order of magnitude.
Serletis & Xu [Serletis and Xu, 2019] construct a sophisticated model of
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the role of the shadow banking sector in meeting demand for banking services
in the US, and further hypothesis that the substitutability/complementarity
between regulated bank and shadow bank services is vital in the transmission
of monetary policy. They allow for Markov regime-switching, and document
that the emergence of the shadow banking sector has increased the stability
of money demand functions, concluding that measures of money supply may
be more useful indicators of the stance of monetary policy than the interest
rate.
2.6 Conclusion
Taken together this literature demonstrates a large and consistent demand
from households, corporates and governments both US and foreign for assets
considered safe. In the event that this demand cannot be entirely satisfied
by traditional banks or government bonds – due to deposit insurance lim-
its [Pozsar, 2013], fiscal prudence constraints [Sunderam, 2014], or because
excessive government debt may cause such claims to lose their information-
insensitive characteristic, thereby losing the very safety investors demand
[Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012] – the demand may be to an
extent met by a shadow banking system that, by allocating or concealing
risk, allows production of money-like assets from loans of varying quality.
We have reviewed the literature around shadow banking in some detail.
Being US-centric, little work has been done focusing on the UK shadow
banking sector specifically. Though hypothetical, descriptive and theoret-
ical models of the role of shadow banking in meeting demand for safe as-
sets have been advanced, no empirical models exist setting the UK shadow
banking sector in the context of safe asset demand. We propose to gather
UK data, construct measures of shadow banking sector activity, and plalce
these measures empirically in a demand-for-safe-assets context. In consid-
ering shadow banking from the perspective of demand for safe assets, our
empirical framework is close in spirit to the theoretical framework of Gen-
naioli et al [Gennaioli et al., 2013]. In assessing shadow bank services as
substitutes for government debt, we take after Krishnamurthy & Vissing-
Jorgensen [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012] , and in considering
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the substitutability between shadow bank and traditional bank services, we
have much in common with Serletis & Xu [Serletis and Xu, 2019] and fit
into the theoretical framework of Pozsar [Pozsar, 2013] – however the focus
on the UK is novel.
Our results will be of interest to policymakers concerned with prudential
regulation, as well as the transmission of monetary policy to the real econ-
omy given the shadow banking sector’s role in the transmission mechanism






The focus of the present work is upon the role of the shadow banking sector
in meeting demand for money-like assets in the United Kingdom. Money-
like assets are defined as those assets providing one or more of the monetary
services outlined above, but in particular that of a store of value, and as such
the present work also addresses the topic of demand for safe assets [Gorton
et al., 2012], of which money-like assets are a subset. The framework for
this analysis will be provided by the well-established literature concerning
demand functions for existing published monetary aggregates, and a key
contribution of the present work is to extend this framework to constructed
aggregates of shadow banking sector monies. The remainder of this chapter
aims to develop specific, testable hypotheses from the existing literature on
the characteristics and dynamics of shadow banking.
H1: The demand function for shadow banking sector liabilities
can be estimated under the assumption that competing safe
assets have supply rigidities leading to inelasticity
To the extent that it is measurable, shadow banking activity can be pre-
sumed to share a relationship with broader economic activity. Shadow
banking liabilities are demanded by rational economic actors, and as such it
should be possible to empirically observe and econometrically estimate the
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relationship of the shadow banking sector to the broader economy. Golec
& Perotti [Golec and Perotti, 2017] document the emerging importance of
considering shadow banking sector instruments in the literature concerning
safe asset provision. The assumption that substitutes such as government
debt and bank deposits are inelastic in supply may be more valid in the
short run.
H2: This demand function has characteristics comparable to
well-established demand functions for exiting monetary ag-
gregates
If indeed shadow banks provide monetary services, and their products are
to an extent substitutable with money assets of the traditional banking sec-
tor, then it is to be expected that the demand function for shadow money
shares characteristics with well-established demand functions for traditional
money. That is to say, aggregate demand for SBS liabilities should be in-
creasing as real GDP increases, and also increasing as its own rate of return
increases. Demand is expected to be decreasing as the ‘cost’ of holding such
money increases - typically defined as opportunity cost, i.e. a higher out-
side interest rate. Pozsar [Pozsar, 2013] documents the importance of the
shadow banking sector in meeting demand for safe assets from corporate
cash pools, whose demand stems chiefly from the transactional motive for
holding money.
H3: Corporate cash pools are a key source of demand for
shadow banking sector monetary services
In the prolific literature on shadow banking as a provider of private-sector
monetary assets due to Pozsar and various co-authors [Pozsar et al., 2010,
Pozsar, 2013, Pozsar, 2014], there are two key institutional ‘bids’ for SBS-
created money - corporate treasurers searching for safety and fund managers
reaching for enhanced yield. As the present work is concerned with safe as-
set provision, we focus on corporate cash pools as a source of demand - and
hypothesize that demand for SBS liabilities should share a negative relation-
ship with corporate assets deposited in traditional banks, all other things
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being equal. That is to say that a corporate treasurer’s decision to place
the marginal pound sterling in a traditional bank deposit should ‘crowd
out’ the production of a shadow bank liability such as a money-market
mutual fund unit to receive that pound. This assessment of substitutabil-
ity/complementarity between traditional and shadow bank deposits builds
on the work of Serletis & Xu [Serletis and Xu, 2019].
H4: As a safe asset, SBS liabilities are treated as a government-
debt substitute
It is not only corporate cash pools who may treat SBS liabilities as a substi-
tute for an alternative safe asset. Any investor seeking safety would likely
also consider government-issued debt securities - though of course at suf-
ficient scale, a cash pool may wish to diversify away from even the most
creditworthy issuer in the economy, and not merely for reasons of enhanced
return. Nevertheless, and considering Gorton et al ’s [Gorton et al., 2012]
finding that the safe asset share in the (US) economy is approximately con-
stant, it might be expected that SBS safe assets and government-produced
safe assets share a negative relationship at the margin. Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012] address this
hypothesis at length for the US case, and find this hypothesis borne out in
data covering the period 1914-2011. It should be noted however that their
definition of private sector safe assets is broader and covers both what we
would term ‘traditional’ and ‘shadow’ banking sector liabilities in a single
set of aggregates.
3.2 Contribution of hypotheses to the literature
Should our hypotheses be borne out, a principal contribution will be to the
shadow banking literature. We will have extended the work of Tyson &
Shabani [Tyson and Shabani, 2013] by retaining their UK focus, and offer
evidence for Pozsar’s [Pozsar, 2013] work showing corporate cash pools as
a key bid for shadow bank liabilities. The broader demand for safe assets
perspective follows the work of Gorton & Metrick [Gorton et al., 2012], and
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Table 3.1: Hypotheses
Hypothesis Variable entering SBS
money demand function
Expected sign and magni-
tude
H2 Log real GDP +, approximately 1
H2 Own interest rate +
H2 Opportunity cost / alterna-
tive interest rates
-
H3 Corporate deposits in tradi-
tional banking sector
-, around 1 in absolute mag-
nitude if ’crowding out’ is to-
tal
H4 Government debt outstand-
ing, government debt is-
suance in short-run models
-, around 1 in absolute mag-
nitude if ’crowding out’ is to-
tal
the focus on substitutability of shadow bank money with government debt
and bank deposits extends the work of Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen
[Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012] and Serletis & Xu [Serletis
and Xu, 2019].
The work also contributes to the broader literature on money demand
in the UK, extending the work of Hendry & Ericsson, Drake & Chrystal,
Ericsson et al, Nielsen, and Jawadi & Sousa [Hendry and Ericsson, 1991,
Drake and Chrystal, 1994, Ericsson et al., 1998, Nielsen, 2007, Jawadi and
Sousa, 2013].
Methodologically the work draws on the vector time-series paradigm of
Johansen [Johansen, 1988, Johansen and Juselius, 1990] and the factor-
based work of Stock & Watson and of Banerjee & Marcellino [Stock and
Watson, 1999, Stock and Watson, 2002, Stock and Watson, 2005, Banerjee
and Marcellino, 2009]. We also introduce a strategy for identifying long-run
cointegrating vectors in a factor-augmented vector error correction model
(FAVECM) which is believed to be novel. We now consider the data we will
use to test these hypotheses.
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3.3 Dataset description and UK Flow of Funds
3.3.1 Introduction
A notable contribution to the literature attempting to assess the scale and
activity of the shadow banking sector in the United States is that of Errico,
Haruyunyan, Loukoianova, Walton, Korniyenko, Amidzic, AbuShanab and
Hyun Song Shin [Errico et al., 2014]. Working at the International Monetary
Fund and making use of that institution’s access to standardized financial
reporting data provided by participant nation states, Errico et al create
a Global Flow of Funds, mapping financial activity between economic sec-
tors within and across borders. Their approach shares a thematic spirit
with the Stock-Flow Consistent school of analysis latterly championed by
the Post-Keynesian school of economics and Wynne Godley in particular,
but dating back at least to Copeland’s work of 1949, and arguably encom-
passing the MONIAC of Phillips. Phillip’s MONIAC (Monetary National
Income Analogue Computer) represented stocks and flows within the UK
economy as reservoirs and pipes filled with water, and in a similar spirit,
the Stock-Flow Consistent modelling tradition attempts to avoid ‘leakages’
– with every dollar or pound sterling leaving one sector, finding a destina-
tion in another. In the case of the United States as studied by Errico et al,
this approach consists of a sectoral input-output matrix that they term the
Balance Sheet Approach (BSA), and a matrix to capture the destination
(origin) nationality of funding leaving (arriving) across American borders.
Errico et al initially offer a broad definition of the shadow banking sector
resulting from this approach. Conjecturing that in normal times regulated
banks depend mostly if not solely on domestically-sourced retail and small
corporate deposits for funding, they argue that this stable but finite source
of liabilities would be insufficient to support rapid asset growth during a
lending boom. Therefore to allow balance sheets to expand more rapidly,
traditional banks seek what Errico et al term ‘noncore’ liabilities – a cate-
gory including foreign individual and corporate depositors in addition to the
repo dealers and wholesale capital market lenders with whom we have iden-
tified shadow banking thus far. The broadest possible definition of shadow
banking then, would be total liabilities of the regulated financial intermedi-
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Figure 3.1: Matching Assets and Liabilities - the US example
[Errico et al., 2014]
ation sector, minus household deposits in that regulated sector. Errico et al
further attribute elevated or rapidly growing noncore liabilities with predic-
tive power in anticipating financial crises – and more generally recommend
that policymakers study the composition of banking sector liabilities as an
indicator of financial conditions.
Notwithstanding their focus on shadow banking in the text, the method
of Errico et al is comprehensive, matching assets and liabilities across 13
different types of financial instrument for each of 9 different economic sectors,
for some 1,404 individual data points (or individual time series). That said,
given constraints on data availability, their matrix is sparse – the US example
provided in the original paper is reproduced herein as Figure 3.1.
Errico et al proceed to offer some description and analysis of the time-
series behaviour of core and noncore funding in the US, along with empirical
evidence in the form of panel regressions of various components of core and
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noncore funding on funding aggregates and macroeconomic variables for
a sample of 82 countries. Eschewing vectorized systems and instrumental
variables approaches in favour of simple OLS to estimate partial derivatives,
Errico et al conclude that both core and noncore liabilities have significant
positive correlation with within-country growth of loans to the private cor-
porate sector – but not to the public sector. In their directions for further
work, Errico et al note data availability as an important area for future
focus, and highlight the UK in particular as a data gap – the UK at this
time did not provide data to the IMF using standardized reporting forms.
The present work therefore set out to in some part replicate the method
of Errico et al, and not without success. With our focus still upon shadow
banking, we nevertheless considered the same 1,404 sector-instrument pairs
considered by Errico et al, and though we faced similar data availabil-
ity issues, were able to complete the matrix to a comparable standard.
However, in the words of Laurence Fishburne’s Morpheus from the promi-
nent 1999 film, “nobody can be told what The Matrix is; you have to see
it for yourself” – and to that end the full BSA approach matrix imple-
mented for the UK by the author is available in a more accessible format
in the online appendix at https://s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/domsilman-
thesis-technicalappendix/BSAMatrix.xlsx. We note that, subsequent to the
present work being conducted, the UK statistical authority the ONS now
publishes flow-of-funds matrices in accordance with the practice established
by Errico et al – though at a much higher, more aggregate level. These data
series are mostly sourced from the ONS – the contribution of the present
work is not to originate the data or to pioneer the structure, merely to bring
the two together for the UK case in a way that was novel (and remains novel
at this level of granularity).
Resulting from that work, we were able to derive a measure of core and
noncore liabilities in the UK regulated banking sector comparable to that
of Errico et al. Their measure of noncore liabilities is defined from the bank
balance sheet side, and includes deposits at ODCs that are outside broad
money; debt securities issued by ODCs, MMFs, and OFCs; loans received
by ODCs and OFCs; and nonresidents’ deposits with ODCs and OFCs. For
the UK, given our focus on safe assets from the perspective of the holder,
69
Figure 3.2: Time Path for Core and Non-core funding (UK regulated banks)
our measure is defined as total M4 (broad money) minus deposits with MFIs
held by the household sector – it therefore includes sterling certificates of
deposit; commercial paper, bonds, floating rate notes and other instruments
of up to five years’ maturity issued by UK MFIs; claims on UK MFIs arising
from repos; and sterling bank bills. We therefore select M4 as the broad
money measure from which we subtract household deposits to define our
measure of noncore liabilities. Hereafter we refer to household deposits
with UK-regulated banks as ‘core’, and the remainder of M4 as ‘non-core’.
This forms a very broad measure of shadow banking as any non-household
funding source used by the financial sector in aggregate, but this is exactly
the measure used in Errico et al. We depict in Figure 3.2 the time path of
core (household deposits in M4) and noncore (rest of M4) funding for UK
regulated banks.
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Comparable to Figure 18 in Errico et al, Figure 3.2 depicts a rapid
increase in noncore funding liabilities during the early 2000s boom, before
sharp falls in nominal terms following the financial crisis of 2007/8. Recently
noncore funding growth appears to have resumed – and as in Errico et al,
core funding from retail depositors has proceeded largely unhindered. The
variable noncore as defined here will be retained for further analysis.
From that broadest of definitions of shadow banking activity, we turn
now to consider a much narrower one. Very little good data exists in most
national aggregates to examine the potentially long chains of collateral re-
hypothecation entered into as part of the maturity, liquidity or credit en-
hancement functions of the shadow banking sector. Any effort to place the
activities of the sector in macroeconomic context must therefore focus on
one or other end of the chain. Previous authors, notably Bord & dos Santos
[Bord and Santos, 2012], Purnanandam [Purnanandam, 2010] and Berndt &
Gupta [Berndt and Gupta, 2009] have considered the role of shadow banking
and the securitization machine in driving aggregate credit growth before the
financial crisis, in doing so concealing risk and increasing fragility. Focusing
in the present work on the provision of safe assets and the role of shadow
banking in innovating in the money supply, we will consider the other end of
the chain – the money market instruments where safety-seeking borrowers
may warehouse cash against good collateral, further protected by net asset
value guarantees. In particular we consider the short-term money market
instruments issued by what the ONS defines as ‘other UK residents’ – to
wit, not regulated banks, and therefore shadow banks in the truest sense of
introducing into the financial system deposits seeking investment that may
not otherwise be there.
These money-market instruments are not large in aggregate – in con-
trast to Gorton et al ’s [Gorton et al., 2012] estimate of 33% of GDP being
composed of safe assets, money market instruments in the UK system of na-
tional accounts typically account for around 0.01% (1 basis point) of GDP,
peaking at 1.5 bps in Q1 2001. There is significant interest in the composi-
tion of this money supply by asset-holder over time however. Excluding for
the moment the rest of the world, Figure 3.3 depicts the time series of this
composition at quarterly frequency, 1987:Q1 – 2018:Q1.
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Figure 3.3: MMIs by Asset Holder, excluding RoW
We see the expected growth before the financial crisis followed by a
decline in this funding source – though it is interesting to note the buying
activity of private nonfinancial corporates during this time, perhaps rotating
cash out of riskier uncollateralized positions with stressed commercial banks.
Corporates began to sell down their positions in aggregate from 2011, though
total volume remains approximately constant with the bid being taken up
by OFIs, who constitute the majority of the domestic market as of mid-
2017. Including the Rest of the World in Figure 3.4, observe that foreign
asset holders are the majority of the market in aggregate, and recovered
more quickly from the credit crunch as a shareholder class – perhaps also
motivated by a flight-to-safety instinct or desire for greater liquidity.
72
Figure 3.4: MMIs by Asset Holder, including RoW
73
3.3.2 Conclusion
It is these money market instruments that will be a predominant focus in
the rest of the work as we consider the relationships between the safe assets
produced by the shadow banking sector, other safe assets, and the wider
macroeconomy. To do so we assemble a time series dataset from publicly-
available sources, at the quarterly frequency and stretching back to 1967
for some indicators – though 1987 is more typical and the dataset becomes
acceptably dense after this point. We include measures of money market vol-
ume in addition to traditional money aggregates, macroeconomic variables,
various interest rates, and alternative measures of financial conditions. The
variables are detailed below, along with some abbreviations and notation
used throughout the statistical results section of this work.
We will use various measures of shadow banking activity as dependent
variables in the following empirical work, including the Errico-inspired mea-
sure of non-core financial sector funding (‘noncore’), and also various com-
ponents of the UK’s balance sheet held in money market instruments (in-
cluding but not limited to ‘MMIs OFIs Liab’). We also construct a measure
of securitisation activity by subtracting M4 lending excluding intermedi-
ate securitisation (‘M4Lex’) from the broader measure M4 lending (‘M4L’),
leaving just sterling value of securitisation activity. In adopting securiti-
sation as a metric for shadow banking activity we follow authors such as
Adrian & Shin, Pozsar et al, and Portes – all of whom have emphasised the
role played by securitisation in shadow banking sector credit transformation
[Adrian and Shin, 2009b, Pozsar et al., 2010, Portes, 2018].
3.4 Variable names and statistical notation
Table 3.4 gives the names, sources, and derivation of variables used in the
empirical work hereafter. Some standard notation is also adopted, and sum-
marised for convenience below.

















l gdpdef Natural logarithm of the GDP defla-
tor (author calc)




BoE yrGilt / ytm20yrGilt 20-year gilt yield
BoE l realM0 log of M0 notes and coins deflated by
GDP deflator (log of real M0 notes &
coins) (author calc)
BoE l realM4 log of M4 deflated by GDP deflator




log of 10-year gilt yield (author calc)
L yrGilt /
l ytm20yrGilt
Log of 20-year gilt yield (author calc)
BoE BankRate Bank of England policy interest rate
ONS RPI Annual % change in retail prices index
TermSpread Yield spread between policy rate and
10-year UK government gilt (author
calc)
NYXK ONS MMI Liab total UK aggregate balance sheet, total
money market instruments issued as
liabilities of UK non-bank FIs
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NYXJ ONS MMIs total econ-
omy assets
UK aggregate balance sheet, total
money market instruments held as as-
sets of UK sectors and issued by UK
nonbank FIs
NKZM ONS PNFC MMI Liab Money market instruments issued by
other UK residents (UK non-bank
FIs) that are held as assets of UK pri-
vate nonfinancial corporates
NKEM ONS MMIs public non-
financial corpora-
tions assets
Money market instruments issued by
other UK residents (UK non-bank
FIs) that are held as assets of UK pub-
lic nonfinancial corporates
NKKU ONS MMIs private
NFCs assets
Money market instruments issued by
other UK residents (UK non-bank
FIs) that are held as assets of UK pri-
vate nonfinancial corporates
NNTS ONS MMIs MFIs assets Money market instruments issued by
other UK residents (UK non-bank
FIs) that are held as assets of UK reg-
ulated banks
NLQG ONS MMIs OFIs assets Money market instruments issued by
other UK residents (UK non-bank
FIs) that are held as assets of UK
other financial institutions
NLTK ONS MMIs OFIs liabilities Money market instruments issued by
other UK residents (UK non-bank
FIs) that are issued as liabilities of UK
other financial institutions
NIYY ONS MMIs Insurers &
pension funds assets
Money market instruments issued by
other UK residents (UK non-bank
FIs) that are held as assets of UK in-
surers & pension funds
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NSUO ONS MMIs Central
govt assets
Money market instruments issued by
other UK residents (UK non-bank
FIs) that are held as assets of UK cen-
tral government
NJFG ONS MMIs Local
govt assets
Money market instruments issued by
other UK residents (UK non-bank
FIs) that are held as assets of UK local
government
NNNK ONS MMIs Hholds &
NPISH assets
Money market instruments issued by
other UK residents (UK non-bank
FIs) that are held as assets of UK
households & nonprofits
NLDQ ONS MMIs RoW assets Money market instruments issued by
other UK residents (UK non-bank
FIs) that are held as assets by the rest
of the world
LPQBC69 BoE M4L Aggregate M4 lending
RPQB57Q BoE M4Lex Aggregate M4 lending excluding secu-
ritisation
M4 securitisation M4 lending minus M4 lending exclud-
ing securitisation (author calc)
l realM4 securit Log of M4 securitisation, deflated by
GDP deflator (author calc)
XUQABK67 BoE EER Quarterly average Effective exchange
rate index - Sterling (Jan 2005 = 100)
LPQZ5GS BoE MFI hding InterOFC Quarterly amounts outstanding of
monetary financial institutions’ ster-
ling holdings of securities issued by In-
termediate OFCs (in sterling millions)
not seasonally adjusted
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LPQBC56 BoE MFI lending OFC Quarterly amounts outstanding of
monetary financial institutions’ ster-
ling net lending to other financial cor-
porations (in sterling millions) season-
ally adjusted
NYWQ ONS STDebt CentGov Balance Sheet, Total Economy, Short-
term debt securities issued by UK cen-
tral government
NYWY ONS STDebt LocGov Balance Sheet, Total Economy, Short-
term debt securities issued by UK lo-
cal government
NYXQ ONS LTDebt CentGov Balance Sheet, Total Economy, Long-
term debt securities issued, by UK
central government
NYXW ONS LTDebt LocGov Balance Sheet, Total Economy, Long-
term debt securities issued, by UK lo-
cal government
NKKC ONS PNFC MFI deposits Private non-financial corporates’ de-
posits with regulated banks
NKFB ONS PNFC total assets Total financial assets of private non-
financial corporates
NNMS ONS Hhold MFI deposits Households’ deposits with regulated
banks
IUQAVNEA BoE LIBOR / LI-
BOR 1m
Quarterly average Sterling 1-month
mean interbank lending rate
IUQAL1ESE BoE Euro CPR 1m Quarterly average of 1-month Euro-
commercial paper rates:
IUQAVJND BoE Bill DCR 1m Quarterly average of eligible bills 1-
month discount rate
IUQAGR1M BoE ON gilt repo Quarterly average of overnight gilt
repo interest rate
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• l - log of variable
• lr - log of variable deflated by log of GDP deflator
• d - first difference of variable
• d lr - first difference of log of variable deflated by log of GDP deflator
Suffixes
• 1 - 1-period lag
• 2 - 2-period lag
Coefficient significance
• *** = 0.01
• ** = 0.05
• * = 0.1
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Chapter 4
OLS and VECM Results
4.1 Replicating existing models of money demand
4.1.1 Introduction
Before investigating the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, we first exam-
ine the behaviour of the traditional monetary aggregates in the quarterly
dataset for comparison with the work of previous authors, and to calibrate
methodology. We consider models of both narrow money – M0 notes & coins
– and of broad money, M4 in the present study. In keeping with the prac-
tice in the literature, we estimate vector error correction models for both of
these aggregates of interest – however we may derive some initial findings
from a simple OLS specification relating these aggregates to measures of real
economy activity, own and alternate interest rates, and inflation. Errico et
al [Errico et al., 2014] also employ simple, OLS estimates to establish par-
tial derivatives in their landmark work mapping the shadow banking system
through a flow of funds methodology for the United States, and we follow
their lead here. Though the nonstationarity present in some of these time
series and the high R2 values associated with the models typically indicate
spurious regression, and though the Gauss-Markov conditions are typically
not met in these models, Verbeek [Verbeek, 2008] demonstrates that in the
presence of cointegration between the timeseries – of the form we go on to
demonstrate here – the OLS estimator is ‘superconsistent’ for estimating
the parameters of the long-run equilibrium relationship, and as such some
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limited inferences may be drawn. Exact model outputs are available in Ap-
pendix A, and are referred to in the text by the code under which they may
be found in that appendix. Traditional monetary aggregate models belong
to model Group A, and have codes of the form A1a, etc.
4.1.2 Methodology: the general vector error correction model
Developing the error-correction methodology of Sargan [Sargan, 1964] and
the two-step, single-cointegrating-vector approach of Engle & Granger [En-
gle and Granger, 1987], the extension of error-correction time series models
into higher-dimensional cointegrating space is due to Johansen [Johansen,
1988] and Johansen & Juselius [Johansen and Juselius, 1990]. The follow-
ing section reproduces in large part the accessible discussion of the linear
algebra of cointegration in the Gretl User Guide [Cottrell and Lucchetti,
2012]. Consider a simple vector autoregressive process of order p where y is
a vector of length n, such as:
yt = ut +A1yt−1 +A2yt−2 + ...+Apyt−p + et (4.1)
As yt−i ≡ yt−1 − (∆yt−1 +∆yt−2 + ...+∆yt−i+1), which is to say that y
is the sum of its past changes, we can cast the above in first difference form
as:
∆yt = ut +Πyt−1 +
p−1∑︂
i=1
Γi∆yt−1 + et (4.2)
This is known as the vector error correction form. Interpretation depends
crucially on the rank r of the matrix Π, where if this matrix has rank greater
than zero but less than the column span of the dataset n, cointegration
exists. At the extremes:
• If r = 0, the processes are all integrated of order 1 and not cointe-
grated, and a VAR in first differences should be estimated.
• If r = n, the matrix Π is invertible, the processes are stationary, and
cointegration analysis is not necessary.
81
• If 0 < r < n, cointegration exists and Π can be decomposed as αβ′,
where β holds the long-run cointegrating vectors and is n× r, while α
holds the parameters governing short-run response to disequilibrium
and is r × n.
The contribution of Johansen [Johansen, 1988] and Johansen & Juselius
[Johansen and Juselius, 1990] was to provide a method to estimate the rank
of the matrix Π by computing the eigenvalues of a closely-related matrix
constructed to be symmetric and positive semidefinite, and therefore having
positive real eigenvalues – the rank of this companion matrix is equal to the
number of nonzero eigenvalues. Johansen [Johansen, 1988] derives critical
values below which cutoffs the eigenvalues are not statistically distinguish-
able from zero. Because αβ′ = αRRβ′ for some arbitrary conformable
nonsingular matrix R, α and β are underidentified in the absence of identi-
fying restrictions. In general for rank r, r2 restrictions are needed to achieve
identification. Normalising one coefficient per column to 1 (or -1 to cast that
variable as the dependent) is an easy route to r such restrictions, and the
other r(r − 1) can be drawn from economic theory or, as we do later, from
statistical properties of the system variables. Overidentifying restrictions
can also be tested by likelihood ratio in the pursuit of particular hypotheses
motivated by theory. Otherwise, the long run relationships can be left un-
deridentified at the cost of not being able to define standard errors or draw
inferences regarding the long run equations – but without the loss of consis-
tent numerical estimation. In the short-run equations, the Granger repre-
sentation theorem holds that any set of nonstationary cointegrated variables
can be characterized as being generated by an error correction mechanism
– and indeed these variables are cointegrated only if this ECM exists. It
is desirable that at least one equation in the system should respond to dis-
equilibrium in each of the long-run relationships specified, and so should
have a negative coefficient of statistical significance to the residuals of these
relationships – moving the variable in the direction of ‘closing the gap’.
It is these attributes – interpretable long-run and valid error-correction
short-run equations – that we will look for in the empirical work directly
following. Given our assumption that safe-asset substitutes suffer from in-
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elastic supply in the short term, it is in the short-run equations that we will
look for evidence towards our hypotheses H3 and H4 regarding demand sub-
stitution. Classical money-demand models are concerned with the long-run
relationships of money quantities to GDP and inflation, so H1 and H2 will
typically be assessed in light of the long-run parameter estimates.
4.1.3 Model group A
Guide to models: model group A
In group A we fit models to standard, not shadow-banking focused mone-
tary aggregates with the aim of reproducing results similar to those found
in the literature concerning money demand for the UK [Hendry and Er-
icsson, 1991, Drake and Chrystal, 1994, Nielsen, 2007]. Full details of all
regressions are presented in Appendix A, and we summarise them here for
ease of use. Models of group A1 concern the measure M0 notes and coins
as dependent variable. Model A1a regresses log real M0 on log real gdp,
the log of the gdp deflator, and the 20-year gilt yield. We find the expected
positive significant coefficient to real GDP (0.23, p<0.06) and negative co-
efficient to the opportunity cost of holding money as measured by the yield
on gilts (-0.03, p<0.01). However the large positive significant coefficient to
the inflation measure violates the common assumption of price invariance
in the literature, in this functional form (1.22, p<0.01). Model A1b substi-
tutes the 10-year gilt yield for the 20-year, and the coefficient to real GDP
now exceeds 1 (1.80, p<0.01) – however the relationship with inflation is now
negative and significant (-0.88, p<0.01) and it may not be a coincidence that
these sum to approximately 1, suggesting a 1-for-1 relationship between de-
mand for narrow money and economic activity as expected in the literature.
The coefficient to opportunity cost remains negative and significant (-0.04,
p<0.01). Model A1c substitutes RPI for the GDP deflator as the measure of
inflation, and the interpretation of the coefficients to real GDP ans outside
interest rates are as A1a and A1b above – the coefficient to the inflation
measure remains significant but is now small in absolute magnitude (0.01,
p<0.01). These models are summarised in Table 4.1. Model A1d attempts
to fit a VECM to the system composed of log real M0, log real gdp, RPI
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and the 10-year gilt yield, but as mentioned above this functional form does
not elicit significant or satisfactory results. These results are nevertheless
published in Appendix A herein.
Models of group A2 concern the broad money measure M4, in log real
form deflated by the GDP deflator. Model A2a introduces log real gdp, the
log gdp deflator, and the 20-year gilt yield as explanatory variables. Though
the coefficient estimates are significant, the signs contradict our hypotheses
and the published literature. Model A2b substitutes the 10-year gilt yield for
the 20-year, but it does not enter the equation with a significant coefficient
and other parameter estimates remain unsatisfactory. Model A2c substitutes
RPI for log gdp deflator as the inflation metric, and returns more promising
estimates. There is a positive coefficient to real gdp (1.95, p<0.01) and a
negative relationship to gilt yields (-0.02, p<0.05), as expected. The RPI
measure is small in magnitude but shows as significant (0.02, p<0.01) – this
is typically expected to be zero. Subsequent models of group A2 introduce
variables to act as proxies for broad money’s own rate of return, and these
might be expected to enter with positive sign if better compensation leads
to larger real money balances being held. However negative relationships
may be due to confounding supply effects making identification difficult –
an asset of the holder is a liability of the seller, and higher interest rates
may induce sellers to supply less money. Model A2d introduces LIBOR as
a measure of return on money, and indeed we find the relationship to be
negative, albeit small in magnitude (-0.02, p<0.01). Model A2e substitutes
the Bank of England policy rate for LIBOR, still with M4 as the dependent,
with similar results (-0.02, p<0.01). This is unsurprising given the close
relationship between the policy rate and LIBOR. Model A2f dispenses with
the 10-year yield but adds the difference between the 10-year yield and the
Bank Rate as a measure we refer to as the Term Spread, and in this model
both the Bank Rate and the Term Spread enter with positive sign. These
results are summarised in Table 4.4.
System A2g estimates a VECM for the variables space composed of log
real M4, log real gdp, RPI, the 10-year gilt yield, and the Bank of England
policy rate, and is discussed below.
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Table 4.1: Parameter estimates and significance for OLS models of group
A1.
Variable A1a A1b A1c
Log Real GDP 0.23* 1.80*** 0.67***
Log GDP Deflator 1.22*** -0.88*** -
RPI - - 0.02***
10-year gilt yield - -0.04*** -
20-year gilt yield -0.03*** - -0.05***
R2 0.97 0.92 0.88
A1: Models of M0 notes & coins
Group A1 concerns models of base or narrow money, defined here as the
Bank of England’s measure M0 notes & coins.
OLS Models The OLS forms summarised in Table 4.1 are not entirely
without merit – in particular, all display the negative coefficient to gilt yields
that would be expected, though it is small in magnitude. Other authors con-
sider a risky rate of return such as commercial paper rates as the ‘alternative’
rate of return opportunity cost to holding money – by using long-dated gilt
yields, our measure of opportunity cost embeds a term premium rather than
a risk premium, casting money as sacrificing yield in exchange for immedi-
acy – through the maturity transformation process of the banking sector.
Otherwise, model A1b displays the expected sign and significance with re-
spect to GDP and the level of prices – and it may be noteworthy that these
coefficients sum to around unity, though all variables are in real terms. We
stop short of implying a relationship between real money balances and nom-
inal GDP. Both A1a and A1c have coefficients to real GDP of less than 1,
and both also display a positive relationship to the incorporated measure of
prices.
It should be noted also that the length of the 10-year and 20-year gilt
yield series differs, with the 10-year yield providing more observations – as
such it is generally preferred hereafter.
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Table 4.2: Cointegrating vectors (unidentified) for system A2g
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
Log real M4 -1 1.94 -50.63 2.14
Log real GDP 0.91 -1 177.14 -11.2
RPI 0.11 0.05 -1 -0.05
10-year gilt yield -0.05 0.08 2.98 -1
Bank Rate -0.06 0.06 2.37 0.44
A1d: VECM on M0 Despite an extensive specification search, we were
unable to elicit a vector error correction form with desirable attributes for
M0 notes and coins. We report an illustrative example as model A1d in
the technical output appendix, but we do not discuss the results at length
here. The Johansen procedure indicates a relatively large cointegration space
of 3 cointegrating vectors for the 4-variable system, and so the long-run
forms are underidentified, though the long run coefficient of real GDP to M0
money supply, at 0.57, is appropriate. The short-run equations lack desirable
equilibrium-correcting properties, and following the work of [Jawadi and
Sousa, 2013], it seems likely that nonlinear or time-varying parameters are
at play here.
A2: Models of M4
Group A2 concerns models of broad money, defined here as the Bank of
England’s measure M4.
A2g: VECM of M4 Parameter estimates for system A2g are reported
in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Table 4.2 contains the long-run equations, and Table
4.3 contains the short-run parameter estimates.
Discussion: model group A
The longer time series permitted by use of the 10-year gilt yield in preference
to the 10-year rate once again delivers estimates more in line with theory
when M4 is the dependent variable – and as such we refrain from discussing
model A2a at length. All other OLS models of M4 display positive and
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Table 4.3: Short-run adjustment parameters for system A2g
Variable Coefficient P-value
d lr M4 1 0.09 0.29
d lr gdp 1 -0.55 0.02**
d RPI 1 0.01 0.001***
d ytm10yrgilt 1 0 0.97







Table 4.4: Parameter estimates and significance for OLS models of group A2
Variable A2a A2b A2c A2d A2e A2f
Log Real GDP -0.92*** 1.44*** 1.95*** 1.67*** 1.67*** 1.67***
Log GDP Deflator 3.74*** 0.71*** - 0.62*** 0.61*** 0.61***
RPI - - 0.02*** - - -
10-year gilt yield - 0.003 -0.03* 0.03* 0.04*** -
20-year gilt yield 0.12*** - - - - -
LIBOR - - - -0.02*** - -
Bank Base Rate - - - - -0.02*** 0.02*
Term Spread - - - - - 0.04***
R2 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.97 0.97 0.97
significant wealth effects, with coefficients to GDP ranging from +1.44 to
+1.95. As with some of the M0 models, coefficients concerning levels or
changes in price tend to be positive. A2c, including RPI as an explanatory
variable, defines a hyperplane solution that is decreasing in increasing gilt
yields, as would be expected from an alternative, opportunity-cost interest
rate. Other models however estimate a positive coefficient to gilt rates. This
may be due to the composition of M4 – as this aggregate includes lending
activity by regulated banks, lending activity may be increasing in increasing
gilt rates as the net interest margin of the lending bank may be higher. As
such, including the 10-year gilt rate in this regression may be proxying term
premia, which we would expect to be positively correlated with at least
the lending component of M4. Models A2d and A2e include short-term
interest rates – LIBOR and the Bank of England Base Rate respectively –
and both these rates enter the equation with negative sign. This also may
be attributable to the effect of short rates on net interest margin – as banks
borrow short and lend long, all other things being equal, increasing long
rates (or equivalently term premia) increase the net interest margin and
incentivise lending, while increasing short rates lower the margin [Genay,
2014].
Applying the Johansen procedure to the system (log real M4, log real
GDP, RPI, 10-year gilt yield, Bank Rate) suggests that, while the small-
est eigenvalue is indistinguishable from zero and cointegration therefore ex-
ists, four vectors are required to span the cointegrating space of this five-
variable system, and identification of the long-run equations on purely the-
oretical grounds is extremely difficult. Some novel identification strategies
are presented later within the present work, but are outside the scope of this
replication-focused analysis of standard monetary aggregates. As such, we
define the cointegrating vectors up to a normalisation only, and otherwise
leave them unconstrained. The cointegrating vector normalised on log real
M4 has a positive coefficient to log real GDP of +0.91, though it is not
possible to say if this is significant. RPI also enters the long-run equation
for M4 with positive sign, while the partial derivatives with respect to both
policy rates and 10-year gilt rates are negative. In the short run, changes in
log real M4 money supply do not display a significant autoregressive compo-
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nent, but do respond negatively to positive changes in log real GDP. Money
supply also is not found to respond significantly to disequilibrium in the
long-run equation for which it is cast as the dependent – log real M4 instead
corrects disequilibrium in long-run equation 2, cast as the long-run equation
for GDP.
To briefly summarise and compare with existing money supply literature
focused on the UK – coefficients are estimated with the expected sign more
often than not, notwithstanding some superficially unusual but logically
explicable responses to term premia in the case of M4. We find that M0
responds to real GDP with a magnitude typically <1, and less than that
estimated for M4, which is typically 1.7. This approximates the results
of McNown & Wallace [McNown and Wallace, 1992], who find coefficients
typically <1 for narrow money and >1 for broad money. Magnitudes of
parameter estimates for own and alternate rates of return are somewhat
different to the magnitudes published in existing literature, being typically
much smaller – though this may be a result of differing variable encoding
between the present study and antecedent literature. We report parameter
estimates around 0.02 to 0.1, whereas 6 to 7 is estimated in, for example,
Ericsson et al [Ericsson et al., 1998]. Having replicated existing models
of money demand using standard dependent variables with some success,
we now turn our attention to the shadow banking sector to see if similar
specifications can be elicited for measures of activity in that sector.
4.2 The shadow banking sector and the provision
of safe, money-like assets
4.2.1 Introduction
We first considered multiple individual variables that address or proxy some
element of shadow banking activity in addressing the hypotheses outlined
in Table 3.1. In the regressions outlined below these range from a relatively
narrow measure, log real amounts outstanding of Money Market Instruments
issued by Other Financial Intermediaries, through the broader categories of
(log real) all MMI assets held by UK sectoral counterparties and a con-
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structed measure we term ‘M4 securitisation’, to the broadest measure of
all – a measure of ‘noncore’ banking sector liabilities defined after Errico et
al [Errico et al., 2014] and constructed as outlined in Chapter 3 above.
4.2.2 Guide to models: model group B
Models of group B concern measures of shadow banking sector activity, de-
fined as aggregate quantities of financial instruments outstanding, at varying
levels of specificity. Group B1 models take the narrowest measure, money
market instruments (MMIs) issued by other financial intermediaries (OFIs),
as the dependent variable - referred to as ‘logreal B1’. Model B1a regresses
this measure on log real gdp, RPI, and the 10-year gilt yield. The positive,
significant coefficient to real GDP (1.20, p<0.01) is in line with the hypoth-
esis that shadow banking narrow money provision scales with real economic
activity in a similar way to demand for central bank narrow money. Model
B1b includes a measure of M4 broad money which enters with negative sign
and significance (-0.76, p<0.01). Model B1c introduces M0, the measure of
official central bank narrow money, and this enters the system with nega-
tive sign, large magnitude and significance (-3.09, p<0.01) – as one would
expect if shadow bank and central bank money are treated as substitutes.
The absolute magnitude (>1) of this estimate also suggests a procyclical at-
tribute to shadow bank narrow money creation – ‘overreacting’ to injections
or withdrawals of official money. Model B1d introduces the overnight gilt
repo rate as a measure of the return on shadow bank narrow money, and this
enters with expected positive sign and marginal significance (0.02, p=0.07).
Removing the insignificant independent variables from model B1d yields
model B1e, an appealing specification showing quantity of shadow bank
narrow money responds positively to real economic activity (0.63, p<0.01)
and to own interest rate (0.03, p<0.01), and negatively to broad money
quantity (-0.23, p<0.01) and to inflation, a measure of the opportunity cost
of holding nominal money balances (-0.02, p<0.01). These regressions are
summarised in Table 4.6.
Model B1f fits a VECM to the system composed of log real money mar-
ket instruments issued by OFIs, log real gdp, log real M4, RPI, and the
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overnight gilt repo rate. The long run relationships are left unidentified in
the absence of plausible identifying restrictions, but are normalised to the
shadow bank money measure, real gdp, and real M4 for interpretability.
The short-run estimates indicate that shadow bank money responds to dis-
equilibrium in the long-run equation for real GDP (λ = −0.33), and also
displays a significant negative relationship to one lag of M4 quantity (-0.99,
p<0.01) – suggesting that an increase (decrease) in broad money leads to an
almost precisely offsetting fall (rise) in shadow bank issued money market
instruments the following quarter.
Models of group B2 concern the constructed measure of M4 securitisa-
tion as the dependent variable. B2a offers an OLS equation comprising log
real gdp, log real M4, RPI and the overnight gilt repo rate as explanatory
variables. Only the measures of internal return and opportunity cost – the
repo rate and RPI respectively – display the expected sign and significance.
Model B2b fits a VECM to the same system of variables involved in B2a,
but a tractable system of short-run equations proves elusive.
Models of group B3 extend the measure of shadow bank money to all
money market instruments issued by UK residents, a sector sum we trans-
form into log real terms and refer to as ‘l realB3’. The contemporaneous
OLS model B3a incorporates log real gdp, RPI, the 10-year gilt yield as
external return, and the overnight repo rate as a measure of the return to
holding shadow bank money. All variables except real gdp (which is in-
significant) enter with the expected sign and significance. Model B3b fits a
VECM to the same variable space, and the long-run forms reported in Table
4.7 show promise. In the long-run equation with shadow bank activity as the
dependent variable, equilibrium relationships are as hypothesised – positive
to GDP (4.76), negative to M4 (-1.40), positive to the overnight repo rate
(0.21) and negative to the yield on gilts (-0.09). The short-run forms prove
intractable once more, but are reported in Table 4.8 nevertheless.
Models of group B4 are all vector error-correction models, and intro-
duce measures of alternative safe asset issuance by banks and government
in order to address hypotheses H3 and H4. Model B4a estimates a system
composed of log real M4 securitisation, log real gdp, log of the gdp defla-
tor, 1-month LIBOR, the 20-year gilt yield, and log real short-term cen-
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tral government debt outstanding. The Johansen rank-selection procedure
suggests one or two long-run equations, and we estimate and report both.
Model B4a presents the single long-run equation form, and we normalise to
the measure of shadow banking activity as the ‘dependent’ of this long-run
equation. We find the expected negative equilibrium relationship with gov-
ernment debt issuance (-1.33), positive relationship with GDP (42.57) and
negative relationship with inflation (-18.43), but the return metrics confound
expectations. The short-run equations suggest that shadow banking activity
does correct disequilibrium in the long-run relationship (λ = −0.04). Model
B4b introduces the 2-equation long-run forms, and the long-run form with
shadow banking activity as the dependent has similar properties to B4a, as
does the short-run equation with shadow banking activity as the dependent.
B4c and B4d mirror B4a and B4b respectively but substitute the mea-
sure of long-term debt issuance by central government for the short-term
measure. Neither produces a short- or long-run system that provides evi-
dence for our hypotheses, and we do not discuss them in detail here.
Model B4e introduces a (log real) measure of deposits held in the tradi-
tional banking sector by private non-financial corporates (‘lr PNFC MMI deposits’).
We thereby seek to address our hypothesis H3, that corporate cash pools
are a key source of demand for shadow banking sector safe assets. Log
real M4 securitisation remains the proxy for shadow banking activity. The
long-run equation with shadow banking activity as the dependent displays
the expected negative relationship in equilibrium with regulated bank de-
posits (-1.41) – however this estimate is not significant given the identifying
restrictions used.
Model B4f introduces quarterly realised volatility in the FTSE 100 as
an exogenous explanatory variable in the short-tun adjustment equations.
This volatility measure aims to proxy financial distress, and the coefficient
should capture how financial stress impacts demand for shadow banking
sector services. Initially we permit this measure to enter contemporaneously,
and the coefficient in the short-run equation for log real M4 securitisation is
positive and significant (0.002, p<0.05), suggesting that elevated financial
distress increases securitisation activity at the margin – possibly as regulated
banks, faced with volatility in their equity holdings and loan securities, seek
93
to move assets off-balance-sheet. However this may also reflect a preference
by safe-asset demanders for instruments that are explicitly asset-backed,
or are at arms’ length from troubled publicly-traded banks. Model B4g
modifies the FTSE volatility variable to enter the short-run equations with a
one-quarter lag. Model B4g is our preferred functional form, and is therefore
discussed in more detail hereinafter.
Model B4h fits a VECM system around the broadest measure of shadow
banking activity, non-core bank funding as defined by Errico et al [Errico
et al., 2014]. It does not yield evidence in support of our hypotheses and is
not discussed in detail here, though full parameter estimates are published
in Appendix A, as they are for all other models estimated.
4.2.3 Summary of results: model group B
Contemporaneous OLS models concerning MMIs liabilities issued by OFIs
display the expected sign and significance with respect to GDP, coefficients
varying from 0.63 to 4.65 depending upon specification. RPI as a measure
of opportunity cost also enters with the expected (negative) sign and is
significant though of smaller magnitude. Alternative measures of narrow
and broad money, introduced as controls, also pick up some significance in
these specifications. Among the vector models, the preferred model for this
most limited of SBS measures, model B1f, estimates a negative coefficient
to GDP in the long-run equation – albeit with the caveat that the long-run
relationships in this case are under-identified, and so significance cannot be
assessed. A tractable short-run error correcting relationship for this system
proved elusive.
Modelling the constructed measure M4 securitisation as a proxy for ac-
tivity in the shadow banking sector yields the vector systems B2b and B4g,
where B4g also includes measures of long-term central government debt
issuance and private non-financial corporates’ holdings of deposits in the
regulated banking sector in order to address hypotheses H3 and H4 as de-
fined above. In both cases the measure of interest is in log-real terms, and
as such the long run relationship with the measure of price level is con-
strained to be zero to achieve identification and estimate standard errors
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for the long-run equations. B4g yields the form that most closely complies
with the hypotheses – albeit with a large and marginally-significant coeffi-
cient of 39.29 to log real GDP. Measures of long-term central government
debt issuance and PNFC deposits in regulated banks do not enter the long-
run cointegrating relationships with significance, and so no evidence can be
given for hypotheses H3 and H4 from this part of the model. However, the
short-run adjustment equation corresponding to this long-run form and with
(the first difference of) log real M4 securitisation as the dependent contains
a negative and significant coefficient of -1.14 to long-term debt issuance by
the central government, and this may be considered as evidence in favour of
the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis due to Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen
[Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012]. The short-run equation for
(change in log real) M4 securitisation is as follows:
∆lr M4 sec =− 14.13 +−0.18 ∗∆lr M4 sect−1 + 0.98 ∗∆l gdpdeft−1
+ 0.09 ∗∆LIBOR 1mt−1 +−0.08 ∗∆ytm 20yrGiltt−1
+−1.14 ∗∆lr LT Debt CGt−1 + 0.70 ∗∆lr PNFC MFI depositst−1
+ 0.001 ∗ FTSE V olt−1 + 0.03 ∗ λ1 +−0.47 ∗ λ2
(4.3)
where all variables are named as in the statistical tables with the ex-
ception of λ1 and λ2, which give the error-correction speed-of-adjustment
parameters with respect to the first (λ1) and second (λ2) long-run equations.
The first long-run equation is normalised to the measure of securitisation ac-
tivity and is reported in Table 4.7 , while the second equation is normalised
to the gdp deflator and is reported in Appendix A.
4.2.4 Discussion: model group B
Applying the time-series methodology of Johansen [Johansen, 1988] to the
question of shadow banking as a provider of monetary services, we document
evidence from the short-run model in favour of our hypothesis H4. Equation
4.3 shows the short-run equation with M4 securitisation as the dependent
variable, and the significant coefficient of -1.14 to central government debt
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Evidence from VECM models
H2 Log real GDP + , approxi-
mately 1
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in absolute mag-
nitude if crowd-
ing out is total
Good – B4g shows significant short run re-
sponse to change in level of outstanding
central government debt (ie. issuance), and
close to hypothesized magnitude
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Table 4.6: Contemporaneous OLS results for models of group B1

























log real GDP 1.21*** 2.64*** 4.65*** 0.98* 0.63*** -1.93*** -0.37
RPI -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03** -0.02**
10-year gilt
yield
0.01 -0.004 -0.09*** 0.004 - - -0.06***
Overnight
gilt repo rate
- - - 0.02* 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02*




- - -3.09*** -0.22 - - -
R2 0.57 0.61 0.87 0.73 0.73 0.99 0.16
Table 4.7: VECM long-run equations for systems of group B
Model Code B1f B2b B3b B4g
Dependent Var log real MMIs OFIs li-
abilities
log real M4 securitisa-
tion
log real MMIs liabili-
ties excl RoW
log real M4 securitisa-
tion
log real GDP -5.2 -7.88*** 4.76*** 39.29*
RPI -0.81 0.00 (constrained) 0.00 (constrained) -
log GDP deflator - - - 0.00 (constrained)
10-year gilt yield - - -0.09 -
20-year gilt yield - - - 3.21***
Overnight gilt repo
rate
0.51 -0.32*** 0.21*** -
1-month LIBOR - - - 0.02
log real M4 4.52 4.66*** -1.40* -
log real M0 notes &
coins
- - - -
log real long-term cen-
tral govt debt
- - - 1.85
log real private non-
financial corporates
deposits with MFIs
- - - -5.9
Table 4.8: VECM short-run equations for variables of interest in systems of group B
Model Code B1f B2b B3b B4g
Dependent Var log real MMIs OFIs liabilities log real M4 securitisation log real MMIs liabilities excl
RoW
log real M4 securitisation
autoregressive term in diffs 0.14 -0.07 -0.16 -0.18
diff log real GDP t-1 0.82 -2.28 -3.02* -5.36***
diff RPI t-1 0.01 0.01 0.04** -
diff log GDP deflator t-1 - - - 0.98
diff 10-year gilt yield t-1 - - 0.002 -
diff 20-year gilt yield t-1 - - - -0.08*
diff overnight gilt repo rate t-1 -0.03* -0.004 -0.04 -
diff 1m LIBOR t-1 - - - 0.09***
diff log real M4 t-1 -0.99*** -0.76 -0.62 -
diff log real M0 notes & coins
t-1
- - - -
diff log real long-term central
govt debt
- - - -1.14***
diff log real PNFC deposits at
MFIs
- - - 0.70*
Acceptable error correction
specification?
No - LR eq 1 has no correction
mechanism
No - LR eq 1 has no correction
mechanism
No - no significant responses to
disequilibrium
Yes - correction to diseq flows
through rates - LIBOR and gilt
yields
issuance implies that extra availability of government debt drains deposits
out of the shadow banking system, and correspondingly a fall in government
debt issuance leads to increasing securitisation and shadow bank money
issuance the following quarter. With a standard error of 0.34 the coefficient is
statistically distinguishable from zero with p < 0.01, but it is not statistically
distinguishable from 1 and we may tentatively conclude that ‘crowding out’
of the shadow banking sector by government-issued safe assets is supported
in the data. This finding accords with the work of Krishnamurthy & Vissing-
Jorgensen [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012] and supports the
assertion of Pozsar [Pozsar, 2013] and of Gorton et al [Gorton et al., 2012]
that the shadow banking sector arises in response to insufficient quantities
of government debt for purchase as safe assets. We assume that quarter-
to-quarter issuance of government debt is related to government’s need for
working capital and not the demand for quality collateral within the financial
sector, and on that basis we identify shifts in shadow banking activity with
shifts in demand for shadow banking services, rather than idiosyncratic shifts
in supply.
Though we demonstrate evidence for hypothesis H4 regarding substi-
tutability of shadow banking assets with government debt, support for our
other hypotheses remains weak – and a potential culprit is that our chosen
dependent variables are poor proxies for shadow banking activity, or fail to
incorporate enough information. In the next chapter we take inspiration
from Stock & Watson, Bernanke et al, and Banerjee & Marcellino to derive
information from considering a broader set of potential dependent variables




The Shadow Banking Factor
5.1 Principal Components Analysis
5.1.1 Introduction
With only weak evidence for the hypotheses arising from specific, individual-
variable-focused regression forms in the previous chapter, we now consider
methods whereby the larger column span of our money-market-funds-by-
investor dataset may be leveraged to provide extra information.
Dimension reduction strategies for data analysis, and more generally
techniques for uncovering latent ‘fundamental’ structure in datasets, are
commonplace in the social and hard sciences. Psychologists, biologists and
others who deal chiefly with cross-sectional data with many attributes but
perhaps relatively few rows (‘large p small n’) were early adopters of the
methods of principal components and exploratory factor analysis. The lit-
erature concerning their use in economics is due in large part to the pro-
lific statisticians and longtime co-authors James Stock and Mark Watson.
Though pioneered by Sargent & Sims in 1977’s ‘Business cycle modelling
without pretending to have too much a priori economic theory’ [Sargent
et al., 1977], factor strategies owe much of their prominence in econometrics
to the work of Stock & Watson, beginning with 1998’s ‘Diffusion Indexes’
[Stock and Watson, 1998]. The present work is closest in spirit to Stock &
Watson’s 2002 ‘Forecasting using principal components from a large number
of predictors’ [Stock and Watson, 2002]. Therein, it is established that a
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correlated time series dataset can be summarized by a potentially smaller
number of uncorrelated, unobservable factors – and that these factors can be
consistently recovered (in the statistical sense) by the method of principal
components under fairly general assumptions about what form the cross-
sectional and temporal correlations within the original dataset take. Treat-
ing these principal components as estimates of the unobservable factors,
Stock & Watson are then able to incorporate them in otherwise standard
forecasting VARs.
Bernanke et al [Bernanke et al., 2005] employ a similar approach to
pioneer the factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR). They also es-
timate the latent factors by the method of principal components, also offer-
ing a Bayesian likelihood approach which we do not pursue here. FAVARs
have since become commonplace in the literature, but the present work
may be subcategorized as the relatively rarer factor-augmented vector error-
correction model (FAVECM), introduced by Banerjee & Marcellino [Baner-
jee and Marcellino, 2009]. Banerjee & Marcellino characterize the functional
form – and we agree – as a natural extension of the FAVAR, and further
note that just as standard VARs in first differences may be misspecified (or
at least improved upon) in the presence of cointegration, so too must be
factor-augmented VARs. Banerjee & Marcellino consider as their examples
US interest rates and the US macroeconomy generally, and the present work
is believed to be a novel application of the FAVECM to the field of shadow
banking – and possibly to the broader field of money demand. A further
point of differentiation is that Banerjee & Marcellino introduce factor repre-
sentations to augment the study of ‘real’ (non-constructed) macroeconomic
variables, whereas in the present study the factors themselves are the object
of focus.
An assumption of the methodology is that one or more latent (unobserv-
able) factors exists, and captures the phenomenon of interest – in this case
we assume the existence of two latent factors carrying information about
the level of shadow banking activity, and we further assume that measured
variables contain information about and are correlated with these latent fac-
tors, but no one observable variable is equal to a latent factor. Owing to
the normalisation of the data that takes place during the principal compo-
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nents procedure, the ability to interpret the coefficients of the FAVECM as
semi-elasticities or elasticities is lost – the factors are in z-score terms. We
can still make statements about sign and significance, and perhaps about
the behaviour of explanatory variables when the latent factors are above or
below their own mean.
5.1.2 Results
We consider four possible structures for a factor structure study of the
shadow banking activity dataspace:
• Panel 1a: A small, four-column dataset containing the Errico ‘noncore’
measure, our constructed measure M4 securitisation, and total MMI
asset and liability series, with all variables entering in log real terms;
• Panel 1b: The same four variables in first-differenced log real form;
• Panel 2a: An expanded dataset with the four previous variables, in
addition to measures of MMI holdings broken out by economic sector:
PNFCs, MFIs, OFI assets, OFI liabilities, Insurers & Pension Funds,
local government, households, and the Rest of World sector. As before
all variables are in log-real terms;
• Panel 2b: The first-differenced version of the above.
Panel 1a Panel 1a: After normalising and scaling the input variables to
be mean zero and have unit variance, we extract the principal components.
In general, and unlike the rank-reduction cointegration work of Johansen
relied upon above, the principal components of a dataset may span a space
of dimension equal to the dataset, that is to say there are as many principal
components defined as there are variables in the dataset. However, like
the Johansen procedure [Johansen, 1988], principal components are closely
related to the eigenvalues of (the covariance matrix of) the dataset, and so
some ‘later’ principal components may be discarded as they explain little
of the remaining unspanned variance in the dataset. The proportion of
variance spanned by each successive principal component may be assessed
numerically, where a rule of thumb is to seek at least 50% explained variance,
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Figure 5.1: Scree plot of variance structure in Panel 1a
or visualised in a scree plot like Figure 5.1 below. In analysing a scree plot
it is practice to look for an ‘elbow’ where the next principal component adds
substantially less explanatory power than the component that preceded it.
In the case of panel 1a, this ‘elbow’ is notable at principal component
2, and the first component accounts for nearly 60% of the variance in the
dataset. Following the Stock &Watson procedure [Stock and Watson, 2002],
it would be acceptable to incorporate just the first principal component of
panel 1a into a subsequent analysis.
We can also graph the variable loadings on the first two principal compo-
nents to gain more information about the covariance structure of the dataset.
Figure 5.2 below depicts this plot for panel 1a – and we can see that the
first principal component contains information about the variables noncore
and M4 securitisation, while the measure of MMI assets, and particularly
liabilities, load on principal component 2.
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Figure 5.2: Variable loading on Principal Components 1 and 2 of Panel 1a
Panel 2a A similar analysis was carried out for the other 3 panels, and full
results are shown in Appendix B. Panel 2a, the larger panel of undifferenced
variables, offered the most promising results and the analysis hereinafter will
focus upon that dataset exclusively. Figure 5.3 below depicts the scree plot
of explained variance associated with the principal components of panel 2a,
and Figure 5.4 depicts the variable loadings.
As with panel 1a it will be seen that principal component 1 contains in-
formation about the variables noncore and M4 securitisation, now joined by
MMIs held by local governments. These variables are somewhat negatively
correlated with total MMI assets, which loads negatively on PC1 along with
MMI liabilities to OFIs, and MFIs MMI assets. Broadly uncorrelated with
the above, by orthogonality of principal components, are MMI assets held
by the Rest of the World, PNFCs, and the measure of total MMI liabilities
in the UK economy. Indeed this finding is borne out by examining X-Y scat-
terplots of the variables themselves, an example of which (M4 securitisation
vs. Rest of World MMI assets in the UK) is shown in Figure 5.5 below.
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Figure 5.3: Scree plot of variance structure in Panel 2a
Given the 59% of variance explained by the first two principal compo-
nents, along with their identifiability with underlying transactional phenom-
ena, these will form the factors to be incorporated into subsequent analysis.
Hereafter, we term Panel 2a’s first principal component ‘SBS Factor 1’ and
the second component ‘SBS Factor 2’.
5.2 Factor-Augmented VECM
Having derived by principal components analysis, estimates of the latent
factors driving activity in the ultimate liabilities of the shadow banking
sector, we now incorporate these estimated factors into vector systems to
assess their validity with respect to our hypotheses about shadow banking
behaviour. The system we attempt to solve also includes log of real GDP,
log of the GDP deflator as a measure of price level, 1 month LIBOR and the
20-year gilt yield (both of which enter untransformed), PNFC deposits with
regulated banks, and central government long-term debt outstanding. We
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Figure 5.4: Variable loading on Principal Components 1 and 2 of Panel 2a
also permit a measure of the realised volatility of the FTSE 100 (proxying
times of financial turbulence) to enter the short-run adjustment equations,
though we do not postulate its membership of a long-run equilibrium system.
The Johansen method for assessing the number of cointegrating relation-
ships offers some evidence for either 1 or 2 such equations, and as such we
assess both. In the 2-equation model, we employ what is believed to be a
novel identification strategy in this field. As the SBS factors were estimated
by the method of principal components, they are orthogonal by construc-
tion, and so each factor can be constrained to have coefficient zero in the
long-run equation normalised to the other – without loss of information as
these variables are known to be uncorrelated.
5.2.1 Guide to models: group C
Incorporating the shadow banking factors into a VECM specification, we
report the single-long-run-equation form as model C1a. Table 5.1 contains
the parameter estimates of this long-run equation, normalised to SBS Fac-
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Figure 5.5: Scatterplot of log real MMIs held as assets by Rest of World
sectors (x-axis) and log real M4 securitisation (y-axis)
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Table 5.1: Model C1a: cointegrating vector
Cointegrating Vector Coefficient Standard Error
SBS Factor 1 -1 0
SBS Factor 2 1.21 0.46
log GDP deflator 125.58 40.78
log real GDP -119.64 34.28
LIBOR 1m -2.35 0.49
20-year gilt yield -5.84 1.37
log real PNFC deposits 20.58 12.17
log real long term central government debt -28.3 5.98
tor 1. Table 5.2 contains the short-run equations with SBS Factor 1 and
SBS Factor 2 as the dependent variables, the other short-run equations are
reported in Appendix B.
We present the results of the two-long-run-equation form as model C1b.
Table 5.3 contains these cointegrating vectors, normalised to SBS Factors 1
and 2. Table 5.4 contains the short-run equations with SBS Factors 1 and
2, and long-term government debt issuance, as dependents, and the other
short-run adjustment equations are presented in Appendix B.
5.2.2 Discussion
While the single long-run equation is trivially identified by a normalisation
on SBS Factor 1, its coefficients defy easy interpretation and its associated
error correction model is not admissible as no error correction takes place
at a significant level of correct sign. Furthermore, both SBS factors ap-
pear exogenous in the short-run equations, with no significant coefficients
appearing at any level.
The 2-equation FAVECM offers more promising results. The identifica-
tion strategy employed allows the standard hypotheses to be assessed for
both of the factor measures of SBS activity. Both display the expected neg-
ative sign to price level and positive coefficient to GDP, with the coefficient
magnitudes likely inflated by the normalising procedure carried out before
extracting principal components – this analysis must therefore be limited
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Table 5.2: Model C1a: short-run equations involving the constructed SBS
factors
Short run equations Dependent
d SBS Factor 1 d SBS Factor 2
d SBS Factor 1 t-1 -0.0629097 -0.250320
d SBS Factor 2 t-1 -0.0399412 -0.127386
d log GDP deflator t-1 -14.1922 14.2779
d log real GDP t-1 -2.82896 27.816
d LIBOR 1m t-1 0.143102 -0.220656
d 20-year gilt yield t-1 0.240002 -0.0665184
d log real PNFC deposits t-1 1.07614 4.71506
d log real long term central govern-
ment debt t-1
0.190477 0.432416
FTSE vol t-1 0.00693117 0.00755645
EC1 0.0173887 0.0141519
Table 5.3: Model C1b: cointegrating vectors
Cointegrating vector 1 Cointegrating vector 2
SBS Factor1 -1 (0) 0 (0)
SBS Factor2 0 (0) -1 (0)
l gdpdef -96.014 (23.84) -182.45 (45.787)
l rgdp 85.4 (20.978) 168.82 (40.291)
LIBOR 1m 0.52721 (0.22525) 2.3655 (0.43261)
ytm 20yrGilt 4.1485 (0.93516) 8.2249 (1.7961)
lr PNFC deposits -20.972 (7.4514) -34.21 (14.311)
lr LTDebt CG 25.086 (3.5125) 43.956 (6.7462)
Standard errors in parentheses
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d SBS Factor1 d SBS Factor2 d lr LTDebt CG
d SBS Factor1 1 0.0175607 -0.320436 0.00827825
d SBS Factor2 1 -0.0723002 -0.0991912 0.00770703
d l gdpdef 1 -9.68669 10.3521 0.894
d l rgdp 1 -8.59420 32.8394 -0.384870
d LIBOR 1m 1 0.130688 -0.209840 -0.00853873




d lr LTDebt CG 1 1.09478 -0.355524 0.426481***
FTSE Vol 1 0.00939051 0.00541357 -0.00117685**
EC1 0.216317** -0.159179 -0.0217623***
EC2 -0.104260** 0.055255 0.00850515**
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to assessing sign and significance, the coefficients having lost easy numeric
interpretability. The factors also share positive relationships to the two
measures of rates, and negative relationships with the measure of PNFC
deposits in the traditional banking sector – offering support for Pozsar’s
[Pozsar, 2013] hypothesis that shadow bank money assets are substitutable
with more traditional safe assets, and in support of the work of Serletis &
Xu [Serletis and Xu, 2019] concerning substitutability of shadow bank ser-
vices with those of traditional banks. Parameter estimates are displayed in
Equations 5.1 & 5.2.
SBS Factor1 =− 96.00 ∗ l gdpdef + 85.40 ∗ l rgdp
+ 0.53 ∗ LIBOR 1m+ 4.15 ∗ ytm 20yrGilt
+−20.98 ∗ lr PNFC deposits+ 25.09 ∗ lr LT Debt CG
(5.1)
SBS Factor2 =− 182.45 ∗ l gdpdef + 168.82 ∗ l rgdp
+ 2.37 ∗ LIBOR 1m+ 8.22 ∗ ytm 20yrGilt
+−34.21 ∗ lr PNFC deposits+ 44.00 ∗ lr LT Debt CG
(5.2)
We also find a well-behaved system of short run equations, in which
the first SBS factor (along with gilt rates and PNFC deposits) responds to
disequilibrium in the second long-run equation, while disequilibrium in the
first cointegrating vector prompts shifts in central government long-term
debt issuance. With the exception of the error-correction terms, the SBS
factors remain weakly exogenous in the short-run dynamics of this system.
SBS Factor 2 however appears to contain information about the short-run
response of 20-year gilt yields, and appears in that equation with significance
and negative sign. Thus, increases in the value of the second shadow banking
factor – which given the factor loadings we can associate with decreased
issuance of money market liabilities, decreased holdings by private NFCs,
and/or decreased holdings by the rest of the world, are associated with
downward shifts in gilt yields in the following quarter. We reproduce the
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short-run equation with 20-year gilt yields as dependent herein as Equation
5.3.
∆ytm 20yrGilt =50.2 + 0.06 ∗∆SBS Factor1t−1 +−0.08 ∗∆SBS Factor2t−1
+−3.94 ∗∆l gdpdeft−1 +−2.14 ∗∆l rgdpt−1
+ 0.09∆ ∗ LIBOR 1mt−1 +−0.23 ∗∆ytm 20yrGiltt−1
+−0.04 ∗∆lr PNFC depositst−1 +−4.85 ∗∆lr LT Debt CGt−1
+ 0.001 ∗ FTSE V olt−1 + 0.07 ∗ λ1
+−0.07 ∗ λ2
(5.3)
where as before λ1 and λ2 represent response to disequilibrium in the
first and second long-run cointegrating vectors – the first having SBS Factor
1 as the dependent, the second having SBS Factor 2.
5.2.3 Conclusion
While the factor-augmented VECM fails to offer the strong evidence in
favour of hypothesis H4 drawn from conventional VECMs, other hypotheses
are better supported. GDP appears to show a positive relationship with the
constructed measures of shadow banking activity, though the data transfor-
mation renders the coefficient values impossible to interpret meaningfully.
The evidence for a shadow banking repsonse to opportunity cost is also in-
conclusive. However H3 is well supported by the long-run models, which
demonstrate a negative equilibrium relationship between the measures of
shadow banking activity and corporate deposits in the regulated banking
sector. We are unable to demonstrate this relationship in the short-run
models, perhaps suggesting that the assumption of quarter-to-quarter rigid-
ity in demand for regulated bank deposits by corporates is too strong an
assumption, and as such it is difficult to statistically disentangle supply
and demand, leaving the information imparted by the quantum of shadow
banking activity ambiguous. Nevertheless, the evidence for H3 is a com-
parable finding to that of Serletis & Xu [Serletis and Xu, 2019] who find
substitutability between shadow bank and traditional bank services.
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Evidence from VECM models
H2 Log real GDP + , approxi-
mately 1
Log real GDP appears with positive sign
in the long-run equilibria for the shadow
banking activity factors. Due to variable
abstraction it is not possible to assess the
magnitude of this effect against H2.
H2 Own interest
rate
+ Inconclusive - SBS factors show a positive
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Good – the SBS factors show a negative
long-run relationship with the log real level
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in absolute mag-
nitude if crowd-
ing out is total
Not demonstrated – in the long-run forms
estimated here, level of government debt
appears to ‘crowd in’ money market hold-
ings, and the short-run relationship is in-
conclusive.
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Serletis & Xu also document regime-switching behaviour in their paper.
Applying a 2-state Markov model they find a single large state transition in
the middle of the time period they study [Serletis and Xu, 2019]. We also
consider the possiblity of regime-switching behaviour within our dataset,
along with a relaxation of the key orthogonality assumption of the method
of principal components.
5.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis
5.3.1 Introduction and methodology
With the FAVECM producing some encouraging results in support of hy-
pothesis H3, we further consider a more generalized study of the latent factor
structure of Panel 2a, the (log real) levels data for money market instrument
asset holdings by sector in the UK. We initially relax the orthogonality re-
straint imposed by principal components analysis in an exploratory factor
analysis to check the validity of our method above; subsequently we perform
a k-means clustering in variable space that may suggest a state-transitioning
or time-varying-parameter structure like that documented by Serletis & Xu
[Serletis and Xu, 2019].
The motive for this exploratory factor analysis is that the principal-
component-based estimates of latent factors are constrained to be mutually
uncorrelated. We exploit that characteristic above to achieve identification
of our long-run cointegrating equations, but that goal may conflict with the
objective of seeking latent factors that have an economic interpretation –
such factors would very likely be correlated, at minimum in the time do-
main as macroeconomic variables broadly increase over time. We employ
the same dataset, Panel 2a, as above, and with the same rationale we ex-
tract two factors by maximum likelihood. We employ the ‘oblimin’ rotation
strategy, which seeks the simplest possible factor representation but unlike
‘varimax’ allows for the extracted factors to be correlated. The extracted
factor representation is depicted in Figure 5.6 below.
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Figure 5.6: Extracted factor representation
5.3.2 Results and discussion
In Figure 5.6 ML1 and ML2 represent the first and second factor respectively,
extracted by maximum likelihood. The underlying variables are depicted at
left, and the arrows give the loadings of those variables on those factors –
it will be seen that these loadings are very similar to those extracted by
principal components, with factor 1 loading heavily and equally on M4 se-
curitization and noncore, while factor 2 contains information about rest of
world money market holdings and, to a lesser extent, total liabilities. Fur-
ther, the two factors share a low correlation of only 5%, and we can conclude
that the assumption of no correlation required by principal components is




5.4.1 Introduction and methodology
A second novel methodology we adopt, closely related to the methods of
factor and principal components analysis, is cluster analysis. The general
goal of cluster analysis is to classify observations into groups or sets, hav-
ing the property that the members of the set are as similar as possible to
one another while the sets themselves are as distinct from each other as
possible. Any clustering algorithm must therefore strike a balance between
within-group similarity and between-group distinction. A well-established
algorithm for this purpose is k-means, sometimes known as the Lloyd-Forgy
algorithm, developed at Bell Labs in the 1960s. Considering each datapoint
as a location in high-dimensional space (of dimension equal to the column
span of the dataset), the algorithm initializes a number of random points
equal to the number of clusters desired – and so this must be exogenously
given to the process.
The algorithm then alternates between two steps – assigning each ob-
servation to the cluster to whose centroid it is closest in squared Euclidean
distance terms (L2 norm), and recalculating the new initial means to be the
centroids of the clusters so generated. The algorithm exits and is said to
have converged when the assignments, and therefore the centroids, no longer
change. The initial random points may be simple random draws (known as
Random Partition) or a random row from the dataset (the Forgy method),
but in general there is no guarantee that the algorithm will converge to
the globally optimal solution. Statistical methods exist for optimizing the
number of clusters sought, but as the ‘closeness’ or ‘distance’ of points in
variable space is closely related to their covariance, it is common to simply
examine the 2D projection of the dataset onto the plane defined by the first
two principal components – as we do here in Figure 5.7 below.
Adding the individual observations to the principal-component-space
plot, we can hypothesize the existence of 3 clusters, and so initialize k-
means with 3 centroids. Though we are dealing with time series, we cluster
in variable space only, not in the time dimension – and so observations in
the same cluster need not be consecutive or adjacent in time. Time-series-
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Figure 5.7: Principal Components Analysis biplot - datapoints and loadings
in PC space
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Figure 5.8: K-means cluster plot of observations in PC space
specific clustering algorithms such as Dynamic Time Warping do exist, but
these aim to classify whole time series as the single unit of observation – as
we are content to split the time series across observations, standard methods
suffice here. Performing the 3-cluster k-means, we find the expected result,
depicted in Figure 5.8.
5.4.2 Results and discussion
Though it is by no means a deterministic or typical result of this approach,
it emerges in this application that all observations clustered together are
also consecutive in time – cluster 3 occurs first and runs from Q4 1997 to
Q4 2003, followed by Q1 from Q1 2004 to Q3 2008, and finally cluster 2
from Q4 2008 to Q2 2016. This suggests a strong state-transition structure
underlying the economic relations observed here, and hints at parameter
instability or nonlinearity of the type that might be assessed by a Chow or
Quandt Likelihood Ratio test in traditional time series macroeconometrics.
Certainly the state transition time periods are interpretable as economic
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regime shifts, Q4 2008 in particular. This is comparable with the single
large regime shift observed in the dataset of Serletis & Xu [Serletis and Xu,
2019].
Limited degrees of freedom prevent us from fitting a full state-transition
specification to the preferred vector model C1b above – however a longer
or higher-frequency time-series dataset should enable this, and we highlight
this as a key avenue for future research. Given the changing economic and
regulatory context of shadow banking, notably before and after the finan-
cial crisis, it seems very likely to the structural parameters are time-varying,
and utilizing a factor representation and a time-clustering approach would
be only one of many ways to admit time-varying parameters into a macroe-
conomic model of the role of shadow banking in the composition of safe





The present work has sought to define the shadow banking sector, a growing
area of study that leapt to prominence following the financial crisis, but an
area in which basic questions of macroeconomic interest remain to be ad-
dressed. In particular, we highlight the role of the shadow banking sector in
concealing, warehousing or otherwise obfuscating risk in order to produce
‘safe’ assets to meet demand unmet by sovereign issuance and not coverable
by the deposit insurance provisions of traditional regulated banks. Review-
ing the literature, we noted the paucity of work focusing on the UK, the
relative lack of data-driven econometric studies by comparison with descrip-
tive and thoeretical papers, and gaps in the understanding of the role of the
shadow banking sector in meeting demand for safe assets. Filling these gaps
in our understanding should be of interest for monetary policy makers – we
established the role of the shadow banking sector in the transmission chan-
nels of monetary policy. Prudential regulators may also be interested in our
work given a perception of shadow banking as a procyclical, destabilising,
endogenous source of risk.
Following the methodology of Errico et al [Errico et al., 2014], we initially
broaden our data view much beyond the shadow banking sector, considering
all financial asset and liability positions observable in the UK monetary
economy, from publicly-available data. Also following the recommendations
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of Errico et al, the UK’s national statistical authority the ONS has begun to
publish flow-of-funds matrices for the UK financial economy, and while we
do not claim prior art – the contribution here is merely to arrange, not source
the data – we take this as evidence that this is a relevant and important
area of study. As a result of this work we are able to narrow our focus to the
safe-asset juncture between the shadow banking sector and the real economy
– money market instruments held on-balance-sheet by UK economic agents.
Extending a broad and deep literature concerning macroeconomic de-
mand functions for money, the ultimate safe, liquid asset, we follow the
practice in that field by employing the time-series econometric methodology
of cointegration and error correction due to Engle & Granger [Engle and
Granger, 1987] and to Johansen [Johansen, 1988] / Johansen & Juselius
[Johansen and Juselius, 1990]. We have mixed results in attempting to
replicate existing estimates of money demand functions for the UK, with
a strong likelihood that parameter nonlinearity or time-instability are at
cause.
Defining four groups of hypotheses firmly grounded in the existing liter-
ature on shadow banking, we are able to provide evidence for these hypothe-
ses from our econometric study. In line with the work of Krishnamurthy &
Vissing-Jorgensen [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012], we present
evidence that shadow bank safe assets are treated as substitutable with gov-
ernment debt.
We subsequently extend the empirical component of the present work
by studying factor representations to augment our vector time-series mod-
els, following a literature built on the work of Bernanke et al [Bernanke
et al., 2005] and Stock & Watson [Stock and Watson, 1999, Stock and Wat-
son, 2002, Stock and Watson, 2005]. We demonstrate a factor-augmented
vector autoregression in the style of Banerjee & Marcellino [Banerjee and
Marcellino, 2009] with appealing econometric qualities and offering some
evidence in favour of our hypotheses. To wit, we present evidence that a
long-run equilibrium relationship of negative sign exists between shadow
bank activity and the volume of traditional bank deposits – that is to say
that these assets are also treated as substitutable by safe-asset buyers, as
hypothesised by Serletis & Xu among others [Pozsar, 2013, Serletis and Xu,
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2019].
Finally, we employ a time-cluster analysis to begin to uncover the time-
varying nature of the shadow banking activity factor, in the manner of
Serletis & Xu [Serletis and Xu, 2019], and we demonstrate a strong 3-state
transition structure, the time series split into three contiguous phases.
The key contributions of the thesis are threefold: to the shadow bank-
ing literature, to the literature concerned with money demand, and to
the methodological literature concerned with factor-augmented and regime-
switching models. To the shadow banking literature, we contribute the
collection of a large dataset, albeit a publicly-available one. We further offer
multiple time-series proxies for shadow banking activity in the UK (noncore
bank funding, money-market instrument sector shares, and M4 Securiti-
sations). We assess the predictions of theoretical and general-equilibrium
modellers such as Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, Gennaioli et al, and
Plantin [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012, Gennaioli et al., 2013,
Plantin, 2014]: we show evidence that both government debt and regulated
bank deposits are treated as substitutable with shadow bank deposits by
safe-asset buyers.
To the literature concerned with money demand, we adopt the stan-
dard models and demonstrate a commonality between models of demand
for broad money and demand for shadow bank money. Like demand for
broad money, demand for shadow bank money appears to scale with real
GDP, but is ambiguous with respect to the price level. We are not able to
conclusively establish the response of demand for shadow bank money to
opportunity cost, i.e. better interest rates available elsewhere.
To the methodological literature we offer a novel dataset and question
– we are not aware of any other papers taking a factor-model, data-driven
approach to assessing shadow banking. While the methodology is well-
established, the object of study is not – and certainly not for the case of the
UK. We also introduce a novel identification strategy for long-run equations
in factor-augmented VECMs. Provided the factors have been constructed
by the method of principal components, they are orthogonal by construction
– and so factors extracted from the same dataset can be constrained to zero
in the long-run equation normalised to any other factor extracted from the
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same dataset. For identification to be achieved, it suffices to include as many
principal components as the rank of the full system – in the present paper, we
include two principal components and have two long-run equations requiring
identification. We are not aware of any other work in the field of shadow
banking having implemented this methodology. The method of k-means
time clustering is also believed to be novel in this field, as an atheoretic and
non-parametric assessment of regime-switching behaviour in a time series.
Naturally, the present study is not without its limitations. Principally,
while we have at least one model giving evidence in favour of each of our
hypotheses, these are typically different and we have no single model that
decisively gives evidence for all our hypotheses in a single system. Miss-
ing data, and the relatively low quarterly frequency, means that degrees
of freedom can be in short supply for high-dimensional vector models, and
longer or more frequently observed time series would ease this constraint.
This – or a more parsimonious estimation method – would also allow for the
study of time-varying structural parameters in the macroeconomic relation-
ships governing shadow banking, which we view as the key next step in this
programme of research.
Our study is also vulnerable to critiques around dataset decisions that
we took – that our variables are so specific as to be a macroeconomic irrel-
evance, or do not capture the underlying economic activity we attribute to
them. Other studies have focused on shadow banking ‘in the middle’ of the
manufacturing process (so to speak) with repo markets, or on the origina-
tion of lending. Pozsar [Pozsar, 2014] holds that as all lending transactions
inevitably involve a regulated bank somewhere along the line, only banks
can create endogenous or inside money, and so it is a mistake to credit the
shadow banking sector with the power to innovate unilaterally in the money
supply. Our choice of the UK as the nation for study is idiosyncratic, though
it does offer the opportunity for novelty when most studies focus on the US
– where data is more readily available.
Certain assumptions are required to achieve identification of the econo-
metric models – specifically, because we observe shadow banking activity
in the form of quantity of financial instruments, in order to identify shifts
in these quantities with shifts in demand we must deal with the matter of
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supply. Our assumption that alternative safe assets are subject to supply
rigidity in the short term is a strong one. An instrumental variables approach
may be able to achieve identification more explicitly. Also, with the excep-
tion of taking logarithms, we do not permit for nonlinearity in our functional
forms – we typically seek a linear model. We also estimate equilibrating re-
lationships across the whole time series, when in fact regime switches seem
very likely to be at play – as demonstrated by our time-clustering model.
Future researchers may wish to consider relaxing any or all of these assump-
tions and constraints in search of better models of the behaviour of the
shadow banking sector in response to demand for safe assets.
Nevertheless, we believe our results should be of interest to academics
and policymakers. We have documented the existence of a shadow banking
sector in the UK, which scales activity up and down at the margin depend-
ing upon the availability of safe-asset substitutes. While we were unable
to conclusively demonstrate a link with policy interest rates, we believe the
shadow banking sector to be important in the transmission channel of mon-
etary policy. We also believe that the response to demand for safe assets
should be of interest to regulators charged with supervising the health of
the banking system – when government debt or bank deposits, for what-
ever reason, are insufficient to meet demand for safety, activity will increase
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A.1 Group A Hypotheses
A.1.1 A1, Models of M0 notes & coins
Variables of interest
A1a, log real M0 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, log GDP deflator (price level), 20-year gilt yield (level)
A1a: OLS, using observations 2000:1–2016:2 (T = 66)
Dependent variable: l realM0
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −2.02091 1.18497 −1.705 0.0931
l rgdp 0.230969 0.118109 1.956 0.0550
l gdpdef 1.22102 0.0986565 12.38 0.0000
yrGilt −0.0333071 0.00641835 −5.189 0.0000
Mean dependent var 6.318674 S.D. dependent var 0.164152
Sum squared resid 0.041353 S.E. of regression 0.025826
R2 0.976390 Adjusted R2 0.975247
F (3, 62) 854.6552 P-value(F ) 2.31e–50
Log-likelihood 149.7337 Akaike criterion −291.4674
Schwarz criterion −282.7088 Hannan–Quinn −288.0065
ρ̂ 0.831678 Durbin–Watson 0.271744
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Figure A.1: Log Real M0 notes & coins
139
Figure A.2: Log Real GDP
140
Figure A.3: Log of GDP Deflator
141
Figure A.4: 10-year (yrGilt1) and 20-year (yrGilt) gilt yields
142
Figure A.5: RPI, annual percentage change
143
Figure A.6: A1a, residual time-series plot
A1b, log real M0 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, log GDP deflator (price level), 10-year gilt yield (level)
A1b: OLS, using observations 1984:1–2016:2 (T = 130)
Dependent variable: l realM0
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −12.7990 1.84347 −6.943 0.0000
l rgdp 1.79672 0.168915 10.64 0.0000
l gdpdef −0.880605 0.120987 −7.279 0.0000
yrGilt1 −0.0405174 0.00820433 −4.939 0.0000
144
Figure A.7: A1b, residual time-series plot
Mean dependent var 6.052984 S.D. dependent var 0.299578
Sum squared resid 0.967779 S.E. of regression 0.087640
R2 0.916408 Adjusted R2 0.914417
F (3, 126) 460.4381 P-value(F ) 1.08e–67
Log-likelihood 134.0566 Akaike criterion −260.1131
Schwarz criterion −248.6430 Hannan–Quinn −255.4524
ρ̂ 0.966484 Durbin–Watson 0.060896
A1c, log real M0 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, RPI inflation (% per annum), 10-year gilt yield (level)
A1c: OLS, using observations 1984:1–2016:2 (T = 130)
Dependent variable: l realM0
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Figure A.8: A1c, residual time-series plot
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −2.26121 1.98725 −1.138 0.2573
l rgdp 0.673638 0.151231 4.454 0.0000
RPI 0.0193701 0.00619177 3.128 0.0022
yrGilt1 −0.0529921 0.0117588 −4.507 0.0000
Mean dependent var 6.052984 S.D. dependent var 0.299578
Sum squared resid 1.275603 S.E. of regression 0.100617
R2 0.889819 Adjusted R2 0.887196
F (3, 126) 339.1916 P-value(F ) 3.82e–60
Log-likelihood 116.1055 Akaike criterion −224.2110
Schwarz criterion −212.7408 Hannan–Quinn −219.5503
ρ̂ 0.946952 Durbin–Watson 0.080439
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Table A.1: Information criteria for lag selection, system A1d
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 671.21559 -10.675665 -10.215990 -10.488959




3 749.85749 0.01810 -11.440287 -10.245130 -10.954851
4 766.94405 0.00515 -11.458099 -9.895202 -10.823299
5 787.31869 0.00060 -11.529815 -9.599177 -10.745649
6 809.34827 0.00019 -
11.628660*
-9.330282 -10.695130
7 823.99566 0.02202 -11.606486 -8.940368 -10.523592
8 832.69189 0.36065 -11.486752 -8.452893 -10.254493
A1d, VECM system on log real M0, log real GDP, RPI level,
10-year gilt yield level
VAR lag selection for system A1d
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Table A.2: Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for system A1d
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test [p-value] Lmax test [p-value]
0 0.40823 124.78 [0.0000] 67.154 [0.0000]
1 0.20877 57.630 [0.0000] 29.973 [0.0015]
2 0.19406 27.656 [0.0003] 27.615 [0.0001]
3 0.00032337 0.041398 [0.8388] 0.041398 [0.8388]
Johansen rank selection for system A1d
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Model A1d
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 1984:3–2016:2 (T = 128)
Cointegration rank = 3
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Restrictions on beta: b[1,1] = -1 b[2,2] = -1 b[3,3] = -1
Cointegrating vectors
l realM0t−1 1.00000 −0.0151742 −11.4217
l rgdpt−1 0.576930 1.00000 −0.843360
RPIt−1 0.241855 −0.0137198 1.00000
yrGilt1t−1 0.161216 0.0640785 −1.80388
Adjustment vectors
l realM0t−1 1.00000 0.172926 −0.0120991
l rgdpt−1 0.154549 1.00000 0.00496597
RPIt−1 33.8217 −29.2986 1.00000
yrGilt1t−1 11.5545 28.4149 −0.221770
Log-likelihood = 756.938




Equation 1: ∆l realM0
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.392516 0.203993 1.924 0.0566
d l realM0 1 −0.162161 0.0885569 −1.831 0.0695
d l rgdp 1 −0.241354 0.145159 −1.663 0.0989
∆RPIt−1 0.000388793 0.00120483 0.3227 0.7475
∆yrGilt1t−1 0.00307347 0.00218397 1.407 0.1619
EC1 0.0112620 0.00164196 6.859 0.0000
EC2 0.00675067 0.0152094 0.4438 0.6579
EC3 −0.00140624 0.000472403 −2.977 0.0035
Mean dependent var 0.006624 S.D. dependent var 0.011339
Sum squared resid 0.010778 S.E. of regression 0.009361
R2 0.339930 Adjusted R2 0.318464
ρ̂ −0.026731 Durbin–Watson 2.048188
Equation 2: ∆l rgdp
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.487275 0.105440 4.621 0.0000
d l realM0 1 0.0426092 0.0457735 0.9309 0.3537
d l rgdp 1 0.356129 0.0750299 4.747 0.0000
∆RPIt−1 0.000846155 0.000622755 1.359 0.1767
∆yrGilt1t−1 0.00143990 0.00112886 1.276 0.2045
EC1 0.00174053 0.000848699 2.051 0.0424
EC2 0.0390379 0.00786147 4.966 0.0000
EC3 0.000577177 0.000244177 2.364 0.0197
Mean dependent var 0.005742 S.D. dependent var 0.006464
Sum squared resid 0.002879 S.E. of regression 0.004838
R2 0.457434 Adjusted R2 0.439790
ρ̂ −0.068122 Durbin–Watson 2.135652
Equation 3: ∆RPI
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −19.3012 13.3102 −1.450 0.1496
d l realM0 1 −5.12637 5.77821 −0.8872 0.3767
d l rgdp 1 12.4812 9.47138 1.318 0.1900
∆RPIt−1 0.512585 0.0786134 6.520 0.0000
∆yrGilt1t−1 0.111888 0.142501 0.7852 0.4339
EC1 0.380900 0.107135 3.555 0.0005
EC2 −1.14375 0.992392 −1.153 0.2513
EC3 0.116226 0.0308236 3.771 0.0003
Mean dependent var −0.028906 S.D. dependent var 0.801490
Sum squared resid 45.88417 S.E. of regression 0.610772
R2 0.437577 Adjusted R2 0.419287
ρ̂ 0.041431 Durbin–Watson 1.909041
Equation 4: ∆yrGilt1
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 18.6449 9.31051 2.003 0.0474
d l realM0 1 −3.36837 4.04186 −0.8334 0.4063
d l rgdp 1 −1.70718 6.62524 −0.2577 0.7971
∆RPIt−1 −0.0193206 0.0549901 −0.3513 0.7259
∆yrGilt1t−1 0.214768 0.0996797 2.155 0.0331
EC1 0.130127 0.0749413 1.736 0.0850
EC2 1.10926 0.694179 1.598 0.1126
EC3 −0.0257756 0.0215612 −1.195 0.2342
Mean dependent var −0.078935 S.D. dependent var 0.435720
Sum squared resid 22.45119 S.E. of regression 0.427235
R2 0.068846 Adjusted R2 0.038565
ρ̂ 0.034429 Durbin–Watson 1.925528
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Figure A.9: Log real M4
152
Figure A.10: Bank of England base rate
153
Figure A.11: Term Spread
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A.1.2 A2, Models of M4 broad money
Variables of interest
A2a, log real M4 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, log GDP deflator, 20-year gilt yield
A2a: OLS, using observations 2000:1–2016:2 (T = 66)
Dependent variable: l realM4
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 4.38405 2.20791 1.986 0.0515
l rgdp −0.921665 0.220067 −4.188 0.0001
l gdpdef 3.73590 0.183823 20.32 0.0000
yrGilt 0.120728 0.0119591 10.10 0.0000
Mean dependent var 9.754190 S.D. dependent var 0.242639
Sum squared resid 0.143568 S.E. of regression 0.048121
R2 0.962484 Adjusted R2 0.960668
F (3, 62) 530.2023 P-value(F ) 3.95e–44
Log-likelihood 108.6600 Akaike criterion −209.3199
Schwarz criterion −200.5613 Hannan–Quinn −205.8590
ρ̂ 0.684255 Durbin–Watson 0.620972
A2b, log real M4 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, log GDP deflator, 10-year gilt yield
A2b: OLS, using observations 1984:1–2016:2 (T = 130)
Dependent variable: l realM4
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −12.1295 1.94380 −6.240 0.0000
l rgdp 1.44301 0.178109 8.102 0.0000
l gdpdef 0.713900 0.127572 5.596 0.0000
yrGilt1 0.00387092 0.00865086 0.4475 0.6553
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Mean dependent var 9.343253 S.D. dependent var 0.485480
Sum squared resid 1.075991 S.E. of regression 0.092410
R2 0.964610 Adjusted R2 0.963768
F (3, 126) 1144.787 P-value(F ) 3.36e–91
Log-likelihood 127.1670 Akaike criterion −246.3340
Schwarz criterion −234.8638 Hannan–Quinn −241.6733
ρ̂ 0.977833 Durbin–Watson 0.044233
A2c, log real M4 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, RPI inflation, 10-year gilt yield
A2c: OLS, using observations 1984:1–2016:2 (T = 130)
Dependent variable: l realM4
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −15.4105 1.96811 −7.830 0.0000
l rgdp 1.95088 0.149774 13.03 0.0000
yrGilt1 −0.0261071 0.0116455 −2.242 0.0267
RPI 0.0186921 0.00613214 3.048 0.0028
Mean dependent var 9.343253 S.D. dependent var 0.485480
Sum squared resid 1.251153 S.E. of regression 0.099648
R2 0.958849 Adjusted R2 0.957869
F (3, 126) 978.6370 P-value(F ) 4.48e–87
Log-likelihood 117.3635 Akaike criterion −226.7270
Schwarz criterion −215.2568 Hannan–Quinn −222.0663
ρ̂ 0.966441 Durbin–Watson 0.071366
A2d, log real M4 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, RPI inflation, 10-year gilt yield, LIBOR
A2d: OLS, using observations 1984:1–2016:2 (T = 130)
Dependent variable: l realM4
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Figure A.12: A2c, residual time-series plot
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −14.6115 2.10551 −6.940 0.0000
l rgdp 1.66504 0.192071 8.669 0.0000
l gdpdef 0.617276 0.129459 4.768 0.0000
yrGilt1 0.0331322 0.0136929 2.420 0.0170
LIBOR −0.0187619 0.00691345 −2.714 0.0076
Mean dependent var 9.343253 S.D. dependent var 0.485480
Sum squared resid 1.016122 S.E. of regression 0.090161
R2 0.966579 Adjusted R2 0.965510
F (4, 125) 903.8034 P-value(F ) 3.46e–91
Log-likelihood 130.8882 Akaike criterion −251.7763
Schwarz criterion −237.4386 Hannan–Quinn −245.9504
ρ̂ 0.971128 Durbin–Watson 0.060120
A2e, log real M4 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, RPI inflation, 10-year gilt yield, Bank of England Base Rate
A2e: OLS, using observations 1984:1–2016:2 (T = 130)
Dependent variable: l realM4
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −14.5787 1.97809 −7.370 0.0000
l rgdp 1.66421 0.180946 9.197 0.0000
l gdpdef 0.609170 0.125330 4.861 0.0000
yrGilt1 0.0350726 0.0119742 2.929 0.0040
BankRate −0.0199387 0.00553559 −3.602 0.0005
Mean dependent var 9.343253 S.D. dependent var 0.485480
Sum squared resid 0.974815 S.E. of regression 0.088309
R2 0.967938 Adjusted R2 0.966912
F (4, 125) 943.4257 P-value(F ) 2.59e–92
Log-likelihood 133.5857 Akaike criterion −257.1714
Schwarz criterion −242.8338 Hannan–Quinn −251.3456
ρ̂ 0.962098 Durbin–Watson 0.078667
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A2f, log real M4 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, RPI inflation, 10-year gilt yield, Term Spread (10-year yield
minus Base Rate)
A2f: OLS, using observations 1984:1–2016:2 (T = 130)
Dependent variable: l realM4
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −14.5787 1.97809 −7.370 0.0000
l rgdp 1.66421 0.180946 9.197 0.0000
l gdpdef 0.609170 0.125330 4.861 0.0000
BankRate 0.0151339 0.00883858 1.712 0.0893
TermSpread 0.0350726 0.0119742 2.929 0.0040
Mean dependent var 9.343253 S.D. dependent var 0.485480
Sum squared resid 0.974815 S.E. of regression 0.088309
R2 0.967938 Adjusted R2 0.966912
F (4, 125) 943.4257 P-value(F ) 2.59e–92
Log-likelihood 133.5857 Akaike criterion −257.1714
Schwarz criterion −242.8338 Hannan–Quinn −251.3456
ρ̂ 0.962098 Durbin–Watson 0.078667
A2g, VECM system on log real M4 dependent, log real GDP, RPI
inflation, 10-year gilt yield, Bank of England Base Rate)
VAR lag selection for system A2g
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Table A.3: Information criteria for lag selection, system A2g
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 561.80784 -8.718161 -8.028648 -8.438102
2 633.03810 0.00000 -9.476034 -8.211926* -8.962593*
3 661.70413 0.00024 -9.536133 -7.697431 -8.789309
4 685.63034 0.00388 -9.518530 -7.105233 -8.538324
5 717.76446 0.00003 -9.635483 -6.647592 -8.421894
6 743.64081 0.00129 -9.649849* -6.087364 -8.202878
7 763.20248 0.03580 -9.560696 -5.423616 -7.880342
8 787.68058 0.00286 -9.552141 -4.840466 -7.638404
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Table A.4: Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for system A2g
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test [p-value] Lmax test [p-value]
0 0.40081 157.09 [0.0000] 65.558 [0.0000]
1 0.28752 91.533 [0.0000] 43.392 [0.0001]
2 0.16968 48.141 [0.0001] 23.801 [0.0183]
3 0.16364 24.340 [0.0014] 22.874 [0.0012]
4 0.011387 1.4659 [0.2260] 1.4659 [0.2260]
Johansen rank selection for system A2g
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Model A2g
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 1984:3–2016:2 (T = 128)
Cointegration rank = 4
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Restrictions on beta: b[1,1] = -1 b[2,2] = -1 b[3,3] = -1 b[4,4] = -1
Cointegrating vectors
l realM4t−1 1.00000 −1.94023 50.6276 −2.14471
l rgdpt−1 −0.911490 1.00000 −177.137 11.1956
RPIt−1 −0.111096 −0.0478950 1.00000 0.0536435
yrGilt1t−1 0.0522684 −0.0807639 −2.97725 1.00000
BankRatet−1 0.0629579 −0.0671178 −2.37287 −0.444878
Adjustment vectors
l realM4t−1 1.00000 1.70074 −0.0765620 0.00182400
l rgdpt−1 −0.0829001 1.00000 0.0151717 0.00589447
RPIt−1 181.771 31.6822 1.00000 −0.368823
yrGilt1t−1 −17.8581 19.0595 −0.0598497 1.00000
BankRatet−1 −65.3581 50.9624 0.207558 −1.42342
Log-likelihood = 637.907




Equation 1: ∆l realM4
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.918447 0.361536 −2.540 0.0123
d l realM4 1 0.0890399 0.0842507 1.057 0.2927
d l rgdp 1 −0.545268 0.231719 −2.353 0.0202
∆RPIt−1 0.00622877 0.00193128 3.225 0.0016
∆yrGilt1t−1 0.000107026 0.00333006 0.03214 0.9744
∆BankRatet−1 −0.000972555 0.00222573 −0.4370 0.6629
EC1 −0.0139394 0.0101400 −1.375 0.1717
EC2 −0.0130519 0.00382223 −3.415 0.0009
EC3 0.000594869 0.000138566 4.293 0.0000
EC4 0.000269878 0.00204074 0.1322 0.8950
Mean dependent var 0.012054 S.D. dependent var 0.015942
Sum squared resid 0.022717 S.E. of regression 0.013646
R2 0.296204 Adjusted R2 0.267360
ρ̂ −0.021708 Durbin–Watson 2.042263
Equation 2: ∆l rgdp
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.375521 0.124864 3.007 0.0032
d l realM4 1 0.0175548 0.0290978 0.6033 0.5474
d l rgdp 1 0.287895 0.0800293 3.597 0.0005
∆RPIt−1 9.35278e–006 0.000667010 0.01402 0.9888
∆yrGilt1t−1 0.000725344 0.00115011 0.6307 0.5294
∆BankRatet−1 0.00200378 0.000768705 2.607 0.0103
EC1 0.00115558 0.00350207 0.3300 0.7420
EC2 −0.00767426 0.00132009 −5.813 0.0000
EC3 −0.000117880 4.78568e–005 −2.463 0.0152
EC4 0.000872141 0.000704815 1.237 0.2183
Mean dependent var 0.005742 S.D. dependent var 0.006464
Sum squared resid 0.002710 S.E. of regression 0.004713
R2 0.489403 Adjusted R2 0.468477
ρ̂ −0.019724 Durbin–Watson 2.038601
Equation 3: ∆RPI
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 13.6517 15.6909 0.8700 0.3860
d l realM4 1 −4.12123 3.65654 −1.127 0.2619
d l rgdp 1 20.5047 10.0568 2.039 0.0436
∆RPIt−1 0.477566 0.0838190 5.698 0.0000
∆yrGilt1t−1 0.0576436 0.144527 0.3988 0.6907
∆BankRatet−1 0.223571 0.0965984 2.314 0.0223
EC1 −2.53378 0.440084 −5.757 0.0000
EC2 −0.243137 0.165887 −1.466 0.1453
EC3 −0.00776977 0.00601387 −1.292 0.1988
EC4 −0.0545707 0.0885697 −0.6161 0.5390
Mean dependent var −0.028906 S.D. dependent var 0.801490
Sum squared resid 42.79082 S.E. of regression 0.592237
R2 0.475494 Adjusted R2 0.453998
ρ̂ −0.052315 Durbin–Watson 2.103078
Equation 4: ∆yrGilt1
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 18.2900 10.9024 1.678 0.0960
d l realM4 1 −1.23949 2.54065 −0.4879 0.6265
d l rgdp 1 −1.74161 6.98769 −0.2492 0.8036
∆RPIt−1 0.0686298 0.0582394 1.178 0.2409
∆yrGilt1t−1 0.320304 0.100421 3.190 0.0018
∆BankRatet−1 −0.219208 0.0671189 −3.266 0.0014
EC1 0.248932 0.305781 0.8141 0.4172
EC2 −0.146268 0.115263 −1.269 0.2069
EC3 0.000465018 0.00417858 0.1113 0.9116
EC4 0.147959 0.0615404 2.404 0.0177
Mean dependent var −0.078935 S.D. dependent var 0.435720
Sum squared resid 20.65856 S.E. of regression 0.411500
R2 0.143195 Adjusted R2 0.108080
ρ̂ 0.099762 Durbin–Watson 1.796765
Equation 5: ∆BankRate
164
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −22.9879 16.4136 −1.401 0.1639
d l realM4 1 −2.73248 3.82495 −0.7144 0.4764
d l rgdp 1 0.903511 10.5200 0.08589 0.9317
∆RPIt−1 0.155939 0.0876796 1.779 0.0778
∆yrGilt1t−1 0.206807 0.151184 1.368 0.1739
∆BankRatet−1 0.0283991 0.101048 0.2810 0.7792
EC1 0.911055 0.460353 1.979 0.0501
EC2 −0.391099 0.173528 −2.254 0.0260
EC3 −0.00161268 0.00629086 −0.2564 0.7981
EC4 −0.210609 0.0926492 −2.273 0.0248
Mean dependent var −0.065270 S.D. dependent var 0.693708
Sum squared resid 46.82338 S.E. of regression 0.619514
R2 0.233865 Adjusted R2 0.202466
ρ̂ 0.070693 Durbin–Watson 1.828528
A.2 Group B Hypotheses
A.2.1 Variables of interest
A.2.2 B1, Models of log real Money Market Instruments
that are liabilities of Other Financial Institutions (lo-
greal B1)
B1a, log real B1 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, RPI, 10-year gilt yield
B1a: OLS, using observations 1987:1–2016:2 (T = 118)
Dependent variable: logreal B1
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −10.5273 5.47665 −1.922 0.0571
l rgdp 1.20814 0.417238 2.896 0.0045
RPI −0.0852940 0.0160438 −5.316 0.0000
ytm 10yrGilt 0.0174733 0.0309267 0.5650 0.5732
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Figure A.13: MMIs OFIs liab (Total economy balance sheet, Money Market
Instruments that are liabilities of Other Financial Institutions, £m
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Figure A.14: logreal B1 (log of MMIs OFIs liab deflated by GDP deflator
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Figure A.15: M4 Securitisation (’M4 lending’ minus ’M4 lending excluding
intermediate OFCs’)
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Figure A.16: l realM4 securit (log of M4 Securitisation deflated by GDP
deflator
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Figure A.17: Measures of Money Market Instruments
MMI Liab total (total economy, short-term debt securities issued, MMIs by other UK
residents), MMIs check2 (checksum of all-sector asset holdings of MMIs by other UK
residents), ROWplusOFIs (checksum of RoW position in UK MMIs plus OFI sector net
position
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Mean dependent var 4.723014 S.D. dependent var 0.381452
Sum squared resid 7.295281 S.E. of regression 0.252970
R2 0.571476 Adjusted R2 0.560199
F (3, 114) 50.67643 P-value(F ) 6.87e–21
Log-likelihood −3.210790 Akaike criterion 14.42158
Schwarz criterion 25.50432 Hannan–Quinn 18.92150
ρ̂ 0.860419 Durbin–Watson 0.187877
B1b, log real B1 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, RPI, 10-year gilt yield, log real M4
B1b: OLS, using observations 1987:1–2016:2 (T = 118)
Dependent variable: logreal B1
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −21.6101 6.12502 −3.528 0.0006
l rgdp 2.63929 0.573044 4.606 0.0000
RPI −0.0696629 0.0159645 −4.364 0.0000
ytm 10yrGilt −0.00486824 0.0302186 −0.1611 0.8723
l realM4 −0.755757 0.217539 −3.474 0.0007
Mean dependent var 4.723014 S.D. dependent var 0.381452
Sum squared resid 6.591269 S.E. of regression 0.241516
R2 0.612829 Adjusted R2 0.599124
F (4, 113) 44.71525 P-value(F ) 1.85e–22
Log-likelihood 2.776636 Akaike criterion 4.446728
Schwarz criterion 18.30015 Hannan–Quinn 10.07163
ρ̂ 0.857588 Durbin–Watson 0.188092
B1c, log real B1 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, RPI, 10-year gilt yield, log real M4, log real M0
B1c: OLS, using observations 1987:1–2016:2 (T = 118)
Dependent variable: logreal B1
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −35.8117 3.64701 −9.819 0.0000
l rgdp 4.65155 0.355502 13.08 0.0000
RPI −0.0391315 0.00940470 −4.161 0.0001
ytm 10yrGilt −0.0874356 0.0182228 −4.798 0.0000
l realM4 0.0554890 0.136155 0.4075 0.6844
l realM0 −3.08743 0.203890 −15.14 0.0000
Mean dependent var 4.723014 S.D. dependent var 0.381452
Sum squared resid 2.162979 S.E. of regression 0.138969
R2 0.872947 Adjusted R2 0.867275
F (5, 112) 153.9041 P-value(F ) 1.78e–48
Log-likelihood 68.51794 Akaike criterion −125.0359
Schwarz criterion −108.4118 Hannan–Quinn −118.2860
ρ̂ 0.720019 Durbin–Watson 0.543468
Test for normality of residual –
Null hypothesis: error is normally distributed
Test statistic: χ2(2) = 20.1092
with p-value = 4.29865e-005
B1d, log real B1 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, RPI, 10-year gilt yield, log real M4, log real M0, ON gilt repo
(overnight gilt repo rate)
B1d: OLS, using observations 1996:1–2016:2 (T = 82)
Dependent variable: logreal B1
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −4.09477 4.34624 −0.9421 0.3491
l rgdp 0.978479 0.525015 1.864 0.0663
RPI −0.0178944 0.00542075 −3.301 0.0015
ytm 10yrGilt 0.00359471 0.0119117 0.3018 0.7637
l realM4 −0.234658 0.0790249 −2.969 0.0040
l realM0 −0.221615 0.396908 −0.5584 0.5783
ON gilt repo 0.0235946 0.0131353 1.796 0.0765
Mean dependent var 4.910360 S.D. dependent var 0.105133
Sum squared resid 0.239937 S.E. of regression 0.056561
R2 0.732000 Adjusted R2 0.710560
F (6, 75) 34.14187 P-value(F ) 1.49e–19
Log-likelihood 122.8451 Akaike criterion −231.6902
Schwarz criterion −214.8432 Hannan–Quinn −224.9264
ρ̂ 0.563276 Durbin–Watson 0.873827
Test for normality of residual –
Null hypothesis: error is normally distributed
Test statistic: χ2(2) = 0.074737
with p-value = 0.963321
Test for omission of variables –
Null hypothesis: parameters are zero for the variables
ytm 10yrGilt
Test statistic: F (1, 75) = 0.0910706
with p-value = P (F (1, 75) > 0.0910706) = 0.763656
B1e, log real B1 dependent, contemporaneous OLS with log real
GDP, RPI, log real M4, ON gilt repo
B1e: OLS, using observations 1996:1–2016:2 (T = 82)
Dependent variable: logreal B1
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −1.10176 1.36592 −0.8066 0.4224
l rgdp 0.633515 0.146510 4.324 0.0000
RPI −0.0179379 0.00537575 −3.337 0.0013
l realM4 −0.229085 0.0743865 −3.080 0.0029
ON gilt repo 0.0325179 0.00574796 5.657 0.0000
Mean dependent var 4.910360 S.D. dependent var 0.105133
Sum squared resid 0.242284 S.E. of regression 0.056094
R2 0.729378 Adjusted R2 0.715320
F (4, 77) 51.88250 P-value(F ) 4.07e–21
Log-likelihood 122.4459 Akaike criterion −234.8918
Schwarz criterion −222.8582 Hannan–Quinn −230.0605
ρ̂ 0.564196 Durbin–Watson 0.870875
Test for normality of residual –
Null hypothesis: error is normally distributed
Test statistic: χ2(2) = 0.129169
with p-value = 0.937457
QLR test for structural break –
Null hypothesis: no structural break
Test statistic: max χ2(5) = 36.0221 (2006:1)
with asymptotic p-value = 3.33404e-005
B1f, VECM system on log real B1, log real GDP, RPI, log real
M4, overnight repo rate
VAR lag selection for system B1f
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Figure A.18: B1e, residuals time-series
Table A.5: Information criteria for lag selection, system B1f
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 562.48711 -14.391543 -13.457463 -14.018927




3 638.84084 0.11707 -15.103806 -12.612925 -14.110163
4 663.93843 0.00202 -15.106444 -11.837162 -13.802287
5 696.18373 0.00002 -15.302263 -11.254581 -13.687593
6 725.60603 0.00015 -15.421785 -10.595702 -13.496601
7 753.60175 0.00036 -15.502750 -9.898267 -13.267053




Table A.6: Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for system B1f
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test [p-value] Lmax test [p-value]
0 0.45382 124.86 [0.0000] 48.385 [0.0002]
1 0.41412 76.477 [0.0000] 42.771 [0.0001]
2 0.24089 33.706 [0.0160] 22.048 [0.0350]
3 0.11867 11.658 [0.1763] 10.106 [0.2090]
4 0.019211 1.5518 [0.2129] 1.5518 [0.2129]
Johansen rank selection for system B1f
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Model B1f
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 1996:3–2016:2 (T = 80)
Cointegration rank = 3
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Restrictions on beta: b[1,1] = -1 b[2,2] = -1 b[3,3] = -1
Cointegrating vectors
logreal B1t−1 1.00000 −0.502864 48.8954
l rgdpt−1 5.19998 1.00000 −17.4703
RPIt−1 0.814023 −0.00153295 1.00000
l realM4t−1 −4.51823 −0.262809 3.58678
ON gilt repot−1 −0.509455 0.0418617 −1.24931
Adjustment vectors
logreal B1t−1 1.00000 −17.0425 0.176440
l rgdpt−1 −0.889697 1.00000 −0.00236186
RPIt−1 −486.257 163.590 1.00000
l realM4t−1 −8.54742 −6.37799 −0.0448890
ON gilt repot−1 −49.8364 92.3759 0.0311784
Log-likelihood = 651.731




Equation 1: ∆logreal B1
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −2.46729 0.666273 −3.703 0.0004
d logreal B1 1 0.136635 0.0998750 1.368 0.1754
d l rgdp 1 0.816191 0.864436 0.9442 0.3481
∆RPIt−1 0.0113690 0.00786313 1.446 0.1524
d l realM4 1 −0.992754 0.316112 −3.141 0.0024
d ON gilt repo 1 −0.0303551 0.0173529 −1.749 0.0844
EC1 −0.000859652 0.00526468 −0.1633 0.8707
EC2 −0.338850 0.0805242 −4.208 0.0001
EC3 0.00564307 0.00156653 3.602 0.0006
Mean dependent var −0.002191 S.D. dependent var 0.048483
Sum squared resid 0.114306 S.E. of regression 0.039302
R2 0.384456 Adjusted R2 0.342865
ρ̂ −0.102060 Durbin–Watson 2.124484
Equation 2: ∆l rgdp
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.179764 0.0796332 2.257 0.0269
d logreal B1 1 −0.00627500 0.0119371 −0.5257 0.6007
d l rgdp 1 0.644017 0.103318 6.233 0.0000
∆RPIt−1 −0.000651315 0.000939804 −0.6930 0.4905
d l realM4 1 0.00412171 0.0377819 0.1091 0.9134
d ON gilt repo 1 0.00284878 0.00207402 1.374 0.1737
EC1 0.000764830 0.000629237 1.215 0.2280
EC2 0.0198827 0.00962429 2.066 0.0423
EC3 −7.55393e–005 0.000187233 −0.4035 0.6878
Mean dependent var 0.005112 S.D. dependent var 0.006219
Sum squared resid 0.001633 S.E. of regression 0.004697
R2 0.465643 Adjusted R2 0.429538
ρ̂ −0.091770 Durbin–Watson 2.180684
Equation 3: ∆RPI
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 39.6062 8.55896 4.627 0.0000
d logreal B1 1 0.549089 1.28300 0.4280 0.6699
d l rgdp 1 18.6588 11.1046 1.680 0.0971
∆RPIt−1 0.399824 0.101010 3.958 0.0002
d l realM4 1 −0.0761019 4.06079 −0.01874 0.9851
d ON gilt repo 1 0.735537 0.222915 3.300 0.0015
EC1 0.418012 0.0676303 6.181 0.0000
EC2 3.25261 1.03442 3.144 0.0024
EC3 0.0319830 0.0201237 1.589 0.1163
Mean dependent var −0.010000 S.D. dependent var 0.764331
Sum squared resid 18.86275 S.E. of regression 0.504878
R2 0.591291 Adjusted R2 0.563675
ρ̂ −0.049408 Durbin–Watson 2.093142
Equation 4: ∆l realM4
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.857259 0.227154 −3.774 0.0003
d logreal B1 1 0.0107231 0.0340506 0.3149 0.7537
d l rgdp 1 −0.834473 0.294714 −2.831 0.0060
∆RPIt−1 0.0105163 0.00268079 3.923 0.0002
d l realM4 1 −0.189910 0.107773 −1.762 0.0822
d ON gilt repo 1 −0.00426957 0.00591615 −0.7217 0.4728
EC1 0.00734781 0.00179490 4.094 0.0001
EC2 −0.126811 0.0274533 −4.619 0.0000
EC3 −0.00143568 0.000534082 −2.688 0.0089
Mean dependent var 0.010602 S.D. dependent var 0.017515
Sum squared resid 0.013286 S.E. of regression 0.013399
R2 0.451757 Adjusted R2 0.414714
ρ̂ −0.083829 Durbin–Watson 2.156081
Equation 5: ∆ON gilt repo
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 15.8551 4.78435 3.314 0.0014
d logreal B1 1 0.146839 0.717180 0.2047 0.8383
d l rgdp 1 22.9627 6.20732 3.699 0.0004
∆RPIt−1 −0.0564972 0.0564634 −1.001 0.3203
d l realM4 1 0.850612 2.26993 0.3747 0.7089
d ON gilt repo 1 0.633211 0.124607 5.082 0.0000
EC1 0.0428419 0.0378045 1.133 0.2608
EC2 1.83668 0.578226 3.176 0.0022
EC3 0.000997179 0.0112489 0.08865 0.9296
Mean dependent var −0.067627 S.D. dependent var 0.404656
Sum squared resid 5.893994 S.E. of regression 0.282221
R2 0.544373 Adjusted R2 0.513587
ρ̂ 0.042980 Durbin–Watson 1.905166
A.2.3 B2, Models of log real M4 Securitisation
B2a, log real M4 securitisation dependent, contemporaneous OLS
with log real gdp, RPI, log real M4, overnight gilt repo rate
B2a: OLS, using observations 1997:4–2016:2 (T = 75)
Dependent variable: l realM4 securit
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −9.62668 3.11366 −3.092 0.0029
l rgdp −1.93684 0.315865 −6.132 0.0000
RPI −0.0271704 0.0107663 −2.524 0.0139
l realM4 4.33907 0.148678 29.18 0.0000
ON gilt repo 0.0384803 0.0116064 3.315 0.0015
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Table A.7: Information criteria for lag selection, system B2b
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 513.28286 -13.613602 -
12.657540*
-13.233406




3 584.52736 0.04471 -14.212038 -11.662540 -13.198184
4 610.21068 0.00144 -14.231287 -10.885070 -12.900603
5 696.18373 0.00002 -15.302263 -11.254581 -13.687593
6 725.60603 0.00015 -15.421785 -10.595702 -13.496601
7 753.60175 0.00036 -15.502750 -9.898267 -13.267053
8 791.31382 0.00000 -
15.846319*
-9.463436 -13.300109
Mean dependent var 7.494599 S.D. dependent var 0.981025
Sum squared resid 0.875338 S.E. of regression 0.111825
R2 0.987709 Adjusted R2 0.987007
F (4, 70) 1406.317 P-value(F ) 4.86e–66
Log-likelihood 60.47837 Akaike criterion −110.9567
Schwarz criterion −99.36930 Hannan–Quinn −106.3300
ρ̂ 0.714617 Durbin–Watson 0.565530
Test for omission of variables –
Null hypothesis: parameters are zero for the variables
l realM4
Test statistic: F (1, 70) = 851.723
with p-value = P (F (1, 70) > 851.723) = 6.48505e-041
B2b, VECM system on log real M4 securitisation, log real GDP,
log real M4, RPI, overnight gilt repo rate
VAR lag selection for system B2b
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Table A.8: Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for system B2b
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test [p-value] Lmax test [p-value]
0 0.50388 126.19 [0.0000] 51.169 [0.0001]
1 0.45408 75.018 [0.0000] 44.186 [0.0001]
2 0.22649 30.832 [0.0375] 18.748 [0.1061]
3 0.11709 12.084 [0.1544] 9.0905 [0.2852]
4 0.040178 2.9936 [0.0836] 2.9936 [0.0836]
Johansen rank selection for system B2b
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Model B2b
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 1998:2–2016:2 (T = 73)
Cointegration rank = 2
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Restrictions on beta: b[1,1] = -1 b[2,5] = -1 b[1,4] = 0 b[2,3] = 0
Cointegrating vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
l rgdpt−1 −1.00000 −7.88366
(0.00000) (1.49453)




ON gilt repot−1 0.00000 −0.322364
(0.00000) (0.0521174)
l realM4 securitt−1 −0.0556035 −1.00000
(0.0541789) (0.00000)
Adjustment vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
l rgdpt−1 0.0121671 0.00187216
(0.0125080) (0.00149121)




ON gilt repot−1 0.735664 0.0695498
(0.798845) (0.0952391)
l realM4 securitt−1 0.0283297 −0.0890182
(0.198576) (0.0236744)
Log-likelihood = 562.599





Equation 1: ∆l rgdp
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.220111 0.0914881 2.406 0.0190
d l rgdp 1 0.662164 0.106890 6.195 0.0000
d l realM4 1 0.0781860 0.0450486 1.736 0.0874
∆RPIt−1 −0.00142475 0.000987911 −1.442 0.1541
d ON gilt repo 1 0.00292868 0.00216363 1.354 0.1806
d l realM4 securit 1 −0.00566784 0.00858256 −0.6604 0.5114
EC1 0.0121671 0.0125080 0.9727 0.3343
EC2 0.00187216 0.00149121 1.255 0.2139
Mean dependent var 0.004856 S.D. dependent var 0.006380
Sum squared resid 0.001420 S.E. of regression 0.004710
R2 0.515669 Adjusted R2 0.455128
ρ̂ −0.137351 Durbin–Watson 2.268273
Equation 2: ∆l realM4
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.673759 0.231613 −2.909 0.0050
d l rgdp 1 −0.341838 0.270606 −1.263 0.2111
d l realM4 1 −0.215833 0.114046 −1.893 0.0629
∆RPIt−1 0.0101124 0.00250102 4.043 0.0001
d ON gilt repo 1 −0.00537574 0.00547749 −0.9814 0.3301
d l realM4 securit 1 0.0125172 0.0217278 0.5761 0.5666
EC1 0.118876 0.0316655 3.754 0.0004
EC2 −0.0251547 0.00377519 −6.663 0.0000
Mean dependent var 0.010170 S.D. dependent var 0.016620
Sum squared resid 0.009098 S.E. of regression 0.011923
R2 0.542523 Adjusted R2 0.485338
ρ̂ −0.083548 Durbin–Watson 2.161971
Equation 3: ∆RPI
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 52.1778 10.1173 5.157 0.0000
d l rgdp 1 15.5617 11.8205 1.317 0.1927
d l realM4 1 −2.66532 4.98172 −0.5350 0.5945
∆RPIt−1 0.391807 0.109249 3.586 0.0006
d ON gilt repo 1 0.885337 0.239266 3.700 0.0004
d l realM4 securit 1 0.936560 0.949107 0.9868 0.3275
EC1 9.02615 1.38320 6.526 0.0000
EC2 −0.305206 0.164907 −1.851 0.0688
Mean dependent var −0.027397 S.D. dependent var 0.789560
Sum squared resid 17.36029 S.E. of regression 0.520821
R2 0.613229 Adjusted R2 0.564883
ρ̂ −0.057376 Durbin–Watson 2.097659
Equation 4: ∆ON gilt repo
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 10.2627 5.84305 1.756 0.0838
d l rgdp 1 18.8508 6.82674 2.761 0.0075
d l realM4 1 1.16471 2.87711 0.4048 0.6870
∆RPIt−1 −0.0481441 0.0630947 −0.7630 0.4482
d ON gilt repo 1 0.567800 0.138184 4.109 0.0001
d l realM4 securit 1 −0.454505 0.548141 −0.8292 0.4101
EC1 0.735664 0.798845 0.9209 0.3606
EC2 0.0695498 0.0952391 0.7303 0.4679
Mean dependent var −0.092126 S.D. dependent var 0.408442
Sum squared resid 5.790431 S.E. of regression 0.300791
R2 0.517921 Adjusted R2 0.457661
ρ̂ 0.102602 Durbin–Watson 1.793509
Equation 5: ∆l realM4 secu
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −5.51344 1.45246 −3.796 0.0003
d l rgdp 1 −2.27609 1.69698 −1.341 0.1846
d l realM4 1 −0.760797 0.715189 −1.064 0.2914
∆RPIt−1 0.0145751 0.0156840 0.9293 0.3562
d ON gilt repo 1 −0.00456690 0.0343497 −0.1330 0.8946
d l realM4 securit 1 −0.0668258 0.136256 −0.4904 0.6255
EC1 0.0283297 0.198576 0.1427 0.8870
EC2 −0.0890182 0.0236744 −3.760 0.0004
Mean dependent var 0.029218 S.D. dependent var 0.085319
Sum squared resid 0.357799 S.E. of regression 0.074770
R2 0.317318 Adjusted R2 0.231983
ρ̂ −0.017708 Durbin–Watson 1.989616
A.2.4 B3, Models of log real aggregate Monemy Market
Instruments held by UK sectors (Rest of World ex-
cluded)
B3a, log real B3 dependent (aggreagate MMIs held by UK sec-
tors), contemporaneous OLS with log real GDP, RPI, 10-year gilt
yield, overnight gilt repo rate
Model 8: OLS, using observations 1996:1–2016:2 (T = 82)
Dependent variable: l realB3
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 10.9721 3.06417 3.581 0.0006
l rgdp −0.367171 0.233663 −1.571 0.1202
RPI −0.0226267 0.0102548 −2.206 0.0303
ytm 10yrGilt −0.0583795 0.0210940 −2.768 0.0071
ON gilt repo 0.0179871 0.0107146 1.679 0.0973
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Table A.9: Information criteria for lag selection, system B3b
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 535.26832 -12.980745 -
11.692708*
-12.465983
2 601.65878 0.00000 -13.780494 -11.388426 -
12.824508*
3 631.29112 0.00862 -13.612924 -10.116824 -12.215713
4 677.75191 0.00000 -13.888208 -9.288076 -12.049773
5 730.92782 0.00000 -
14.340206*
-8.636043 -12.060546
6 766.42814 0.00045 -14.327056 -7.518862 -11.606172
Mean dependent var 5.989774 S.D. dependent var 0.126097
Sum squared resid 1.079577 S.E. of regression 0.118408
R2 0.161773 Adjusted R2 0.118229
F (4, 77) 3.715150 P-value(F ) 0.008099
Log-likelihood 61.18320 Akaike criterion −112.3664
Schwarz criterion −100.3328 Hannan–Quinn −107.5351
ρ̂ 0.758938 Durbin–Watson 0.469674
B3b, VECM system on log real B3, log real GDP, log real M4,
RPI, 10-year gilt yield, overnight gilt repo rate
VAR lag selection for system B3b
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Table A.10: Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for system B3b
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test [p-value] Lmax test [p-value]
0 0.48061 140.29 [0.0000] 52.408 [0.0006]
1 0.38971 87.880 [0.0007] 39.506 [0.0069]
2 0.23605 48.374 [0.0430] 21.540 [0.2530]
3 0.16590 26.834 [0.1083] 14.512 [0.3378]
4 0.11116 12.321 [0.1432] 9.4270 [0.2579]
Johansen rank selection for system B3b
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Model B3b
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 1996:3–2016:2 (T = 80)
Cointegration rank = 2
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Restrictions on beta: b[1,1] = -1 b[2,5] = -1 b[1,4] = 0 b[2,3] = 0
Cointegrating vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
l rgdpt−1 −1.00000 4.76364
(0.00000) (1.54487)




ON gilt repot−1 0.00000 0.208170
(0.00000) (0.0570393)
l realB3t−1 0.223743 −1.00000
(0.104322) (0.00000)
ytm 10yrGiltt−1 0.0608575 −0.0862104
(0.0192218) (0.102157)
Adjustment vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
l rgdpt−1 0.00771335 −0.00109431
(0.00655359) (0.00169169)




ON gilt repot−1 0.498821 −0.121655
(0.379584) (0.0979825)
l realB3t−1 −0.132623 0.0414051
(0.100908) (0.0260475)








Equation 1: ∆l rgdp
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.0874665 0.0605917 1.444 0.1533
d l rgdp 1 0.656865 0.107526 6.109 0.0000
d l realM4 1 0.000445433 0.0399534 0.01115 0.9911
∆RPIt−1 −0.000787217 0.000989476 −0.7956 0.4290
d ON gilt repo 1 0.00258064 0.00217468 1.187 0.2394
d l realB3 1 0.00404349 0.00738239 0.5477 0.5856
∆ytmt−10 0.000423920 0.00193229 0.2194 0.8270
EC1 0.00771335 0.00655359 1.177 0.2432
EC2 −0.00109431 0.00169169 −0.6469 0.5198
Mean dependent var 0.005112 S.D. dependent var 0.006219
Sum squared resid 0.001672 S.E. of regression 0.004887
R2 0.452910 Adjusted R2 0.382570
ρ̂ −0.085262 Durbin–Watson 2.164297
Equation 2: ∆l realM4
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.975327 0.169473 −5.755 0.0000
d l rgdp 1 −0.769393 0.300748 −2.558 0.0127
d l realM4 1 −0.201419 0.111748 −1.802 0.0758
∆RPIt−1 0.0104060 0.00276753 3.760 0.0003
d ON gilt repo 1 −0.00744568 0.00608251 −1.224 0.2250
d l realB3 1 0.00506154 0.0206483 0.2451 0.8071
∆ytmt−10 0.00267863 0.00540456 0.4956 0.6217
EC1 0.0649795 0.0183302 3.545 0.0007
EC2 0.0313673 0.00473160 6.629 0.0000
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Mean dependent var 0.010602 S.D. dependent var 0.017515
Sum squared resid 0.013078 S.E. of regression 0.013669
R2 0.460335 Adjusted R2 0.390950
ρ̂ −0.093842 Durbin–Watson 2.181085
Equation 3: ∆RPI
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 13.7523 6.43971 2.136 0.0362
d l rgdp 1 20.7261 11.4280 1.814 0.0740
d l realM4 1 −2.04952 4.24626 −0.4827 0.6308
∆RPIt−1 0.355752 0.105162 3.383 0.0012
d ON gilt repo 1 0.665037 0.231126 2.877 0.0053
d l realB3 1 −1.20758 0.784604 −1.539 0.1283
∆ytmt−10 0.0207714 0.205365 0.1011 0.9197
EC1 4.00654 0.696519 5.752 0.0000
EC2 0.157481 0.179793 0.8759 0.3841
Mean dependent var −0.010000 S.D. dependent var 0.764331
Sum squared resid 18.88364 S.E. of regression 0.519390
R2 0.590838 Adjusted R2 0.538232
ρ̂ −0.098699 Durbin–Watson 2.194768
Equation 4: ∆ON gilt repo
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 7.55162 3.50947 2.152 0.0349
d l rgdp 1 22.4503 6.22792 3.605 0.0006
d l realM4 1 0.0187311 2.31410 0.008094 0.9936
∆RPIt−1 −0.0746235 0.0573105 −1.302 0.1972
d ON gilt repo 1 0.580518 0.125957 4.609 0.0000
d l realB3 1 −0.249672 0.427588 −0.5839 0.5612
∆ytmt−10 0.236660 0.111918 2.115 0.0380
EC1 0.498821 0.379584 1.314 0.1931
EC2 −0.121655 0.0979825 −1.242 0.2185
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Mean dependent var −0.067627 S.D. dependent var 0.404656
Sum squared resid 5.608356 S.E. of regression 0.283054
R2 0.566454 Adjusted R2 0.510712
ρ̂ 0.016497 Durbin–Watson 1.955576
Equation 5: ∆l realB3
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −2.40053 0.932952 −2.573 0.0122
d l rgdp 1 −3.01586 1.65562 −1.822 0.0728
d l realM4 1 −0.617211 0.615176 −1.003 0.3192
∆RPIt−1 0.0379102 0.0152353 2.488 0.0152
d ON gilt repo 1 −0.0356932 0.0334843 −1.066 0.2901
d l realB3 1 −0.164558 0.113669 −1.448 0.1522
∆ytmt−10 0.00154396 0.0297522 0.05189 0.9588
EC1 −0.132623 0.100908 −1.314 0.1930
EC2 0.0414051 0.0260475 1.590 0.1164
Mean dependent var 0.001984 S.D. dependent var 0.079093
Sum squared resid 0.396343 S.E. of regression 0.075247
R2 0.198016 Adjusted R2 0.094904
ρ̂ −0.062699 Durbin–Watson 2.120615
Equation 6: ∆ytm 10yrGilt
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −2.22292 3.63079 −0.6122 0.5424
d l rgdp 1 9.56734 6.44323 1.485 0.1421
d l realM4 1 −2.32396 2.39410 −0.9707 0.3350
∆RPIt−1 0.0130531 0.0592917 0.2202 0.8264
d ON gilt repo 1 −0.288074 0.130312 −2.211 0.0303
d l realB3 1 −0.284739 0.442370 −0.6437 0.5219
∆ytmt−10 0.305928 0.115787 2.642 0.0102
EC1 0.0154528 0.392707 0.03935 0.9687
EC2 0.0521443 0.101370 0.5144 0.6086
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Table A.11: Information criteria for lag selection, system B4a
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 572.73602 -18.301242 -
16.809197*
-17.720061
2 635.77201 0.00000 -19.233517 -16.462577 -18.154180
3 658.90749 0.11735 -18.789914 -14.740077 -17.212421
4 710.14888 0.00000 -19.315478 -13.986747 -17.239830
5 751.21150 0.00002 -19.490052 -12.882424 -16.916247
6 808.61067 0.00000 -20.227954 -12.341431 -17.155994
7 877.07155 0.00000 -21.347295 -12.181876 -17.777179




Mean dependent var −0.082487 S.D. dependent var 0.302689
Sum squared resid 6.002831 S.E. of regression 0.292839
R2 0.170652 Adjusted R2 0.064021
ρ̂ −0.005071 Durbin–Watson 2.002234
A.2.5 B4, Models of log real M4 Securitisation incorporating
measures of government debt issuance
B4a, VECM system on log real M4 securitisation, log real GDP,
log GDP deflator, 1 month LIBOR, 20-year gilt yield, log real
short-term debt outstanding as a liability of central government
(lr STDebt CG)
VAR lag selection for system B4a
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Table A.12: Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for system B4a
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test [p-value] Lmax test [p-value]
0 0.50305 127.77 [0.0000] 44.753 [0.0105]
1 0.44398 83.012 [0.0025] 37.565 [0.0138]
2 0.28208 45.447 [0.0815] 21.210 [0.2727]
3 0.20383 24.237 [0.1968] 14.588 [0.3319]
4 0.13133 9.6488 [0.3144] 9.0108 [0.2919]
5 0.0099201 0.63806 [0.4244] 0.63806 [0.4244]
Johansen rank selection for system B4a
194
Model B4a
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2000:3–2016:2 (T = 64)
Cointegration rank = 1
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Cointegrating vectors (standard errors in parentheses)










lr STDebt CGt−1 1.32729
(0.423698)
Adjustment vectors





lr STDebt CGt−1 3.76863
Log-likelihood = 618.281




Equation 1: ∆lr M4 sec
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −18.1476 5.51408 −3.291 0.0017
d lr M4 sec 1 0.0460085 0.128565 0.3579 0.7218
d l gdpdef 1 3.80414 2.16813 1.755 0.0848
d l rgdp 1 −6.06143 2.04716 −2.961 0.0045
∆LIBORt−1 0.0735219 0.0282886 2.599 0.0119
∆ytmt−20 −0.0369230 0.0475793 −0.7760 0.4410
d lr STDebt CG 1 0.0226388 0.0357992 0.6324 0.5297
EC1 −0.0397359 0.0120540 −3.297 0.0017
Mean dependent var 0.029617 S.D. dependent var 0.088053
Sum squared resid 0.323168 S.E. of regression 0.075966
R2 0.338393 Adjusted R2 0.255693
ρ̂ −0.014158 Durbin–Watson 2.004873
Equation 2: ∆l gdpdef
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.456157 0.351723 −1.297 0.2000
d lr M4 sec 1 0.000207723 0.00820072 0.02533 0.9799
d l gdpdef 1 −0.200038 0.138297 −1.446 0.1536
d l rgdp 1 −0.112187 0.130581 −0.8591 0.3939
∆LIBORt−1 0.00251757 0.00180443 1.395 0.1685
∆ytmt−20 −0.00277472 0.00303491 −0.9143 0.3645
d lr STDebt CG 1 0.000462693 0.00228350 0.2026 0.8402
EC1 −0.00101041 0.000768878 −1.314 0.1942
Mean dependent var 0.004801 S.D. dependent var 0.004818
Sum squared resid 0.001315 S.E. of regression 0.004846
R2 0.100816 Adjusted R2 -0.011582
ρ̂ −0.072317 Durbin–Watson 2.132418
Equation 3: ∆l rgdp
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.150985 0.334307 −0.4516 0.6533
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0148048 0.00779466 −1.899 0.0627
d l gdpdef 1 −0.122525 0.131450 −0.9321 0.3553
d l rgdp 1 0.665573 0.124115 5.363 0.0000
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00141186 0.00171508 −0.8232 0.4139
∆ytmt−20 0.000124877 0.00288463 0.04329 0.9656
d lr STDebt CG 1 −0.00166231 0.00217043 −0.7659 0.4470
EC1 −0.000335152 0.000730807 −0.4586 0.6483
Mean dependent var 0.004298 S.D. dependent var 0.006389
Sum squared resid 0.001188 S.E. of regression 0.004606
R2 0.538038 Adjusted R2 0.480293
ρ̂ −0.045868 Durbin–Watson 2.082137
Equation 4: ∆LIBOR 1m
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −18.2512 23.0342 −0.7924 0.4315
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.991448 0.537062 −1.846 0.0702
d l gdpdef 1 −1.14968 9.05704 −0.1269 0.8994
d l rgdp 1 25.7704 8.55171 3.013 0.0039
∆LIBORt−1 0.288446 0.118171 2.441 0.0178
∆ytmt−20 0.224451 0.198755 1.129 0.2636
d lr STDebt CG 1 0.00856753 0.149546 0.05729 0.9545
EC1 −0.0395929 0.0503535 −0.7863 0.4350
Mean dependent var −0.086511 S.D. dependent var 0.429329
Sum squared resid 5.639346 S.E. of regression 0.317337
R2 0.514368 Adjusted R2 0.453664
ρ̂ 0.042832 Durbin–Watson 1.913858
Equation 5: ∆ytm 20yrGilt
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 18.3308 16.7326 1.096 0.2780
d lr M4 sec 1 0.616649 0.390136 1.581 0.1196
d l gdpdef 1 1.17052 6.57927 0.1779 0.8594
d l rgdp 1 12.2907 6.21218 1.978 0.0528
∆LIBORt−1 −0.162457 0.0858427 −1.892 0.0636
∆ytmt−20 0.131227 0.144381 0.9089 0.3673
d lr STDebt CG 1 −0.0952677 0.108634 −0.8770 0.3843
EC1 0.0403149 0.0365781 1.102 0.2751
Mean dependent var −0.039531 S.D. dependent var 0.231049
Sum squared resid 2.975852 S.E. of regression 0.230522
R2 0.115165 Adjusted R2 0.004561
ρ̂ 0.005530 Durbin–Watson 1.986342
Equation 6: ∆lr STDebt CG
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −68.3671 15.3982 −4.440 0.0000
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.123071 0.359023 −0.3428 0.7330
d l gdpdef 1 −12.8274 6.05459 −2.119 0.0386
d l rgdp 1 −15.7139 5.71677 −2.749 0.0080
∆LIBORt−1 −0.0924954 0.0789968 −1.171 0.2466
∆ytmt−20 −0.233112 0.132867 −1.754 0.0848
d lr STDebt CG 1 −0.438035 0.0999705 −4.382 0.0001
EC1 −0.149750 0.0336611 −4.449 0.0000
Mean dependent var 0.042230 S.D. dependent var 0.279060
Sum squared resid 2.520139 S.E. of regression 0.212138
R2 0.486325 Adjusted R2 0.422115
ρ̂ 0.051234 Durbin–Watson 1.832908
B4b, VECM system of same composition as B4a but with 2 coin-
tegrating vectors
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2000:3–2016:2 (T = 64)
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Cointegration rank = 2
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Cointegrating vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
lr M4 sect−1 1.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
l gdpdeft−1 0.00000 1.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
l rgdpt−1 −16.2657 −1.42704
(2.13017) (0.0919944)
LIBOR 1mt−1 0.295563 0.0335255
(0.0808181) (0.00349024)
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 −1.29042 −0.0404684
(0.175691) (0.00758744)
lr STDebt CGt−1 0.327062 0.0542711
(0.219380) (0.00947423)
Adjustment vectors
lr M4 sect−1 1.00000 86.8952
l gdpdeft−1 0.0193173 1.00000
l rgdpt−1 0.0189507 2.81449
LIBOR 1mt−1 −0.625030 −234.363
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 −2.44386 −371.075
lr STDebt CGt−1 −1.76134 −767.126
Log-likelihood = 637.063




Equation 1: ∆lr M4 sec
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −7.91907 7.28644 −1.087 0.2819
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0248176 0.130400 −0.1903 0.8498
d l gdpdef 1 1.57474 2.37617 0.6627 0.5103
d l rgdp 1 −4.32766 2.16975 −1.995 0.0512
∆LIBORt−1 0.0390856 0.0322315 1.213 0.2305
∆ytmt−20 −0.0237123 0.0470282 −0.5042 0.6162
d lr STDebt CG 1 −0.00942618 0.0382698 −0.2463 0.8064
EC1 −0.126167 0.0429833 −2.935 0.0049
EC2 1.30660 0.998976 1.308 0.1964
Mean dependent var 0.029617 S.D. dependent var 0.088053
Sum squared resid 0.298956 S.E. of regression 0.074406
R2 0.387960 Adjusted R2 0.285954
ρ̂ 0.026272 Durbin–Watson 1.937936
Equation 2: ∆l gdpdef
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.287305 0.482016 −0.5960 0.5536
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.000961466 0.00862626 −0.1115 0.9117
d l gdpdef 1 −0.236840 0.157189 −1.507 0.1377
d l rgdp 1 −0.0835662 0.143534 −0.5822 0.5629
∆LIBORt−1 0.00194910 0.00213219 0.9141 0.3647
∆ytmt−20 −0.00255664 0.00311103 −0.8218 0.4148
d lr STDebt CG 1 −6.66313e–005 0.00253164 −0.02632 0.9791
EC1 −0.00243720 0.00284345 −0.8571 0.3952
EC2 0.0150365 0.0660847 0.2275 0.8209
Mean dependent var 0.004801 S.D. dependent var 0.004818
Sum squared resid 0.001308 S.E. of regression 0.004922
R2 0.105328 Adjusted R2 -0.043784
ρ̂ −0.079554 Durbin–Watson 2.144768
Equation 3: ∆l rgdp
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.0923059 0.456646 0.2021 0.8406
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0164894 0.00817224 −2.018 0.0486
d l gdpdef 1 −0.175552 0.148916 −1.179 0.2436
d l rgdp 1 0.706811 0.135980 5.198 0.0000
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00223094 0.00201997 −1.104 0.2743
∆ytmt−20 0.000439098 0.00294729 0.1490 0.8821
d lr STDebt CG 1 −0.00242499 0.00239840 −1.011 0.3165
EC1 −0.00239095 0.00269379 −0.8876 0.3787
EC2 0.0423200 0.0626065 0.6760 0.5019
Mean dependent var 0.004298 S.D. dependent var 0.006389
Sum squared resid 0.001174 S.E. of regression 0.004663
R2 0.543365 Adjusted R2 0.467259
ρ̂ −0.083899 Durbin–Watson 2.152638
Equation 4: ∆LIBOR 1m
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −32.2691 31.5187 −1.024 0.3105
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.894383 0.564065 −1.586 0.1187
d l gdpdef 1 1.90564 10.2785 0.1854 0.8536
d l rgdp 1 23.3943 9.38562 2.493 0.0158
∆LIBORt−1 0.335640 0.139423 2.407 0.0195
∆ytmt−20 0.206346 0.203428 1.014 0.3149
d lr STDebt CG 1 0.0525116 0.165542 0.3172 0.7523
EC1 0.0788580 0.185931 0.4241 0.6732
EC2 −3.52400 4.32123 −0.8155 0.4184
Mean dependent var −0.086511 S.D. dependent var 0.429329
Sum squared resid 5.593872 S.E. of regression 0.321854
R2 0.518284 Adjusted R2 0.437998
ρ̂ 0.059696 Durbin–Watson 1.880523
Equation 5: ∆ytm 20yrGilt
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −13.3876 22.0713 −0.6066 0.5467
d lr M4 sec 1 0.836279 0.394992 2.117 0.0389
d l gdpdef 1 8.08382 7.19763 1.123 0.2664
d l rgdp 1 6.91436 6.57237 1.052 0.2975
∆LIBORt−1 −0.0556708 0.0976320 −0.5702 0.5709
∆ytmt−20 0.0902613 0.142453 0.6336 0.5290
d lr STDebt CG 1 0.00416484 0.115923 0.03593 0.9715
EC1 0.308335 0.130200 2.368 0.0215
EC2 −5.57967 3.02598 −1.844 0.0707
Mean dependent var −0.039531 S.D. dependent var 0.231049
Sum squared resid 2.743034 S.E. of regression 0.225382
R2 0.184391 Adjusted R2 0.048456
ρ̂ −0.008104 Durbin–Watson 2.002871
Equation 6: ∆lr STDebt CG
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −112.388 19.1812 −5.859 0.0000
d lr M4 sec 1 0.181744 0.343270 0.5294 0.5987
d l gdpdef 1 −3.23273 6.25514 −0.5168 0.6074
d l rgdp 1 −23.1755 5.71176 −4.058 0.0002
∆LIBORt−1 0.0557081 0.0848477 0.6566 0.5142
∆ytmt−20 −0.289967 0.123799 −2.342 0.0229
d lr STDebt CG 1 −0.300037 0.100743 −2.978 0.0043
EC1 0.222223 0.113151 1.964 0.0547
EC2 −11.5349 2.62975 −4.386 0.0001
Mean dependent var 0.042230 S.D. dependent var 0.279060
Sum squared resid 2.071698 S.E. of regression 0.195869
R2 0.577729 Adjusted R2 0.507351
ρ̂ 0.052040 Durbin–Watson 1.845851
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Table A.13: Information criteria for lag selection, system B4c
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 688.74210 -22.301452 -
20.809407*
-21.720270
2 750.51850 0.00000 -23.190293 -20.419353 -22.110956
3 772.44240 0.17298 -22.704910 -18.655074 -21.127417
4 815.94646 0.00000 -22.963671 -17.634939 -20.888022
5 853.06818 0.00018 -23.002351 -16.394723 -20.428547
6 902.99944 0.00000 -23.482739 -15.596216 -20.410779
7 997.52633 0.00000 -25.500908 -16.335489 -21.930792




B4c, VECM system on log real M4 securitisation, log real GDP,
log GDP deflator, 1 month LIBOR, 20-year gilt yield, log real
long-term debt outstanding as a liability of central government
(lr LTDebt CG)
VAR lag selection for system B4c
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Table A.14: Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for system B4c
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test [p-value] Lmax test [p-value]
0 0.55933 134.33 [0.0000] 52.446 [0.0006]
1 0.46505 81.887 [0.0033] 40.037 [0.0057]
2 0.27433 41.850 [0.1637] 20.523 [0.3167]
3 0.18427 21.327 [0.3478] 13.035 [0.4634]
4 0.11778 8.2924 [0.4419] 8.0204 [0.3851]
5 0.0042411 0.27201 [0.6020] 0.27201 [0.6020]
Johansen rank selection for system B4c
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Model B4c
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2000:3–2016:2 (T = 64)
Cointegration rank = 1
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Cointegrating vectors (standard errors in parentheses)










lr LTDebt CGt−1 −4.97299
(1.30576)
Adjustment vectors





lr LTDebt CGt−1 0.344324
Log-likelihood = 768.848




Equation 1: ∆lr M4 sec
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −2.00446 0.789937 −2.537 0.0140
d lr M4 sec 1 0.0739946 0.130218 0.5682 0.5721
d l gdpdef 1 1.19717 2.27015 0.5274 0.6000
d l rgdp 1 −4.36920 2.08716 −2.093 0.0409
∆LIBORt−1 0.0906192 0.0292215 3.101 0.0030
∆ytmt−20 −0.0370122 0.0508369 −0.7281 0.4696
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.971803 0.398453 −2.439 0.0179
EC1 0.0439350 0.0169128 2.598 0.0120
Mean dependent var 0.029617 S.D. dependent var 0.088053
Sum squared resid 0.336250 S.E. of regression 0.077488
R2 0.311611 Adjusted R2 0.225562
ρ̂ −0.069477 Durbin–Watson 2.114181
Equation 2: ∆l gdpdef
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.126828 0.0462350 −2.743 0.0082
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.00431565 0.00762164 −0.5662 0.5735
d l gdpdef 1 −0.334123 0.132872 −2.515 0.0148
d l rgdp 1 −0.0997837 0.122161 −0.8168 0.4175
∆LIBORt−1 0.00389165 0.00171033 2.275 0.0267
∆ytmt−20 −0.00472842 0.00297548 −1.589 0.1177
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0565541 0.0233214 −2.425 0.0186
EC1 0.00286569 0.000989903 2.895 0.0054
Mean dependent var 0.004801 S.D. dependent var 0.004818
Sum squared resid 0.001152 S.E. of regression 0.004535
R2 0.212261 Adjusted R2 0.113794
ρ̂ −0.140016 Durbin–Watson 2.226542
Equation 3: ∆l rgdp
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.00337533 0.0471950 0.07152 0.9432
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0136789 0.00777989 −1.758 0.0842
d l gdpdef 1 −0.145433 0.135631 −1.072 0.2882
d l rgdp 1 0.660620 0.124698 5.298 0.0000
∆LIBORt−1 −0.000956276 0.00174585 −0.5477 0.5860
∆ytmt−20 0.000185003 0.00303726 0.06091 0.9516
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.00918843 0.0238056 −0.3860 0.7010
EC1 −1.46028e–005 0.00101046 −0.01445 0.9885
Mean dependent var 0.004298 S.D. dependent var 0.006389
Sum squared resid 0.001200 S.E. of regression 0.004630
R2 0.533233 Adjusted R2 0.474887
ρ̂ −0.047206 Durbin–Watson 2.082800
Equation 4: ∆LIBOR 1m
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −10.9847 2.83406 −3.876 0.0003
d lr M4 sec 1 −1.53908 0.467183 −3.294 0.0017
d l gdpdef 1 −11.3059 8.14463 −1.388 0.1706
d l rgdp 1 23.5613 7.48811 3.146 0.0026
∆LIBORt−1 0.411715 0.104838 3.927 0.0002
∆ytmt−20 −0.00172128 0.182388 −0.009437 0.9925
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −4.66061 1.42953 −3.260 0.0019
EC1 0.233934 0.0606780 3.855 0.0003
Mean dependent var −0.086511 S.D. dependent var 0.429329
Sum squared resid 4.328080 S.E. of regression 0.278006
R2 0.627288 Adjusted R2 0.580698
ρ̂ −0.010812 Durbin–Watson 1.987719
Equation 5: ∆ytm 20yrGilt
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −5.03091 1.98654 −2.532 0.0142
d lr M4 sec 1 0.0424648 0.327473 0.1297 0.8973
d l gdpdef 1 −4.92092 5.70899 −0.8620 0.3924
d l rgdp 1 −0.171134 5.24881 −0.03260 0.9741
∆LIBORt−1 −0.0323812 0.0734866 −0.4406 0.6612
∆ytmt−20 −0.231707 0.127845 −1.812 0.0753
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −5.02145 1.00203 −5.011 0.0000
EC1 0.108353 0.0425324 2.548 0.0136
Mean dependent var −0.039531 S.D. dependent var 0.231049
Sum squared resid 2.126534 S.E. of regression 0.194869
R2 0.367700 Adjusted R2 0.288662
ρ̂ 0.031984 Durbin–Watson 1.892125
Equation 6: ∆lr LTDebt CG
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.694289 0.304165 −2.283 0.0263
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0519608 0.0501403 −1.036 0.3045
d l gdpdef 1 0.909087 0.874119 1.040 0.3028
d l rgdp 1 −1.08964 0.803658 −1.356 0.1806
∆LIBORt−1 0.00580074 0.0112517 0.5155 0.6082
∆ytmt−20 0.0273707 0.0195747 1.398 0.1675
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.315834 0.153424 2.059 0.0442
EC1 0.0151279 0.00651225 2.323 0.0238
Mean dependent var 0.022390 S.D. dependent var 0.034964
Sum squared resid 0.049853 S.E. of regression 0.029837
R2 0.352675 Adjusted R2 0.271760
ρ̂ 0.002627 Durbin–Watson 1.918330
B4d, VECM system of same composition as B4c but with 2 coin-
tegrating vectors
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2000:3–2016:2 (T = 64)
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Cointegration rank = 2
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Cointegrating vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
lr M4 sect−1 1.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
l gdpdeft−1 0.00000 1.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
l rgdpt−1 4.15915 0.00901688
(1.53019) (0.0987245)
LIBOR 1mt−1 −0.215114 −0.00858658
(0.0604348) (0.00389911)
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 −0.474067 −0.000381906
(0.178411) (0.0115107)
lr LTDebt CGt−1 −3.29106 −0.237413
(0.414338) (0.0267321)
Adjustment vectors
lr M4 sect−1 1.00000 79.3367
l gdpdeft−1 −0.0149964 1.00000
l rgdpt−1 0.0197157 1.01694
LIBOR 1mt−1 −3.53181 −38.4565
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 −2.73590 −75.0592
lr LTDebt CGt−1 −0.264637 −4.37306
Log-likelihood = 788.866




Equation 1: ∆lr M4 sec
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −4.02356 0.798313 −5.040 0.0000
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.163601 0.122101 −1.340 0.1859
d l gdpdef 1 −0.148232 1.96226 −0.07554 0.9401
d l rgdp 1 −5.38373 1.79792 −2.994 0.0041
∆LIBORt−1 0.0736745 0.0252471 2.918 0.0051
∆ytmt−20 −0.0759320 0.0442475 −1.716 0.0919
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.672807 0.346572 −1.941 0.0574
EC1 −0.118621 0.0371643 −3.192 0.0024
EC2 3.07846 0.591702 5.203 0.0000
Mean dependent var 0.029617 S.D. dependent var 0.088053
Sum squared resid 0.237204 S.E. of regression 0.066277
R2 0.514382 Adjusted R2 0.433446
ρ̂ 0.002255 Durbin–Watson 1.972555
Equation 2: ∆l gdpdef
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.140327 0.0555245 −2.527 0.0145
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.00590415 0.00849239 −0.6952 0.4899
d l gdpdef 1 −0.343118 0.136480 −2.514 0.0149
d l rgdp 1 −0.106567 0.125050 −0.8522 0.3979
∆LIBORt−1 0.00377836 0.00175600 2.152 0.0359
∆ytmt−20 −0.00498862 0.00307751 −1.621 0.1108
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0545551 0.0241049 −2.263 0.0277
EC1 0.00177889 0.00258486 0.6882 0.4943
EC2 0.0388025 0.0411542 0.9429 0.3500
Mean dependent var 0.004801 S.D. dependent var 0.004818
Sum squared resid 0.001147 S.E. of regression 0.004610
R2 0.215289 Adjusted R2 0.084504
ρ̂ −0.149334 Durbin–Watson 2.243994
Equation 3: ∆l rgdp
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.0254920 0.0563056 −0.4527 0.6525
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0170758 0.00861187 −1.983 0.0525
d l gdpdef 1 −0.164668 0.138400 −1.190 0.2393
d l rgdp 1 0.646115 0.126809 5.095 0.0000
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00119854 0.00178070 −0.6731 0.5038
∆ytmt−20 −0.000371439 0.00312081 −0.1190 0.9057
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.00491364 0.0244440 −0.2010 0.8414
EC1 −0.00233869 0.00262123 −0.8922 0.3762
EC2 0.0394597 0.0417332 0.9455 0.3486
Mean dependent var 0.004298 S.D. dependent var 0.006389
Sum squared resid 0.001180 S.E. of regression 0.004675
R2 0.541106 Adjusted R2 0.464624
ρ̂ −0.052732 Durbin–Watson 2.091531
Equation 4: ∆LIBOR 1m
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −8.68670 3.35912 −2.586 0.0124
d lr M4 sec 1 −1.26866 0.513772 −2.469 0.0167
d l gdpdef 1 −9.77459 8.25675 −1.184 0.2417
d l rgdp 1 24.7160 7.56524 3.267 0.0019
∆LIBORt−1 0.431001 0.106234 4.057 0.0002
∆ytmt−20 0.0425753 0.186183 0.2287 0.8200
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −5.00091 1.45829 −3.429 0.0012
EC1 0.418947 0.156379 2.679 0.0098
EC2 −1.49221 2.48974 −0.5993 0.5515
Mean dependent var −0.086511 S.D. dependent var 0.429329
Sum squared resid 4.199778 S.E. of regression 0.278879
R2 0.638336 Adjusted R2 0.578059
ρ̂ −0.015379 Durbin–Watson 1.994864
Equation 5: ∆ytm 20yrGilt
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −2.34572 2.28971 −1.024 0.3102
d lr M4 sec 1 0.358443 0.350208 1.024 0.3106
d l gdpdef 1 −3.13168 5.62813 −0.5564 0.5802
d l rgdp 1 1.17809 5.15678 0.2285 0.8202
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00984652 0.0724135 −0.1360 0.8923
∆ytmt−20 −0.179948 0.126910 −1.418 0.1620
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −5.41909 0.994033 −5.452 0.0000
EC1 0.324536 0.106594 3.045 0.0036
EC2 −2.91249 1.69711 −1.716 0.0919
Mean dependent var −0.039531 S.D. dependent var 0.231049
Sum squared resid 1.951359 S.E. of regression 0.190095
R2 0.419786 Adjusted R2 0.323084
ρ̂ −0.018085 Durbin–Watson 1.982282
Equation 6: ∆lr LTDebt CG
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.492279 0.362324 −1.359 0.1799
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0281895 0.0554169 −0.5087 0.6130
d l gdpdef 1 1.04369 0.890597 1.172 0.2464
d l rgdp 1 −0.988136 0.816009 −1.211 0.2312
∆LIBORt−1 0.00749605 0.0114587 0.6542 0.5158
∆ytmt−20 0.0312646 0.0200823 1.557 0.1254
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.285919 0.157296 1.818 0.0747
EC1 0.0313915 0.0168675 1.861 0.0682
EC2 −0.169686 0.268551 −0.6319 0.5301
Mean dependent var 0.022390 S.D. dependent var 0.034964
Sum squared resid 0.048862 S.E. of regression 0.030081
R2 0.365549 Adjusted R2 0.259807
ρ̂ 0.011345 Durbin–Watson 1.904819
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Table A.15: Information criteria for lag selection, system B4e
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 895.67220 -27.086200 -
25.164917*
-26.331856




3 1017.51171 0.00349 -27.855216 -22.571689 -25.780770
4 1075.34002 0.00000 -28.140001 -21.175351 -25.405504
B4e, VECM system on log real M4 securitisation, log real GDP,
log GDP deflator, 1 month LIBOR, 20-year gilt yield, log real long-
term debt outstanding as a liability of central government, and log
real deposits in Monetary Financial Institutions held as assets of
UK Private Non-Financial Corporates (lr PNFC MFI deposits)
VAR lag selection for system B4e
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Table A.16: Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for system B4e
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test [p-value] Lmax test [p-value]
0 0.59748 165.44 [0.0000] 58.241 [0.0008]
1 0.46435 107.20 [0.0056] 39.954 [0.0477]
2 0.41641 67.243 [0.0771] 34.467 [0.0385]
3 0.22550 32.776 [0.5734] 16.355 [0.6425]
4 0.14422 16.421 [0.6892] 9.9677 [0.7502]
5 0.094812 6.4534 [0.6467] 6.3752 [0.5728]
6 0.0012200 0.078127 [0.7799] 0.078127 [0.7799]
Johansen rank selection for system B4e
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Model B4e
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2000:3–2016:2 (T = 64)
Cointegration rank = 2
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Cointegrating vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
lr M4 sect−1 1.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
l gdpdeft−1 0.00000 1.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
l rgdpt−1 1.64947 −0.256491
(4.36084) (0.252107)
LIBOR 1mt−1 −0.232189 −0.00969886
(0.0609398) (0.00352302)
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 −0.383155 0.00389188
(0.213965) (0.0123696)
lr LTDebt CGt−1 −3.37919 −0.240485
(0.571246) (0.0330246)
lr PNFC MFI depositst−1 1.40989 0.123122
(2.16446) (0.125131)
Adjustment vectors
lr M4 sect−1 1.00000 109.992
l gdpdeft−1 −0.0149850 1.00000
l rgdpt−1 0.0203989 1.71087
LIBOR 1mt−1 −3.12487 −53.5566
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 −2.57672 −113.490
lr LTDebt CGt−1 −0.202185 −3.53857
lr PNFC MFI depositst−1 −0.0265532 −9.06060
Log-likelihood = 966.628





Equation 1: ∆lr M4 sec
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 1.11195 0.315651 3.523 0.0009
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.111933 0.120504 −0.9289 0.3572
d l gdpdef 1 0.477883 2.00350 0.2385 0.8124
d l rgdp 1 −5.49677 1.82393 −3.014 0.0040
∆LIBORt−1 0.0811123 0.0255594 3.173 0.0025
∆ytmt−20 −0.0951529 0.0457080 −2.082 0.0422
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.691931 0.352069 −1.965 0.0546
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.493697 0.394537 1.251 0.2163
EC1 −0.133980 0.0401527 −3.337 0.0016
EC2 3.41059 0.684681 4.981 0.0000
Mean dependent var 0.029617 S.D. dependent var 0.088053
Sum squared resid 0.235793 S.E. of regression 0.066700
R2 0.517271 Adjusted R2 0.426190
ρ̂ 0.037135 Durbin–Watson 1.917205
Equation 2: ∆l gdpdef
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.00820795 0.0219236 −0.3744 0.7096
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.00314527 0.00836961 −0.3758 0.7086
d l gdpdef 1 −0.297178 0.139153 −2.136 0.0373
d l rgdp 1 −0.120241 0.126681 −0.9492 0.3468
∆LIBORt−1 0.00407666 0.00177523 2.296 0.0256
∆ytmt−20 −0.00550482 0.00317465 −1.734 0.0887
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0552086 0.0244529 −2.258 0.0281
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.0324503 0.0274026 1.184 0.2416
EC1 0.00200768 0.00278881 0.7199 0.4747
EC2 0.0310076 0.0475545 0.6520 0.5172
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Mean dependent var 0.004801 S.D. dependent var 0.004818
Sum squared resid 0.001137 S.E. of regression 0.004633
R2 0.222138 Adjusted R2 0.075371
ρ̂ −0.117855 Durbin–Watson 2.193254
Equation 3: ∆l rgdp
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.0238348 0.0219543 1.086 0.2825
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0170698 0.00838133 −2.037 0.0467
d l gdpdef 1 −0.144089 0.139348 −1.034 0.3058
d l rgdp 1 0.625412 0.126859 4.930 0.0000
∆LIBORt−1 −0.000942162 0.00177772 −0.5300 0.5983
∆ytmt−20 −0.000957516 0.00317909 −0.3012 0.7644
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.00540357 0.0244872 −0.2207 0.8262
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.0311130 0.0274409 1.134 0.2620
EC1 −0.00273304 0.00279271 −0.9786 0.3322
EC2 0.0530500 0.0476211 1.114 0.2703
Mean dependent var 0.004298 S.D. dependent var 0.006389
Sum squared resid 0.001141 S.E. of regression 0.004639
R2 0.556406 Adjusted R2 0.472709
ρ̂ −0.080243 Durbin–Watson 2.133639
Equation 4: ∆LIBOR 1m
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −3.29042 1.31351 −2.505 0.0154
d lr M4 sec 1 −1.19838 0.501449 −2.390 0.0204
d l gdpdef 1 −7.62399 8.33708 −0.9145 0.3646
d l rgdp 1 23.6902 7.58986 3.121 0.0029
∆LIBORt−1 0.447422 0.106359 4.207 0.0001
∆ytmt−20 −0.00504913 0.190203 −0.02655 0.9789
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −5.13138 1.46505 −3.503 0.0009
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 1.83447 1.64177 1.117 0.2689
EC1 0.418669 0.167086 2.506 0.0153
EC2 −1.66066 2.84914 −0.5829 0.5625
Mean dependent var −0.086511 S.D. dependent var 0.429329
Sum squared resid 4.083014 S.E. of regression 0.277557
R2 0.648391 Adjusted R2 0.582050
ρ̂ −0.049210 Durbin–Watson 2.072402
Equation 5: ∆ytm 20yrGilt
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −2.67147 0.893982 −2.988 0.0042
d lr M4 sec 1 0.412972 0.341290 1.210 0.2316
d l gdpdef 1 −1.19596 5.67427 −0.2108 0.8339
d l rgdp 1 0.0983520 5.16571 0.01904 0.9849
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00166212 0.0723890 −0.02296 0.9818
∆ytmt−20 −0.192523 0.129453 −1.487 0.1429
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −5.41928 0.997122 −5.435 0.0000
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 1.64091 1.11740 1.469 0.1479
EC1 0.345228 0.113720 3.036 0.0037
EC2 −3.51905 1.93914 −1.815 0.0752
Mean dependent var −0.039531 S.D. dependent var 0.231049
Sum squared resid 1.891357 S.E. of regression 0.188907
R2 0.437627 Adjusted R2 0.331519
ρ̂ −0.061198 Durbin–Watson 2.093640
Equation 6: ∆lr LTDebt CG
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.191627 0.140691 −1.362 0.1789
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0374205 0.0537107 −0.6967 0.4890
d l gdpdef 1 0.809786 0.892993 0.9068 0.3686
d l rgdp 1 −0.836766 0.812957 −1.029 0.3080
∆LIBORt−1 0.00641706 0.0113923 0.5633 0.5756
∆ytmt−20 0.0291567 0.0203728 1.431 0.1583
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.269950 0.156923 1.720 0.0912
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 −0.236840 0.175852 −1.347 0.1838
EC1 0.0270887 0.0178967 1.514 0.1361
EC2 −0.109722 0.305174 −0.3595 0.7206
Mean dependent var 0.022390 S.D. dependent var 0.034964
Sum squared resid 0.046843 S.E. of regression 0.029729
R2 0.391758 Adjusted R2 0.276995
ρ̂ −0.002914 Durbin–Watson 1.929953
Equation 7: ∆lr PNFC MFI d
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.0255874 0.0903292 −0.2833 0.7781
d lr M4 sec 1 0.111241 0.0344844 3.226 0.0022
d l gdpdef 1 −0.511422 0.573336 −0.8920 0.3764
d l rgdp 1 1.66067 0.521950 3.182 0.0024
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00465654 0.00731428 −0.6366 0.5271
∆ytmt−20 0.0141228 0.0130801 1.080 0.2852
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.219361 0.100751 2.177 0.0339
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 −0.269996 0.112904 −2.391 0.0204
EC1 0.00355760 0.0114904 0.3096 0.7581
EC2 −0.280947 0.195934 −1.434 0.1575
Mean dependent var 0.010924 S.D. dependent var 0.021537
Sum squared resid 0.019310 S.E. of regression 0.019087
R2 0.339189 Adjusted R2 0.214508
ρ̂ 0.192806 Durbin–Watson 1.597545
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B4f, VECM system on log real M4 securitisation, log real GDP,
log GDP deflator, 1 month LIBOR, 20-year gilt yield, log real
long-term debt outstanding as a liability of central government,
log real deposits in Monetary Financial Institutions held as assets
of UK Private Non-Financial Corporates, and contemporaneous
FTSE 100 realised volatility (in short-run equations only)
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2000:3–2016:2 (T = 64)
Cointegration rank = 2
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Restrictions on beta: b[1,1] = -1 b[1,2] = 0 b[2,1] = 0 b[2,2] = -1
Cointegrating vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
lr M4 sect−1 −1.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
l gdpdeft−1 0.00000 −1.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
l rgdpt−1 −11.9356 0.678709
(7.02852) (0.158050)
LIBOR 1mt−1 0.298670 0.00777223
(0.0978904) (0.00220125)
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 −0.277951 0.0201613
(0.345082) (0.00775982)
lr LTDebt CGt−1 3.89871 0.225157
(0.918025) (0.0206435)
lr PNFC MFI depositst−1 −0.357625 −0.180049
(3.47773) (0.0782033)
Adjustment vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
220
lr M4 sect−1 −0.0571836 0.616420
(0.0273628) (1.20677)
l gdpdeft−1 −0.00389074 0.0703436
(0.00169991) (0.0749706)
l rgdpt−1 0.00550362 −0.264296
(0.00149527) (0.0659453)
LIBOR 1mt−1 −0.0727362 −5.26022
(0.0952487) (4.20071)
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 0.133360 −9.63428
(0.0649533) (2.86461)
lr LTDebt CGt−1 −0.0141666 0.0866862
(0.0110553) (0.487568)
lr PNFC MFI depositst−1 0.0221308 −0.632921
(0.00667464) (0.294369)
Log-likelihood = 985.954




Equation 1: ∆lr M4 sec
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −10.5090 9.27601 −1.133 0.2624
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0546572 0.134898 −0.4052 0.6870
d l gdpdef 1 2.38062 2.23330 1.066 0.2914
d l rgdp 1 −3.49364 2.14010 −1.632 0.1086
∆LIBORt−1 0.0822294 0.0310819 2.646 0.0108
∆ytmt−20 −0.0550258 0.0494216 −1.113 0.2707
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −1.15013 0.389362 −2.954 0.0047
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.868084 0.442456 1.962 0.0551
FTSE Vol 0.00247224 0.00111104 2.225 0.0304
EC1 −0.0571836 0.0273628 −2.090 0.0415
EC2 0.616420 1.20677 0.5108 0.6117
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Mean dependent var 0.029617 S.D. dependent var 0.088053
Sum squared resid 0.278614 S.E. of regression 0.073198
R2 0.429606 Adjusted R2 0.308945
ρ̂ −0.078949 Durbin–Watson 2.147703
Equation 2: ∆l gdpdef
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.849929 0.576273 −1.475 0.1463
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.00944595 0.00838057 −1.127 0.2649
d l gdpdef 1 −0.249640 0.138744 −1.799 0.0778
d l rgdp 1 −0.103109 0.132954 −0.7755 0.4415
∆LIBORt−1 0.00278184 0.00193096 1.441 0.1557
∆ytmt−20 −0.00553021 0.00307032 −1.801 0.0775
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0638612 0.0241892 −2.640 0.0109
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.0427010 0.0274876 1.553 0.1264
FTSE Vol 6.78124e–005 6.90235e–005 0.9825 0.3304
EC1 −0.00389074 0.00169991 −2.289 0.0262
EC2 0.0703436 0.0749706 0.9383 0.3524
Mean dependent var 0.004801 S.D. dependent var 0.004818
Sum squared resid 0.001075 S.E. of regression 0.004547
R2 0.264636 Adjusted R2 0.109078
ρ̂ −0.143692 Durbin–Watson 2.234701
Equation 3: ∆l rgdp
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 2.03404 0.506898 4.013 0.0002
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.000802620 0.00737167 −0.1089 0.9137
d l gdpdef 1 −0.244114 0.122041 −2.000 0.0507
d l rgdp 1 0.595225 0.116948 5.090 0.0000
∆LIBORt−1 0.00240610 0.00169850 1.417 0.1626
∆ytmt−20 −0.000673632 0.00270070 −0.2494 0.8040
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.0109813 0.0212772 0.5161 0.6080
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.00882989 0.0241785 0.3652 0.7164
FTSE Vol −0.000148782 6.07141e–005 −2.451 0.0177
EC1 0.00550362 0.00149527 3.681 0.0006
EC2 −0.264296 0.0659453 −4.008 0.0002
Mean dependent var 0.004298 S.D. dependent var 0.006389
Sum squared resid 0.000832 S.E. of regression 0.004000
R2 0.676440 Adjusted R2 0.607995
ρ̂ −0.141604 Durbin–Watson 2.264331
Equation 4: ∆LIBOR 1m
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 16.9623 32.2894 0.5253 0.6016
d lr M4 sec 1 −1.02363 0.469576 −2.180 0.0338
d l gdpdef 1 −11.9085 7.77401 −1.532 0.1316
d l rgdp 1 12.7334 7.44962 1.709 0.0934
∆LIBORt−1 0.443894 0.108195 4.103 0.0001
∆ytmt−20 −0.109193 0.172035 −0.6347 0.5284
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −4.24914 1.35536 −3.135 0.0028
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.682216 1.54017 0.4429 0.6596
FTSE Vol −0.0148968 0.00386749 −3.852 0.0003
EC1 −0.0727362 0.0952487 −0.7636 0.4485
EC2 −5.26022 4.20071 −1.252 0.2161
223
Mean dependent var −0.086511 S.D. dependent var 0.429329
Sum squared resid 3.375995 S.E. of regression 0.254800
R2 0.709276 Adjusted R2 0.647777
ρ̂ −0.101352 Durbin–Watson 2.176305
Equation 5: ∆ytm 20yrGilt
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 65.4218 22.0192 2.971 0.0045
d lr M4 sec 1 0.640652 0.320219 2.001 0.0507
d l gdpdef 1 −7.40365 5.30136 −1.397 0.1685
d l rgdp 1 −5.33714 5.08014 −1.051 0.2983
∆LIBORt−1 0.0673599 0.0737816 0.9130 0.3655
∆ytmt−20 −0.278010 0.117316 −2.370 0.0215
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −4.05817 0.924263 −4.391 0.0001
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.325578 1.05030 0.3100 0.7578
FTSE Vol −0.00892829 0.00263737 −3.385 0.0014
EC1 0.133360 0.0649533 2.053 0.0451
EC2 −9.63428 2.86461 −3.363 0.0015
Mean dependent var −0.039531 S.D. dependent var 0.231049
Sum squared resid 1.569950 S.E. of regression 0.173757
R2 0.533194 Adjusted R2 0.434446
ρ̂ 0.046460 Durbin–Watson 1.872677
Equation 6: ∆lr LTDebt CG
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −2.27136 3.74777 −0.6061 0.5471
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0879912 0.0545027 −1.614 0.1125
d l gdpdef 1 0.876730 0.902314 0.9716 0.3357
d l rgdp 1 −0.499507 0.864662 −0.5777 0.5660
∆LIBORt−1 0.00127688 0.0125579 0.1017 0.9194
∆ytmt−20 0.0266269 0.0199677 1.333 0.1882
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.282170 0.157313 1.794 0.0787
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 −0.203796 0.178765 −1.140 0.2595
FTSE Vol 0.000729558 0.000448891 1.625 0.1102
EC1 −0.0141666 0.0110553 −1.281 0.2057
EC2 0.0866862 0.487568 0.1778 0.8596
Mean dependent var 0.022390 S.D. dependent var 0.034964
Sum squared resid 0.045481 S.E. of regression 0.029574
R2 0.409453 Adjusted R2 0.284530
ρ̂ 0.051578 Durbin–Watson 1.818612
Equation 7: ∆lr PNFC MFI d
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 6.03582 2.26271 2.668 0.0102
d lr M4 sec 1 0.141265 0.0329059 4.293 0.0001
d l gdpdef 1 −0.919859 0.544771 −1.689 0.0973
d l rgdp 1 1.51641 0.522038 2.905 0.0054
∆LIBORt−1 0.00332076 0.00758184 0.4380 0.6632
∆ytmt−20 0.0116627 0.0120555 0.9674 0.3378
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.306217 0.0949778 3.224 0.0022
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 −0.353337 0.107929 −3.274 0.0019
FTSE Vol −0.000426558 0.000271018 −1.574 0.1216
EC1 0.0221308 0.00667464 3.316 0.0017
EC2 −0.632921 0.294369 −2.150 0.0362
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Mean dependent var 0.010924 S.D. dependent var 0.021537
Sum squared resid 0.016578 S.E. of regression 0.017855
R2 0.432658 Adjusted R2 0.312644
ρ̂ 0.035792 Durbin–Watson 1.907162
B4g, VECM system of same composition as B4f but with lagged
FTSE volatility in short-run equations
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2000:3–2016:2 (T = 64)
Cointegration rank = 2
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Restrictions on beta: b[1,1] = -1 b[1,2] = 0 b[2,1] = 0 b[2,2] = -1
Cointegrating vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
lr M4 sect−1 −1.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
l gdpdeft−1 0.00000 −1.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
l rgdpt−1 39.2880 0.390668
(14.4618) (0.262048)
LIBOR 1mt−1 0.0233637 0.0110085
(0.192625) (0.00349038)
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 3.21607 0.00140918
(0.690938) (0.0125198)
lr LTDebt CGt−1 1.85093 0.255430
(1.83133) (0.0331838)
lr PNFC MFI depositst−1 −5.90349 −0.176024
(7.00448) (0.126922)
Adjustment vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
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lr M4 sect−1 0.0307592 −0.466006
(0.00993404) (0.453193)
l gdpdeft−1 0.000334583 −0.0516170
(0.000684615) (0.0312323)
l rgdpt−1 −0.00107524 −0.0510168
(0.000670832) (0.0306035)
LIBOR 1mt−1 −0.0834168 −6.95224
(0.0373538) (1.70409)
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 −0.100418 −4.84181
(0.0265642) (1.21187)
lr LTDebt CGt−1 −0.00311761 −0.362989
(0.00433776) (0.197890)
lr PNFC MFI depositst−1 −0.00607654 0.0442925
(0.00267557) (0.122060)
Log-likelihood = 976.936




Equation 1: ∆lr M4 sec
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −14.1336 5.26480 −2.685 0.0097
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.175205 0.131261 −1.335 0.1878
d l gdpdef 1 0.976367 2.09075 0.4670 0.6425
d l rgdp 1 −5.35791 1.88515 −2.842 0.0064
∆LIBORt−1 0.0864890 0.0313690 2.757 0.0080
∆ytmt−20 −0.0803863 0.0471503 −1.705 0.0942
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −1.14018 0.349426 −3.263 0.0020
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.697880 0.400810 1.741 0.0876
FTSE Vol 1 0.00175840 0.00125787 1.398 0.1681
EC1 0.0307592 0.00993404 3.096 0.0032
EC2 −0.466006 0.453193 −1.028 0.3086
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Mean dependent var 0.029617 S.D. dependent var 0.088053
Sum squared resid 0.240664 S.E. of regression 0.068031
R2 0.507299 Adjusted R2 0.403073
ρ̂ 0.017993 Durbin–Watson 1.959172
Equation 2: ∆l gdpdef
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.0780815 0.362829 −0.2152 0.8305
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.00609627 0.00904597 −0.6739 0.5033
d l gdpdef 1 −0.302825 0.144086 −2.102 0.0404
d l rgdp 1 −0.138495 0.129917 −1.066 0.2913
∆LIBORt−1 0.00374952 0.00216183 1.734 0.0888
∆ytmt−20 −0.00591313 0.00324941 −1.820 0.0746
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0493926 0.0240811 −2.051 0.0453
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.0297935 0.0276222 1.079 0.2857
FTSE Vol 1 8.61554e–006 8.66873e–005 0.09939 0.9212
EC1 0.000334583 0.000684615 0.4887 0.6271
EC2 −0.0516170 0.0312323 −1.653 0.1044
Mean dependent var 0.004801 S.D. dependent var 0.004818
Sum squared resid 0.001143 S.E. of regression 0.004688
R2 0.218341 Adjusted R2 0.052990
ρ̂ −0.126116 Durbin–Watson 2.212847
Equation 3: ∆l rgdp
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.596566 0.355525 1.678 0.0994
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0104696 0.00886384 −1.181 0.2429
d l gdpdef 1 −0.163130 0.141185 −1.155 0.2532
d l rgdp 1 0.662642 0.127302 5.205 0.0000
∆LIBORt−1 0.000994934 0.00211830 0.4697 0.6405
∆ytmt−20 −5.81941e–005 0.00318399 −0.01828 0.9855
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0153699 0.0235962 −0.6514 0.5177
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.0307461 0.0270661 1.136 0.2612
FTSE Vol 1 1.75551e–005 8.49421e–005 0.2067 0.8371
EC1 −0.00107524 0.000670832 −1.603 0.1150
EC2 −0.0510168 0.0306035 −1.667 0.1015
Mean dependent var 0.004298 S.D. dependent var 0.006389
Sum squared resid 0.001097 S.E. of regression 0.004594
R2 0.573205 Adjusted R2 0.482921
ρ̂ −0.114752 Durbin–Watson 2.214886
Equation 4: ∆LIBOR 1m
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 50.8007 19.7966 2.566 0.0132
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.684951 0.493564 −1.388 0.1711
d l gdpdef 1 −4.11303 7.86161 −0.5232 0.6031
d l rgdp 1 19.6295 7.08851 2.769 0.0078
∆LIBORt−1 0.305250 0.117953 2.588 0.0125
∆ytmt−20 −0.125953 0.177294 −0.7104 0.4806
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −2.73661 1.31391 −2.083 0.0422
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 1.01165 1.50712 0.6712 0.5050
FTSE Vol 1 −0.0175007 0.00472982 −3.700 0.0005
EC1 −0.0834168 0.0373538 −2.233 0.0299
EC2 −6.95224 1.70409 −4.080 0.0002
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Mean dependent var −0.086511 S.D. dependent var 0.429329
Sum squared resid 3.402752 S.E. of regression 0.255808
R2 0.706972 Adjusted R2 0.644985
ρ̂ 0.016859 Durbin–Watson 1.921060
Equation 5: ∆ytm 20yrGilt
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 55.6953 14.0784 3.956 0.0002
d lr M4 sec 1 0.672389 0.350999 1.916 0.0609
d l gdpdef 1 −3.66033 5.59079 −0.6547 0.5155
d l rgdp 1 0.362009 5.04101 0.07181 0.9430
∆LIBORt−1 0.0562197 0.0838826 0.6702 0.5057
∆ytmt−20 −0.201613 0.126083 −1.599 0.1159
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −4.33125 0.934386 −4.635 0.0000
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.930537 1.07179 0.8682 0.3893
FTSE Vol 1 −0.00207843 0.00336362 −0.6179 0.5393
EC1 −0.100418 0.0265642 −3.780 0.0004
EC2 −4.84181 1.21187 −3.995 0.0002
Mean dependent var −0.039531 S.D. dependent var 0.231049
Sum squared resid 1.720896 S.E. of regression 0.181918
R2 0.488312 Adjusted R2 0.380070
ρ̂ −0.029872 Durbin–Watson 2.019962
Equation 6: ∆lr LTDebt CG
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 2.07728 2.29891 0.9036 0.3704
d lr M4 sec 1 −0.0160791 0.0573158 −0.2805 0.7802
d l gdpdef 1 1.05164 0.912939 1.152 0.2546
d l rgdp 1 −1.12112 0.823163 −1.362 0.1791
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00435808 0.0136975 −0.3182 0.7516
∆ytmt−20 0.0214891 0.0205885 1.044 0.3014
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.422391 0.152579 2.768 0.0078
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 −0.283451 0.175016 −1.620 0.1114
FTSE Vol 1 −0.00101259 0.000549256 −1.844 0.0709
EC1 −0.00311761 0.00433776 −0.7187 0.4755
EC2 −0.362989 0.197890 −1.834 0.0723
Mean dependent var 0.022390 S.D. dependent var 0.034964
Sum squared resid 0.045887 S.E. of regression 0.029706
R2 0.404174 Adjusted R2 0.278134
ρ̂ 0.000851 Durbin–Watson 1.918937
Equation 7: ∆lr PNFC MFI d
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 2.87737 1.41799 2.029 0.0476
d lr M4 sec 1 0.144408 0.0353528 4.085 0.0002
d l gdpdef 1 −0.491298 0.563109 −0.8725 0.3870
d l rgdp 1 1.71411 0.507734 3.376 0.0014
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00314489 0.00844872 −0.3722 0.7112
∆ytmt−20 0.0144284 0.0126991 1.136 0.2611
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.250243 0.0941120 2.659 0.0104
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 −0.286470 0.107951 −2.654 0.0105
FTSE Vol 1 −0.000381350 0.000338786 −1.126 0.2655
EC1 −0.00607654 0.00267557 −2.271 0.0273
EC2 0.0442925 0.122060 0.3629 0.7182
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Table A.17: Information criteria for lag selection, system B4h
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 748.37955 -18.712961 -
16.969344*
-18.017411




3 885.44908 0.00006 -19.768894 -14.973948 -17.856131
4 934.53258 0.00004 -19.771151 -13.450540 -17.249781
Mean dependent var 0.010924 S.D. dependent var 0.021537
Sum squared resid 0.017458 S.E. of regression 0.018323
R2 0.402556 Adjusted R2 0.276173
ρ̂ 0.118762 Durbin–Watson 1.727330
B4h, VECM system on log real non-core funding measure (lr noncore),
log real GDP, RPI, 1 month LIBOR, 10-year gilt yield, log real
long-term debt outstanding as a liability of central government,
and log real deposits in Monetary Financial Institutions held as as-
sets of UK Private Non-Financial Corporates (lr PNFC MFI deposits)
VAR lag selection for system B4h
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Table A.18: Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for system B4h
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test [p-value] Lmax test [p-value]
0 0.59816 183.49 [0.0000] 69.290 [0.0000]
1 0.45069 114.20 [0.0012] 45.532 [0.0080]
2 0.29573 68.670 [0.0596] 26.646 [0.2926]
3 0.26416 42.024 [0.1586] 23.312 [0.1638]
4 0.16177 18.712 [0.5243] 13.411 [0.4296]
5 0.060417 5.3012 [0.7757] 4.7362 [0.7732]
6 0.0074067 0.56500 [0.4523] 0.56500 [0.4523]
Johansen rank selection for system B4h
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Model B4h
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2000:2–2016:2 (T = 65)
Cointegration rank = 2
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Cointegrating vectors (standard errors in parentheses)




l rgdpt−1 69.4887 504.168
(121.946) (916.268)
LIBOR 1mt−1 8.24134 62.0216
(2.10519) (15.8178)
ytm 10yrGiltt−1 −4.58552 −34.1747
(4.98048) (37.4219)
lr LTDebt CGt−1 −7.91261 −55.9429
(14.4534) (108.598)
lr PNFC MFI depositst−1 −1.79009 −3.65625
(59.6338) (448.070)
Adjustment vectors
lr noncoret−1 1.00000 0.0241100
RPIt−1 40.5493 1.00000
l rgdpt−1 0.00704295 0.000204794
LIBOR 1mt−1 6.11046 0.150818
ytm 10yrGiltt−1 8.58164 0.211116
lr LTDebt CGt−1 0.264533 0.00658900
lr PNFC MFI depositst−1 0.114252 0.00291506
Log-likelihood = 727.646





Equation 1: ∆lr noncore
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −3.24949 0.621753 −5.226 0.0000
d lr noncore 1 −0.200929 0.141201 −1.423 0.1606
∆RPIt−1 0.0145792 0.00556203 2.621 0.0114
d l rgdp 1 −1.70509 0.693611 −2.458 0.0173
∆LIBORt−1 0.0158241 0.0144367 1.096 0.2780
∆ytmt−10 0.00679798 0.0157886 0.4306 0.6685
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.00816026 0.140954 −0.05789 0.9541
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.253435 0.143803 1.762 0.0838
FTSE Vol 1 6.80326e–005 0.000440918 0.1543 0.8780
EC1 0.0775325 0.0214747 3.610 0.0007
EC2 −0.0100962 0.00285163 −3.540 0.0008
Mean dependent var 0.010741 S.D. dependent var 0.033930
Sum squared resid 0.033344 S.E. of regression 0.025083
R2 0.547437 Adjusted R2 0.453509
ρ̂ −0.114476 Durbin–Watson 2.185167
Equation 2: ∆RPI
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −75.7597 12.0207 −6.302 0.0000
d lr noncore 1 −1.24109 2.72991 −0.4546 0.6512
∆RPIt−1 0.481275 0.107534 4.476 0.0000
d l rgdp 1 9.52784 13.4100 0.7105 0.4805
∆LIBORt−1 0.894809 0.279114 3.206 0.0023
∆ytmt−10 −0.672875 0.305250 −2.204 0.0319
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −10.3373 2.72513 −3.793 0.0004
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 6.91777 2.78022 2.488 0.0160
FTSE Vol 1 −0.00236292 0.00852452 −0.2772 0.7827
EC1 3.14389 0.415182 7.572 0.0000
EC2 −0.418756 0.0551322 −7.595 0.0000
Mean dependent var −0.013846 S.D. dependent var 0.809490
Sum squared resid 12.46370 S.E. of regression 0.484937
R2 0.702803 Adjusted R2 0.641121
ρ̂ −0.131058 Durbin–Watson 2.252940
Equation 3: ∆l rgdp
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.0667205 0.117730 0.5667 0.5733
d lr noncore 1 0.0172274 0.0267365 0.6443 0.5221
∆RPIt−1 −0.000286381 0.00105317 −0.2719 0.7867
d l rgdp 1 0.664820 0.131336 5.062 0.0000
∆LIBORt−1 0.000290958 0.00273361 0.1064 0.9156
∆ytmt−10 −0.00148051 0.00298959 −0.4952 0.6225
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0183381 0.0266897 −0.6871 0.4950
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 0.0440186 0.0272292 1.617 0.1119
FTSE Vol 1 −7.29696e–006 8.34883e–005 −0.08740 0.9307
EC1 0.000546057 0.00406625 0.1343 0.8937
EC2 −8.57588e–005 0.000539959 −0.1588 0.8744
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Mean dependent var 0.004343 S.D. dependent var 0.006349
Sum squared resid 0.001196 S.E. of regression 0.004749
R2 0.536631 Adjusted R2 0.440461
ρ̂ −0.095632 Durbin–Watson 2.182800
Equation 4: ∆LIBOR 1m
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −10.8850 6.71295 −1.621 0.1108
d lr noncore 1 −1.86870 1.52452 −1.226 0.2257
∆RPIt−1 0.0807005 0.0600521 1.344 0.1847
d l rgdp 1 16.4795 7.48878 2.201 0.0321
∆LIBORt−1 0.187351 0.155871 1.202 0.2347
∆ytmt−10 −0.0195910 0.170467 −0.1149 0.9089
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −2.08699 1.52185 −1.371 0.1760
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 1.88981 1.55261 1.217 0.2289
FTSE Vol 1 −0.0166650 0.00476051 −3.501 0.0009
EC1 0.473759 0.231858 2.043 0.0460
EC2 −0.0631559 0.0307885 −2.051 0.0452
Mean dependent var −0.083777 S.D. dependent var 0.426532
Sum squared resid 3.886995 S.E. of regression 0.270813
R2 0.666165 Adjusted R2 0.596879
ρ̂ 0.101277 Durbin–Watson 1.790659
Equation 5: ∆ytm 10yrGilt
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −17.2657 6.34052 −2.723 0.0087
d lr noncore 1 −0.593376 1.43994 −0.4121 0.6819
∆RPIt−1 0.0178583 0.0567205 0.3148 0.7541
d l rgdp 1 1.20946 7.07331 0.1710 0.8649
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00196091 0.147223 −0.01332 0.9894
∆ytmt−10 −0.145526 0.161009 −0.9038 0.3702
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −4.82816 1.43742 −3.359 0.0015
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 2.18188 1.46647 1.488 0.1427
FTSE Vol 1 −0.00551641 0.00449640 −1.227 0.2253
EC1 0.665356 0.218995 3.038 0.0037
EC2 −0.0884059 0.0290804 −3.040 0.0037
Mean dependent var −0.063542 S.D. dependent var 0.293037
Sum squared resid 3.467668 S.E. of regression 0.255788
R2 0.369026 Adjusted R2 0.238069
ρ̂ 0.001812 Durbin–Watson 1.976847
Equation 6: ∆lr LTDebt CG
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.289252 0.755719 −0.3828 0.7034
d lr noncore 1 0.0120274 0.171624 0.07008 0.9444
∆RPIt−1 0.00954187 0.00676044 1.411 0.1640
d l rgdp 1 −1.60738 0.843059 −1.907 0.0620
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00784951 0.0175473 −0.4473 0.6565
∆ytmt−10 0.0106554 0.0191905 0.5552 0.5811
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.307141 0.171324 1.793 0.0787
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 −0.298457 0.174787 −1.708 0.0936
FTSE Vol 1 −0.000723212 0.000535921 −1.349 0.1829
EC1 0.0205099 0.0261017 0.7858 0.4355
EC2 −0.00275918 0.00346605 −0.7961 0.4295
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Mean dependent var 0.022221 S.D. dependent var 0.034716
Sum squared resid 0.049261 S.E. of regression 0.030487
R2 0.361353 Adjusted R2 0.228803
ρ̂ −0.053358 Durbin–Watson 2.045446
Equation 7: ∆lr PNFC MFI d
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.0396407 0.516176 0.07680 0.9391
d lr noncore 1 0.284382 0.117224 2.426 0.0187
∆RPIt−1 −0.00800502 0.00461756 −1.734 0.0888
d l rgdp 1 1.51661 0.575832 2.634 0.0110
∆LIBORt−1 0.0161359 0.0119853 1.346 0.1839
∆ytmt−10 −0.00773745 0.0131076 −0.5903 0.5575
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0138027 0.117019 −0.1180 0.9066
d lr PNFC MFI deposits 1 −0.330726 0.119384 −2.770 0.0077
FTSE Vol 1 −9.51081e–006 0.000366048 −0.02598 0.9794
EC1 0.00885824 0.0178282 0.4969 0.6213
EC2 −0.00122070 0.00236741 −0.5156 0.6083
Mean dependent var 0.011780 S.D. dependent var 0.022455
Sum squared resid 0.022982 S.E. of regression 0.020823
R2 0.287827 Adjusted R2 0.140018










Table B.1: Variables for Undifferenced Small panel
lr noncore
lr M4 sec
lr MMI liab total
lr MMI asset total
240
Figure B.1: Scree plot of Undifferenced Small panel
241
Figure B.2: Biplot of Undifferenced Small panel
Biplot
242
Table B.2: Principal Components summary for Undifferenced Small panel
Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Comp.4
Standard
deviation
1.5302416 0.9753368 0.8346909 0.101833102
Proportion
of Variance
0.5854098 0.2378204 0.1741772 0.002592495
Cumulative
Proportion
0.5854098 0.8232303 0.9974075 1.000000000
Importance of components
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Table B.3: Variables for Differenced Small panel
d lr noncore
d lr M4 sec
d lr MMI liab total





Figure B.3: Scree plot of Differenced Small panel
245
Figure B.4: Biplot of Differenced Small panel
Biplot
246
Table B.4: Principal Components summary for Differenced Small panel
Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Comp.4
Standard
deviation
1.232286 1.1988487 0.7484104 0.6957843
Proportion
of Variance
0.379632 0.3593095 0.1400295 0.1210289
Cumulative
Proportion
0.379632 0.7389415 0.8789711 1.0000000
Importance of components
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Table B.5: Variables for Undifferenced Large panel
lr noncore
lr M4 sec
lr MMI liab total
lr MMI asset total
lr MMI PNFC
lr MMI MFI asset
lr MMI OFI asset










Figure B.5: Scree plot of Undifferenced Large panel
249
Figure B.6: Biplot of Undifferenced Large panel
Biplot
250




lr M4 sec 0.41
lr MMI liab total 0.02
lr MMI asset total 0.00
lr MMI PNFC 0.07
lr MMI MFI asset 0.74
lr MMI OFI asset 0.04
lr MMI OFI liab 0.01
lr MMI IPF 0.07
lr MMI CG 0.53
lr MMI LG 0.07
lr MMI HH 0.04






Table B.7: Variables for Differenced Large panel
d lr noncore
d lr M4 sec
d lr MMI liab total
d lr MMI asset total
d lr MMI PNFC
d lr MMI MFI asset
d lr MMI OFI asset
d lr MMI OFI liab
d lr MMI IPF
d lr MMI CG
d lr MMI LG
d lr MMI HH
d lr MMI RoW
Figure B.7: Scree plot of Differenced Large panel
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Table B.8: Principal Components summary for Undifferenced Large panel
Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Comp.4 Comp.5 Comp.6 Comp.7 Comp.8 Comp.9 Comp.10 Comp.11 Comp.12
Standard de-
viation
2.13584 1.60850 1.27410 1.10510 0.91496 0.73084 0.51557 0.43381 0.32314 0.24819 0.09464 0.07727
Proportion of
Variance
0.38015 0.21560 0.13527 0.10177 0.06976 0.04451 0.02215 0.01568 0.00870 0.00513 0.00074 0.00049
Cumulative
Proportion
0.38015 0.59576 0.73104 0.83281 0.90257 0.94708 0.96923 0.98492 0.99362 0.99875 0.99950 1.00000
Biplot
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Figure B.8: Biplot of Differenced Large panel
255
Figure B.9: Time series plot of extracted shadow banking factors
Importance of components
B.2 Time-series plot of Factors
256
Table B.9: Principal Components summary for Differenced Large panel
Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Comp.4 Comp.5 Comp.6 Comp.7 Comp.8 Comp.9 Comp.10 Comp.11 Comp.12
Standard de-
viation
1.63149 1.38494 1.27449 1.11775 1.05363 0.92387 0.85444 0.78938 0.70124 0.65674 0.53873 0.12743
Proportion of
Variance
0.22181 0.15983 0.13536 0.10411 0.09251 0.07112 0.06084 0.05192 0.04097 0.03594 0.02418 0.00135
Cumulative
Proportion
0.22181 0.38165 0.51701 0.62113 0.71364 0.78477 0.84561 0.89753 0.93851 0.97446 0.99864 1.00000
Table B.10: Information criteria for lag selection, group C1 models
lags loglik p(LR) AIC BIC HQC
1 741.11706 -22.037235 -
19.244776*
-20.944951
2 816.73764 0.00000 -22.424588 -17.398161 -20.458476
3 875.90524 0.00004 -22.263508 -15.003114 -19.423569
4 967.64416 0.00000 -23.188139 -13.693777 -19.474372
5 1073.91728 0.00000 -24.597243 -12.868913 -20.009648





B.3.1 C1, Factor-Augmented Vector Error Correction Mod-
els
VAR lag selection for group C1
258
Table B.11: Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for group C1
Rank Eigenvalue Trace test [p-value] Lmax test [p-value]
0 0.61821 187.03 [0.0005] 61.625 [0.0025]
1 0.51867 125.41 [0.0501] 46.796 [0.0391]
2 0.43820 78.610 [0.4143] 36.902 [0.1087]
3 0.22311 41.708 [0.9135] 16.157 [0.9393]
4 0.17210 25.551 [0.8995] 12.087 [0.9184]
5 0.15299 13.463 [0.8681] 10.627 [0.6907]
6 0.040131 2.8365 [0.9665] 2.6213 [0.9587]
7 0.0033557 0.21513 [0.6428] 0.21513 [0.6428]
Johansen rank selection for group C1
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C1a, Factor-Augmented VECM system with two shadow banking
system activity factors, log GDP deflator, log real GDP, 1-month
LIBOR, 20-year gilt yield, log real deposits held by UK Private
Non-Financial Corporates (lr PNFC deposits), log real long-term
debt outstanding as a liability of central government, and FTSE
volatility in short-run equations
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2000:3–2016:2 (T = 64)
Cointegration rank = 1
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Restrictions on beta: b1 = -1













lr PNFC depositst−1 20.5778
(12.1653)
lr LTDebt CGt−1 −28.2994
(5.98395)














lr PNFC depositst−1 0.00141455
(0.00114784)
lr LTDebt CGt−1 0.000741032
(0.00161967)
Log-likelihood = 785.726




Equation 1: ∆SBS Factor1
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 19.1907 25.7995 0.7438 0.4603
d SBS Factor1 1 −0.0629097 0.137212 −0.4585 0.6485
d SBS Factor2 1 −0.0399412 0.0758163 −0.5268 0.6005
d l gdpdef 1 −14.1922 12.7572 −1.112 0.2709
d l rgdp 1 −2.82896 11.7347 −0.2411 0.8104
∆LIBORt−1 0.143102 0.195340 0.7326 0.4670
∆ytmt−20 0.240002 0.280023 0.8571 0.3953
d lr PNFC deposits 1 1.07614 2.56222 0.4200 0.6762
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.190477 2.06105 0.09242 0.9267
FTSE Vol 1 0.00693117 0.00772870 0.8968 0.3739
EC1 0.0173887 0.0234098 0.7428 0.4609
Mean dependent var 0.089722 S.D. dependent var 0.402435
Sum squared resid 9.523594 S.E. of regression 0.423899
R2 0.066600 Adjusted R2 -0.109514
ρ̂ −0.059563 Durbin–Watson 2.091345
Equation 2: ∆SBS Factor2
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 15.1775 52.2585 0.2904 0.7726
d SBS Factor1 1 −0.250320 0.277932 −0.9007 0.3718
d SBS Factor2 1 −0.127386 0.153571 −0.8295 0.4105
d l gdpdef 1 14.2779 25.8405 0.5525 0.5829
d l rgdp 1 27.8160 23.7694 1.170 0.2471
∆LIBORt−1 −0.220656 0.395674 −0.5577 0.5794
∆ytmt−20 −0.0665184 0.567204 −0.1173 0.9071
d lr PNFC deposits 1 4.71506 5.18992 0.9085 0.3677
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.432416 4.17477 0.1036 0.9179
FTSE Vol 1 0.00755645 0.0156549 0.4827 0.6313
EC1 0.0141519 0.0474180 0.2985 0.7665
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Mean dependent var −0.003823 S.D. dependent var 0.828717
Sum squared resid 39.07428 S.E. of regression 0.858633
R2 0.096895 Adjusted R2 -0.073502
ρ̂ −0.127495 Durbin–Watson 2.237635
Equation 3: ∆l gdpdef
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.264708 0.292465 0.9051 0.3695
d SBS Factor1 1 0.00261089 0.00155545 1.679 0.0991
d SBS Factor2 1 0.000195126 0.000859459 0.2270 0.8213
d l gdpdef 1 −0.229493 0.144616 −1.587 0.1185
d l rgdp 1 −0.112579 0.133026 −0.8463 0.4012
∆LIBORt−1 0.00379396 0.00221439 1.713 0.0925
∆ytmt−20 −0.00351940 0.00317436 −1.109 0.2726
d lr PNFC deposits 1 0.0291612 0.0290454 1.004 0.3199
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0285282 0.0233642 −1.221 0.2275
FTSE Vol 1 2.15901e–005 8.76130e–005 0.2464 0.8063
EC1 0.000234749 0.000265375 0.8846 0.3804
Mean dependent var 0.004801 S.D. dependent var 0.004818
Sum squared resid 0.001224 S.E. of regression 0.004805
R2 0.163068 Adjusted R2 0.005157
ρ̂ 0.009062 Durbin–Watson 1.972657
Equation 4: ∆l rgdp
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.681665 0.278139 2.451 0.0176
d SBS Factor1 1 0.000144244 0.00147926 0.09751 0.9227
d SBS Factor2 1 −0.00108571 0.000817360 −1.328 0.1898
d l gdpdef 1 −0.237944 0.137533 −1.730 0.0894
d l rgdp 1 0.696582 0.126510 5.506 0.0000
∆LIBORt−1 0.00106489 0.00210592 0.5057 0.6152
∆ytmt−20 −0.00134955 0.00301887 −0.4470 0.6567
d lr PNFC deposits 1 0.0236879 0.0276227 0.8576 0.3950
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0183880 0.0222197 −0.8276 0.4116
FTSE Vol 1 6.61444e–006 8.33215e–005 0.07938 0.9370
EC1 0.000616720 0.000252376 2.444 0.0179
Mean dependent var 0.004298 S.D. dependent var 0.006389
Sum squared resid 0.001107 S.E. of regression 0.004570
R2 0.569538 Adjusted R2 0.488319
ρ̂ −0.086181 Durbin–Watson 2.144622
Equation 5: ∆LIBOR 1m
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 47.5116 16.1084 2.949 0.0047
d SBS Factor1 1 0.0993907 0.0856711 1.160 0.2512
d SBS Factor2 1 0.0272250 0.0473373 0.5751 0.5676
d l gdpdef 1 −3.33627 7.96519 −0.4189 0.6770
d l rgdp 1 19.6299 7.32679 2.679 0.0098
∆LIBORt−1 0.267879 0.121964 2.196 0.0325
∆ytmt−20 −0.115613 0.174838 −0.6613 0.5113
d lr PNFC deposits 1 1.01487 1.59977 0.6344 0.5286
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −1.62843 1.28685 −1.265 0.2112
FTSE Vol 1 −0.0157766 0.00482555 −3.269 0.0019
EC1 0.0429598 0.0146164 2.939 0.0049
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Mean dependent var −0.086511 S.D. dependent var 0.429329
Sum squared resid 3.712641 S.E. of regression 0.264669
R2 0.680286 Adjusted R2 0.619963
ρ̂ 0.098141 Durbin–Watson 1.790741
Equation 6: ∆ytm 20yrGilt
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 53.0183 10.5753 5.013 0.0000
d SBS Factor1 1 0.0544695 0.0562438 0.9685 0.3372
d SBS Factor2 1 −0.0785162 0.0310774 −2.526 0.0145
d l gdpdef 1 −4.50594 5.22922 −0.8617 0.3927
d l rgdp 1 −1.42035 4.81010 −0.2953 0.7689
∆LIBORt−1 0.0915086 0.0800707 1.143 0.2582
∆ytmt−20 −0.227493 0.114783 −1.982 0.0527
d lr PNFC deposits 1 0.115052 1.05026 0.1095 0.9132
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −4.96596 0.844830 −5.878 0.0000
FTSE Vol 1 0.00121250 0.00316802 0.3827 0.7034
EC1 0.0480830 0.00959577 5.011 0.0000
Mean dependent var −0.039531 S.D. dependent var 0.231049
Sum squared resid 1.600162 S.E. of regression 0.173758
R2 0.524211 Adjusted R2 0.434439
ρ̂ −0.001229 Durbin–Watson 1.980461
Equation 7: ∆lr PNFC depos
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 1.56937 1.26502 1.241 0.2202
d SBS Factor1 1 −0.00340503 0.00672788 −0.5061 0.6149
d SBS Factor2 1 −0.00177348 0.00371747 −0.4771 0.6353
d l gdpdef 1 −0.715632 0.625518 −1.144 0.2577
d l rgdp 1 1.26691 0.575383 2.202 0.0320
∆LIBORt−1 0.00343574 0.00957804 0.3587 0.7212
∆ytmt−20 0.00302072 0.0137303 0.2200 0.8267
d lr PNFC deposits 1 −0.325128 0.125632 −2.588 0.0124
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.0860259 0.101058 0.8512 0.3985
FTSE Vol 1 6.07151e–006 0.000378958 0.01602 0.9873
EC1 0.00141455 0.00114784 1.232 0.2233
Mean dependent var 0.010924 S.D. dependent var 0.021537
Sum squared resid 0.022897 S.E. of regression 0.020785
R2 0.216434 Adjusted R2 0.068591
ρ̂ 0.034652 Durbin–Watson 1.860952
Equation 8: ∆lr LTDebt CG
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.844675 1.78501 0.4732 0.6380
d SBS Factor1 1 0.0173813 0.00949341 1.831 0.0727
d SBS Factor2 1 0.00404649 0.00524555 0.7714 0.4439
d l gdpdef 1 1.40368 0.882640 1.590 0.1177
d l rgdp 1 −1.03705 0.811898 −1.277 0.2071
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00994300 0.0135151 −0.7357 0.4652
∆ytmt−20 0.0277259 0.0193742 1.431 0.1583
d lr PNFC deposits 1 −0.238833 0.177274 −1.347 0.1836
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.528778 0.142599 3.708 0.0005
FTSE Vol 1 −0.000898642 0.000534730 −1.681 0.0987
EC1 0.000741032 0.00161967 0.4575 0.6492
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Mean dependent var 0.022390 S.D. dependent var 0.034964
Sum squared resid 0.045589 S.E. of regression 0.029329
R2 0.408049 Adjusted R2 0.296360
ρ̂ −0.011821 Durbin–Watson 1.969369
C1b,
VECM system, lag order 2
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations 2000:3–2016:2 (T = 64)
Cointegration rank = 2
Case 3: Unrestricted constant
Restrictions on beta: b[1,1] = -1 b[1,2] = 0 b[2,1] = 0 b[2,2] = -1
Cointegrating vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
SBS Factor1t−1 −1.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
SBS Factor2t−1 0.00000 −1.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
l gdpdeft−1 −96.0138 −182.450
(23.8398) (45.7867)
l rgdpt−1 85.4001 168.819
(20.9785) (40.2912)
LIBOR 1mt−1 0.527211 2.36546
(0.225245) (0.432605)
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 4.14853 8.22490
(0.935158) (1.79606)
lr PNFC depositst−1 −20.9717 −34.2103
(7.45139) (14.3111)
lr LTDebt CGt−1 25.0861 43.9557
(3.51255) (6.74618)
Adjustment vectors (standard errors in parentheses)
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SBS Factor1t−1 0.216317 −0.104260
(0.102169) (0.0501020)
SBS Factor2t−1 −0.159179 0.0552550
(0.213450) (0.104672)
l gdpdeft−1 −0.000928238 0.000200954
(0.00119101) (0.000584052)
l rgdpt−1 0.000997914 −0.000908343
(0.00114246) (0.000560242)
LIBOR 1mt−1 −0.0647954 −0.00714021
(0.0644060) (0.0315836)
ytm 20yrGiltt−1 0.0730613 −0.0688378
(0.0433397) (0.0212530)
lr PNFC depositst−1 0.0159102 −0.00777638
(0.00476672) (0.00233751)
lr LTDebt CGt−1 −0.0217623 0.00850515
(0.00658957) (0.00323141)
Log-likelihood = 809.124




Equation 1: ∆SBS Factor1
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −2.98563 27.6524 −0.1080 0.9144
d SBS Factor1 1 0.0175607 0.140594 0.1249 0.9011
d SBS Factor2 1 −0.0723002 0.0761711 −0.9492 0.3470
d l gdpdef 1 −9.68669 12.7252 −0.7612 0.4500
d l rgdp 1 −8.59420 11.8759 −0.7237 0.4726
∆LIBORt−1 0.130688 0.191869 0.6811 0.4989
∆ytmt−20 0.180573 0.276506 0.6531 0.5167
d lr PNFC deposits 1 −0.192738 2.59427 −0.07429 0.9411
d lr LTDebt CG 1 1.09478 2.07335 0.5280 0.5998
FTSE Vol 1 0.00939051 0.00768652 1.222 0.2274
EC1 0.216317 0.102169 2.117 0.0391
EC2 −0.104260 0.0501020 −2.081 0.0425
Mean dependent var 0.089722 S.D. dependent var 0.402435
Sum squared resid 8.832088 S.E. of regression 0.416147
R2 0.134374 Adjusted R2 -0.069303
ρ̂ −0.036888 Durbin–Watson 2.068671
Equation 2: ∆SBS Factor2
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 34.5002 57.7709 0.5972 0.5530
d SBS Factor1 1 −0.320436 0.293726 −1.091 0.2804
d SBS Factor2 1 −0.0991912 0.159135 −0.6233 0.5359
d l gdpdef 1 10.3521 26.5853 0.3894 0.6986
d l rgdp 1 32.8394 24.8109 1.324 0.1915
∆LIBORt−1 −0.209840 0.400849 −0.5235 0.6029
∆ytmt−20 −0.0147364 0.577673 −0.02551 0.9797
d lr PNFC deposits 1 5.82066 5.41991 1.074 0.2879
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.355524 4.33160 −0.08208 0.9349
FTSE Vol 1 0.00541357 0.0160586 0.3371 0.7374
EC1 −0.159179 0.213450 −0.7457 0.4592
EC2 0.0552550 0.104672 0.5279 0.5999
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Mean dependent var −0.003823 S.D. dependent var 0.828717
Sum squared resid 38.54929 S.E. of regression 0.869407
R2 0.109029 Adjusted R2 -0.100611
ρ̂ −0.130457 Durbin–Watson 2.252751
Equation 3: ∆l gdpdef
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.394356 0.322351 1.223 0.2268
d SBS Factor1 1 0.00214044 0.00163894 1.306 0.1974
d SBS Factor2 1 0.000384305 0.000887946 0.4328 0.6670
d l gdpdef 1 −0.255833 0.148341 −1.725 0.0907
d l rgdp 1 −0.0788741 0.138440 −0.5697 0.5714
∆LIBORt−1 0.00386653 0.00223666 1.729 0.0899
∆ytmt−20 −0.00317196 0.00322331 −0.9841 0.3297
d lr PNFC deposits 1 0.0365794 0.0302421 1.210 0.2320
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0338150 0.0241695 −1.399 0.1678
FTSE Vol 1 7.21216e–006 8.96038e–005 0.08049 0.9362
EC1 −0.000928238 0.00119101 −0.7794 0.4394
EC2 0.000200954 0.000584052 0.3441 0.7322
Mean dependent var 0.004801 S.D. dependent var 0.004818
Sum squared resid 0.001200 S.E. of regression 0.004851
R2 0.179231 Adjusted R2 -0.013891
ρ̂ −0.002472 Durbin–Watson 1.995883
Equation 4: ∆l rgdp
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.639170 0.309210 2.067 0.0438
d SBS Factor1 1 0.000298444 0.00157212 0.1898 0.8502
d SBS Factor2 1 −0.00114771 0.000851747 −1.347 0.1838
d l gdpdef 1 −0.229311 0.142294 −1.612 0.1132
d l rgdp 1 0.685535 0.132797 5.162 0.0000
∆LIBORt−1 0.00104110 0.00214548 0.4853 0.6296
∆ytmt−20 −0.00146343 0.00309190 −0.4733 0.6380
d lr PNFC deposits 1 0.0212564 0.0290092 0.7327 0.4671
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −0.0166551 0.0231842 −0.7184 0.4758
FTSE Vol 1 1.13271e–005 8.59510e–005 0.1318 0.8957
EC1 0.000997914 0.00114246 0.8735 0.3865
EC2 −0.000908343 0.000560242 −1.621 0.1111
Mean dependent var 0.004298 S.D. dependent var 0.006389
Sum squared resid 0.001104 S.E. of regression 0.004653
R2 0.570526 Adjusted R2 0.469473
ρ̂ −0.084775 Durbin–Watson 2.138022
Equation 5: ∆LIBOR 1m
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 59.5240 17.4317 3.415 0.0013
d SBS Factor1 1 0.0558018 0.0886282 0.6296 0.5318
d SBS Factor2 1 0.0447532 0.0480171 0.9320 0.3557
d l gdpdef 1 −5.77681 8.02180 −0.7201 0.4747
d l rgdp 1 22.7528 7.48639 3.039 0.0037
∆LIBORt−1 0.274604 0.120951 2.270 0.0274
∆ytmt−20 −0.0834218 0.174306 −0.4786 0.6343
d lr PNFC deposits 1 1.70220 1.63539 1.041 0.3029
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −2.11827 1.30701 −1.621 0.1112
FTSE Vol 1 −0.0171087 0.00484547 −3.531 0.0009
EC1 −0.0647954 0.0644060 −1.006 0.3191
EC2 −0.00714021 0.0315836 −0.2261 0.8220
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Mean dependent var −0.086511 S.D. dependent var 0.429329
Sum squared resid 3.509743 S.E. of regression 0.262333
R2 0.697759 Adjusted R2 0.626643
ρ̂ 0.027278 Durbin–Watson 1.907327
Equation 6: ∆ytm 20yrGilt
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 50.2338 11.7300 4.283 0.0001
d SBS Factor1 1 0.0645736 0.0596392 1.083 0.2840
d SBS Factor2 1 −0.0825793 0.0323114 −2.556 0.0136
d l gdpdef 1 −3.94020 5.39798 −0.7299 0.4688
d l rgdp 1 −2.14426 5.03770 −0.4256 0.6722
∆LIBORt−1 0.0899499 0.0813897 1.105 0.2743
∆ytmt−20 −0.234955 0.117293 −2.003 0.0505
d lr PNFC deposits 1 −0.0442743 1.10048 −0.04023 0.9681
d lr LTDebt CG 1 −4.85242 0.879503 −5.517 0.0000
FTSE Vol 1 0.00152131 0.00326059 0.4666 0.6428
EC1 0.0730613 0.0433397 1.686 0.0979
EC2 −0.0688378 0.0212530 −3.239 0.0021
Mean dependent var −0.039531 S.D. dependent var 0.231049
Sum squared resid 1.589259 S.E. of regression 0.176527
R2 0.527452 Adjusted R2 0.416265
ρ̂ 0.007455 Durbin–Watson 1.971133
Equation 7: ∆lr PNFC depos
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Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.0465887 1.29013 −0.03611 0.9713
d SBS Factor1 1 0.00245872 0.00655942 0.3748 0.7093
d SBS Factor2 1 −0.00413144 0.00355377 −1.163 0.2504
d l gdpdef 1 −0.387322 0.593697 −0.6524 0.5171
d l rgdp 1 0.846808 0.554071 1.528 0.1326
∆LIBORt−1 0.00253117 0.00895165 0.2828 0.7785
∆ytmt−20 −0.00130979 0.0129004 −0.1015 0.9195
d lr PNFC deposits 1 −0.417590 0.121036 −3.450 0.0011
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.151921 0.0967321 1.571 0.1225
FTSE Vol 1 0.000185280 0.000358616 0.5167 0.6076
EC1 0.0159102 0.00476672 3.338 0.0016
EC2 −0.00777638 0.00233751 −3.327 0.0016
Mean dependent var 0.010924 S.D. dependent var 0.021537
Sum squared resid 0.019225 S.E. of regression 0.019415
R2 0.342089 Adjusted R2 0.187287
ρ̂ 0.003884 Durbin–Watson 1.976835
Equation 8: ∆lr LTDebt CG
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 3.35332 1.78348 1.880 0.0658
d SBS Factor1 1 0.00827825 0.00906782 0.9129 0.3656
d SBS Factor2 1 0.00770703 0.00491277 1.569 0.1229
d l gdpdef 1 0.894000 0.820734 1.089 0.2812
d l rgdp 1 −0.384870 0.765955 −0.5025 0.6175
∆LIBORt−1 −0.00853873 0.0123749 −0.6900 0.4933
∆ytmt−20 0.0344487 0.0178337 1.932 0.0590
d lr PNFC deposits 1 −0.0952932 0.167322 −0.5695 0.5715
d lr LTDebt CG 1 0.426481 0.133724 3.189 0.0024
FTSE Vol 1 −0.00117685 0.000495754 −2.374 0.0214
EC1 −0.0217623 0.00658957 −3.303 0.0018
EC2 0.00850515 0.00323141 2.632 0.0112
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Mean dependent var 0.022390 S.D. dependent var 0.034964
Sum squared resid 0.036740 S.E. of regression 0.026840
R2 0.522950 Adjusted R2 0.410702




See online technical appendix at:
https://s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/domsilman-thesis-technical-appendix/BSAMatrix.xlsx
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